

MONUMENTA SREBRENICA

Istraživanja, dokumenti, svjedočanstva

KNJIGA 11

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MONUMENTA SREBRENICA

Research, documents, testimonies

BOOK 11

**SREBRENICA
THROUGH
PAST CENTURIES**

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THE WORD OF THE EDITOR

In last year's Tenth Book of *Monumenta*, we ended the text of the Word of the Editor with the sentence "I hope this is not the last issue of *Monumenta*." The main reason for this thought, which readers certainly did not know, is the lack of financial resources for printing, proofreading and translation into English. Fortunately, we managed, with great efforts, to provide part of the funds for this eleventh issue of *Monumenta*, with the hope that it really will not be the last. The problem of financing *Monumenta* has been present from its first issue until today. This problem raises before the intellectual, political and general Bosniak-Bosnian public the question of the attitude of government institutions towards science and scientific truth, especially about genocide. As each page of the text increases the cost of the magazine, we will avoid, this time, the analysis of all levels of collective awareness among Bosniaks about the importance of science and scientific research, especially the crime of genocide and its consequences, including the prevention of possible future genocides through objective scientific interpretation committed until now, above all, the latter, in the war against Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995. For the sake of the information, the Center for Research of War, War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons of the Republika Srpska, according to the director of the Center Milorad Kojić, will publish the first volume of the Atlas of Mass Crimes against the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in as they say "defense and patriotic war of the Republika Srpska" in this year. This information speaks of how a narrative is being built that will emphasize the perpetrators of genocide and the perpetrators of Bosniaks as criminals by emphasizing Serb military, much less civilian victims of war, and not mentioning Bosniak and other victims who are many times bigger. To be clear, every crime should be recorded and sanctioned, every victim should be recorded, be it Bosniak, Croat or Serb. It is inadmissible to manipulate with facts, which are scientifically and judicially proven, such as e.g. genocide against Bosniaks committed during the "defense and patriotic war of the Republika Srpska" in: Doboj, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, the vicinity of Zvornik and Srebrenica. What are the concentration camps of death Omarska and Manjača and other camps in which criminals in the "defense and patriotic war of the Republika Srpska" imprisoned civilians and exposed them to the most monstrous tortures until death if they are not genocide. Read the book by Rezak Hukanović, *Deseta vrata pakla*, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2019, and you will see that genocide against Bosniaks in the war against the Bosnian society and state in from 1992 to

1995 began in Prijedor and ended in Srebrenica¹, as a paradigm of centuries of genocidal suffering of Bosniaks², from the same “national liberation” and “defense and patriotic” ideological-political and military entities. If we do not investigate and interpret these and other crimes against Bosniaks extremely seriously and scientifically objectively, all with the aim of preventing future genocides, Bosniaks are threatened not only politically, but also biologically. The history of mankind is, among other things, the history of missing peoples. In order for Bosniaks not to disappear, they must be strong, and the first precondition for strength is knowledge. “Knowledge is the greatest possession,” says folk wisdom, and the next warns: “Not to know and not to have are the same things.” In order to get to know the institution of the state, at all levels of government, it is necessary to allocate funds for scientific research. We will realize our modest contribution to the scientific knowledge of the genocide against Bosniaks and other important issues from the past of the Bosnian Podrinje in the eleventh issue of *Monumenta*, which, dear and respected readers, is before you for the eleventh year in a row.

In the eleventh issue of *Monumenta*, we publish only 7 articles, twice less than in the previous issue, for the above reasons. The small number of articles does not diminish the scientific value of the eleventh book because all papers are original scientific papers. We have made an effort to respect the basic established structure of the *Monumenta* this time as well, by publishing 5 papers in the chapter GENOCIDE. Rasim Muratović writes a text about the types of evil in which he explains the types of evil, and the main characteristics of collective evil. In the work *Types of Evil*, Muratović also problematizes the attitude of the criminal towards the victim, his opinion that he has the right to hurt the victim because, according to the criminal, he deserves it. Vedad Gurda, in: *Chronology of Ratko Mladić’s Trial for Srebrenica Genocide and Other Crimes before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, introduces us not only to the chronology of trials but also to the importance of court verdicts in preventing revisionism of the 1992-1995 war against the Bosnian society and state, and “an even more ominous phase of triumphalism.” As an appendix to the paper, Gurda also gives an abbreviated version of the

1 In addition to the final court rulings of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State Court of Germany, it is necessary to read the rare written testimonies of Bosniak survivors of genocide. One of them is a book of Kadir Habibović, *Život protiv smrti*, Dobra knjiga, Sarajevo, 2014.

2 Where are the Bosniaks of Belgrade, Užice, Leskovac, Valjevo, Šabac and other cities in Serbia today, which were “liberated” by some past “liberators” in the past “defense and patriotic wars”.

verdict, which we publish only in the Bosnian language. We did not translate the “abbreviated Verdict” into English due to possible conceptual inaccuracies in the translation, which could create some ambiguities. Adib Đozić in his work: *Anti-rationalism, lies, hatred and genocide against Bosniaks* analyzes the genocidal contents in the national-cultural and national-church programs of the Serbian great state as important causes of genocide, along with national-political programs. *From classification to triumphalism (the last stage of genocide against Bosniaks)* is the topic of the work of Muamer Džananović, who problematizes genocide as a well-designed, organized and planned state crime that is carried out in stages. Džananović emphasizes the denial of genocide through “celebrations of convicted war criminals, triumphalism.” Ermin Kuka and Almir Grabovica in their article: *Srebrenica: a scene of Dante’s hell in Europe at the end of the 20th century*, point to the diversity and monstrosity of torture and killing in the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica. The authors prove that genocidal murders can only be committed by a “perverted mind.” In the chapter: *From the Past of Bosnian Podrinje* is an article of Kemal Nurkić titled *Demographic structure of the population/families in the settlement Gladovići in the middle of the 20th*. Nurkić uses previously unpublished, first-order historical sources, analyzes and interprets the basic demographic structural contents of the Gladovići settlement. In the chapter: *Memory* Faruk Đozić in the paper: *Twenty-four wounds of mothers from the Zukić family: Fata, Zaha, Munira, Kada, Šida, Rasema and Hajra* analyzes the generational suffering of male members of the family of Zukić’s mothers from the village of Karačići, whom three i.e. four generations of male family members were killed in the genocide.

Let us hope, indeed, that this will not be the last issue of “Monumenta”, but on the contrary, the beginning of a new period in which it will continue to develop qualitatively, spreading the scientific truth about genocide as a warning that it will never happen to anyone again.

GENOCIDE

TYPES OF EVIL

Summary: Genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica completes and finishes the barbaric campaign of the two expansionist regimes that made Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia by all available means. One of the main features of collective evil throughout history is that it explains that criminals have the right to hurt their victims: criminals fight for good and against evil in the world, they have morals on their side and they only treat victims the way the victims deserve to be treated. The result is the following: criminals who participate in the commission of mass crimes, who feel pride instead of repentance and have a sense of justice instead of guilt, shame and remorse. Ideologically conceived and executed, evil is interpreted not as evil but as good.

In this regard an analysis of the types of evil will be performed within the elaboration of the selected topic.

Key words: *evil, good, genocide, executor, victim, “we”, “they”, suffering, justice, ideology, human will*

In his rather objective philosophical study *Ondskapens filosofi (Philosophy of Evil)*, the Norwegian philosopher from the University of Bergen, Lars Fr. H. Svendsen speaks of four kinds of evil.¹

Demonic evil is the least widespread form of evil. In many theories, this type of evil is explained as doing evil because that action itself is evil in itself.

Assumptions about this type of evil come, first of all, from the description of the victim, and not from those motives that motivated the executioner to do evil. Therefore, the victim's explanation is not enough to see the executioner's motives. The fact that for the victim it functions as an action/process that can be motivated by pure sadism does not have to have

¹ Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *Ondskapens filosofi (Filozofija zla)*. Universitets Forlaget, Oslo 2002, p. 93.

a particularly strong emotional content for the executioner. The executioner does not even remember all his victims well because he just does his job. However, the victim, in any case, feels the consequences for the rest of his life.

“In most cases, it is a big gap between a big negative value and a small positive value, which carries one procedure for the victim and the executioner. The victim’s loss is almost without exception greater than the executioner’s gain. This is the reason that this conflict tends to escalate and lasts in the eternal accusation of who caused more damage to whom. Both sides in the process are ready to claim that they have suffered more damage than they did to the other side.”²

The documentation on the genocide against Bosniaks contains countless examples of Serb soldiers who claim that killing Bosniaks was a pleasure, interesting and beautiful. A soldier who killed 100 Bosniaks in Srebrenica in just one day says: “I have to admit that it was the happiest day of my life.”³ Another artillery soldier who targeted civilians in Sarajevo during the siege states: „Killing a mass while waiting in line for water or bread is very interesting.”⁴ Most of these soldiers after the war continued to live almost the same life as before the war - a normal life. So, these people have limited these horrors to time and space, although there are those who continue to commit these acts even after the war. The point of the crimes committed against Bosniaks was to commit as much torture and suffering as possible, for which there was justification in „centuries of hatred”. This kind of violence, as well as the attempt to justify it, seems incomprehensible, like pure madness. Draža Mihailović in 1942 and Radovan Karadžić in 1992 called this hatred infernal, unbridled, hellish. In this way, the executioners try to find a justification for their personal guilt, their demonic evil, an evil that they think is able to find a justification for their personal guilt.

Are there people who want evil for evil’s sake? We understand the joy of people after the good has been done, but we have seen that there are also people who feel joy and satisfaction after the evil has been done. How to understand it? To do evil just because it is evil is a central theme in most literature on evil, but to which there is still no real answer. During this time, this kind of evil became the main theme of horror movies, with no clear beginning and end.

2 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 95.

3 Cited according to *Bergens Tidende*. Bergen, Norveška, 26 July 1999, p.16.

4 Cited according to *Bergens Tidende*. Bergen, Norveška, 26 July 1999, p.16.

The assumption that ordinary people commit a crime because it is evil is something that is not only found in crime novels, horror films and speculative metaphysics, but is defined by the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer as selfish pleasure in suffering of others - then suffering exists as a goal in itself.

Can we then claim that this is sadism - a kind of evil where evil is not only an injury to the other but also joy and a sense of satisfaction for having the ability to inflict pain and suffering on the other?

In the mentioned study, *Ondskapens filosofi*, Lars Svendsen, asks: “Do we perform actions that we know are evil without having any other reason to perform them? If this is true, does it mean that we are irrational in some cases? An irrational actor wants to have a reason to act, but he does not want to have a reason to assume one worse alternative over a better one. In a person who does evil just because it is evil, there must be some mechanism that overrides rational choice. This may be about aesthetics or pathology or a combination of the two. An actor may have a reason to do evil even though he knows it is evil, but this reason is not moral. It can be something that for that action gives the actor a desire to do so. Romantics or possibly post-romantics can find beauty in evil, and violence can be portrayed as beauty,”⁵ says Lars Svendsen. He quotes an American soldier who speaks of the „beauty of war” in Vietnam: „It was once I stood on the edge of my humanity, staring at one reasonlessness loving what I was watching. I personally surrendered myself to an aesthetic that was separate from that decisive empathic quality that teaches us to follow the sufferings of others. I saw one beauty. War is not only a spirit of fright and horror, it is also an event of great and seductive love.”⁶

Through the aestheticization of evil, such as the portrayal of war through film, even the fiercest events can be portrayed as beautiful. Thus, war can be portrayed as a desired game in which those wounded and killed can be portrayed as comic figures. To make war unreal means to trivialize and obscure the crime and suffering of those who suffer because of it. Violence can even be shown to be attractive, after all. It is just a matter of aesthetic taste as we will understand it all.

The extermination of Jews was understood by many theorists as a work of art of modern times. In the genocide against Bosniaks, we had a case where that evil became good or compensation for the good. According to many, it was an aesthetic good. If the reason is aesthetic, then we do not have

5 Ibid., p. 134.

6 Ibid., p. 134.

a big problem to explain. It is about expecting these actions to contribute to aesthetic comfort.⁷

Within the framework of demonic evil, it is necessary to recall the basic settings of sadism, classic sadism that enjoys someone else's suffering? The most horrible sufferings that people can inflict on people are situations when the executioner turns the victim into a thing, when the victim is so objectified that the I-YOU relationship is blurred. Lars Svendsen talks about the so-called Hegelian model of sadism, which is the easiest to understand. „It is a situation when a sadist wants to be recognized as a subject. The sadist wants to have power. The scream of the victim for the sadist is nothing but a sign that he/ the executioner has power over the victim and the scream confirms that the relationship between the executioner and the victim is authentic. Doing evil and inflicting pain is not a goal for a sadist, but it is a means of domination and recognition. In that relation of inflicting pain, there is, in fact, a struggle for life and death. The fight ends with the executioner killing the victim, and sometimes, though very rarely, the victim kills the executioner so that death occurs at the same time. But if both actors are killed, or just one, then mutual recognition cannot happen. The one or those killed cannot admit what is left in life, so recognition lacks. In this way, sadism/enjoyment of another's suffering contains the basis for personal defeat, and hatred, which occurs as a side effect, leads to self-destruction. People are recognized as real people only when they are recognized by others and when they recognize others.”⁸

Lars Svendsen refers to Colin McGinn who interprets sadism, that is, a sadist as someone who suffers from existential envy. “His sense of his own life is a feeling of less value in relation to the lives of others, and *that is why the sadist is working on a project to reduce the life quality of the other so that the life quality of the other is less valuable than his own*. This is one hypothesis that allows sadists to succeed in their intentions. But the problem with existential envy is what about sadists who feel more valuable than others, than their victim. In such situations, the sadist thinks that the others/his victims have no value and that is why he/the executioner thinks that he/the executioner can do what he wants with those others/his victims. If this hypothesis with existential envy is true, then we come to the answer why

7 In leaflets issued to Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from September 1991 to April 1992, Serbs were promised the best apartments, houses with backyards, managerial jobs of their choice and golden spoons that they would use to eat after the „Turkish gold” was stolen.

8 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., 2002. *Ondskapens filosofi (Filozofija zla)*. Universitets Forlaget, Oslo 2002, p. 135.

the sadist/executioner wants to meet new people unstopably, new victims to whom he will feel existential envy because of their better quality of life, or wants to kill them.”⁹ Is that the kind of infernal envy and unbridled hatred that Dragoljub Draža Mihailović and Radovan Karadžić also talked about?

Larsen concludes his studies on sadism with an interesting hypothesis about compassion as a feeling that can be transmitted to another so that others feel the suffering of the sufferer. “It is a process where sufferers want to show they suffer. Wretches can express their suffering in several ways: symbolically, in words or images, or quite concretely, by inflicting suffering on others. Then, in the notion of a criminal/executioner, a crime is not considered a crime, but only as an attempt of hopeless communication.”¹⁰

What about the pleasure of doing evil, Larsen asks and calls for the help of a classic? “Plato (*IIAÉTOWN*) describes as malicious those who feel pleasure in doing evil to others. Pleasure in doing evil can be characterized as passive evil. Schopenhauer describes the feeling of satisfaction in doing evil as the absolutely worst trait of human nature and the most devilish of all pleasures. Immanuel Kant largely condemns the feeling of satisfaction in doing evil because it is contrary to the love we must feel. It is something inhuman and devilish.”¹¹

According to Lars Svendsen, satisfaction in doing evil can have two reasons: “general satisfaction with the suffering of another or satisfaction with the fulfillment of justice. The general satisfaction stems from the fact that all people have sadistic dispositions. The satisfaction that justice is being done is related to justice, which is understood here as fiction.”¹²

Instrumental/radical evil is an evil in which executioners do evil knowing that what they do is evil, but they do it to achieve something else, which they consider to be good.¹³ Instrumental/radical evil is exclusively about the means, not the goal, although the instrumental action does not find satisfaction in the process as much as in the goal to be achieved.

9 Ibid, p. 136.

10 Ibid, p. 137.

11 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *Ondskapens filosofi (Filozofija zla)*. Universitets Forlaget, Oslo 2002, p. 138.

12 Ibid, p. 139.

13 In 1991, the President of the Presidency of SFRY, Borisav Jović stated: ”Serbia is ready to sacrifice one million Serbs to save Yugoslavia”. „*Oslobođenje*”, 29 September, 1991, p. 4.

“Genocide is a radical evil. Evil becomes radical whenever it goes beyond the very purpose of destroying individual victims and when, in addition, it aims to mutilate and destroy a world that can react in some way.”¹⁴ To explain the instrumental/radical type of evil, Svendsen calls on Kant’s theory of radical evil in human nature. As it has been said, in instrumental evil the executioner is aware that what he does is evil, but the goal and other consideration is placed higher above it. Kant says „that in these cases personal love is placed above the moral law.”¹⁵

Kant’s answer to the question of why we do what we did not have to do is “that we have suppressed the moral law, a law given by reason that is morally obligatory for people and as such was underestimated by our desire for adaptation and happiness. This is not so dangerous until morality begins to be pushed aside and evil begins to take its place. Instrumental/radical evil, however, does not mean completely pushing moral laws aside, because it recognizes moral law, but for others, and at the same time means making an exception for oneself. It is, in fact, putting personal desire above the universal.”¹⁶

Instrumental/radical evil is not extravagant evil as it may be in cases of demonic evil. It is a kind of everyday evil. It is the evil that lies at the root of all evil. Instrumental/radical/everyday evil is not associated with sadistic actions. The radicalism of this evil speaks of the depth and moral corruption in which personal love is assumed by all other considerations. Personal love grows in proportion to the moral degeneration of actors, where the most morally degenerate interpret their crimes not as their own guilt, but as their own personal love. There are no limits to the consequences that instrumental/radical/everyday evil can produce.

“The root of this kind of evil lies in free human will. Without free will, no one can be accused. Evil always exists as a possibility, and whether it will be realized depends on the free human will. All evils, according to Kant, originate from people and every man has a personal responsibility to do good or evil. Whether a person does good or evil is a choice of his free will, but which is still related to the tendency of a certain person to perform a certain type of activity. Evil has its origins in free human choice. We create our own inclination for evil, but we are also naturally evil,”¹⁷ says Kant. Is then the

14 Keith Doubt, *Sociologija poslije Bosne*, Baybook, Sarajevo 2003, p. 33.

15 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p.140

16 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 141.

17 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 92.

assumption of free human choice and propensity for evil paradoxical or can we talk here about the principle of either - or. Following Kant, the good is obligatory because the moral law cannot be rejected. But even that evil is a contingent and a trait in people because all people have a tendency to adapt to deviations from the moral law. The existence of evil, in Kant's sense of the word, cannot be proven empirically, he does not try to do that at all. Our actions, however, are conditioned by motives and the end of that process can never be predicted with certainty. These motives are always partially unknown to the one who participates in a certain action or activity, which certainly cannot be an excuse for doing evil.

Instrumental/radical/everyday evil is paradoxical because of the origin of the choice that must be assumed. It is a choice that assumes oneself personally. As an accompaniment to this, a man may be responsible or irresponsible for his personal evil. Kant is not able, although so close, to give proof of how the choice between good and evil is possible. But, if we cannot take responsibility for ourselves because we are naturally evil, we can work to improve ourselves personally. If we have so much power at all to put good over evil? Is this possibility closed because that instrumental/radical/everyday evil corrupts? ***However, Kant thinks that "people have the ability to defeat evil and that it is our obligation that does not require us to do something that we cannot do." According to Kant, the victory of good over evil presupposes a revolution in the basics of human behavior, but this revolution is impossible without God's help.***¹⁸

The main objection of many Western theorists to Kant's theory of evil is that he did not give a rational explanation of why one person is responsible for choosing something that is fundamentally evil and how that choice is even possible. It is not so unimportant that his theory, according to them, does not contain a rational explanation of how the basis of evil can be defeated/overcome, or how people can be corrected.

Idealistic evil is characterized by the fact that the actors do evil, believing that in fact they do good. ***Evil enjoys best when there is an ideal in front of it.*** The Nazis were driven by the idea and ambition of forming a better and more just society, and members of the SS division considered themselves the moral elite. Serbian nationalists were driven by the idea of "Greater Serbia" and the revenge of Kosovo, and in that idea, Serbs considered themselves to be a heavenly and chosen people. The fact that personal ideals are perverted in this process does not make the actors less idealistic. For idealists, as opposed

18 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 95.

to those bearers of instrumental/radical/everyday evil, there is something that is not morally permissible, but for them it is a moral obligation to hurt others in the service of good, good in their view. Idealists may admit some of their actions are wrong and even apologize, but those actions are always in front of their higher good. The bearers of idealistic evil often present themselves as advocates of true good and they think all the time that they do good.

People are vulnerable. They may see evil in that or in those who have hurt them, made them sick, or prevented them from enjoying themselves. It has been proven that such people are burdened with hatred and evil even when they are not exposed to all of the above. Their life becomes a meditation on evil. Their life becomes a myth. It is the result of a great human tragedy in human existence. It is the fetishization of evil. In order to eliminate their imaginary threat, they try to reduce and control certain places and geographical areas, and certain groups, peoples, religious groups. To that end, they make fantasies about evil by destroying themselves and others. In such cases, human aggression is produced and reproduced from a personal idea of a certain mythological and paranoid phenomenon. In this process, there are two central representations, good and evil, which very often correlate with the separation into the relation “WE” and “THEY”. Thus, according to that, the devils are eternal and always the others, never We or I, personally. In this way, the world is structured in which different conceptual pairs are defined: Christians/Muslims; Semites/Aryans; blacks/whites; WE and THEY.

Which pair will be used varies depending on the historical, geographical, social and political context. In principle, there is nothing wrong with forming such conceptual pairs. The problem, however, is that these conceptual pairs are readily understood as asymmetric and as such form the basis for different processing that can very rarely be overcome by discussion alone.

Humans are “political animals,” and as such end up in certain groups, according to animal preference. It is, one might say, a human need. But, the group is also a danger since the group has no conscience. Belonging to a group and the absence of individual opinion are in the alliance. If they are intolerant, groups are unable, or simply unwilling, to consider themselves a set of individuals. A man must be an individual in order for others to be recognized as individuals. Personal depersonalization leads to depersonalization of others. When the others have depersonalized themselves then they are no longer human but monsters, weeds to be cleaned, dirt, Jews, Bosniaks, “Balijs”, “jihad warriors”, “fundamentalists”, Muslims, enemies. If we do not see the similarity between us and those others and if we think that all evil comes

from those others and not from ourselves, then we are destined to resemble those others. By denying that we recognize the similarity with those others, we reinforce that similarity in that way. The more we think we are different the more similar we are to those we want to be different from. And the more we think we are the same with those others the more different we are from them.

Although violence is mainly group-related, there are still individuals prone to violence. Usually, a weak personality or lack of personal respect is associated with violence and aggression. But there is no definite connection between low personal respect and violent expression. Typical executioners usually do not feel a lower value of themselves, on the contrary, they are usually confident in themselves and have a strong but still unstable image of themselves. If someone appears as a threat to that image then they perceive it as humiliation and their aggression can be described as unprovoked. The question is why does this happen? There is still no real answer to this question. Meanwhile, many interpretations are emerging that justify evil and crime more than they explain it. There are always countless reasons for one person to be physically assaulted. Personal control keeps us out of it. This is about losing that personal control. Usually this is interpreted that a man loses control when he is exposed to some injustice. So it turns out that the executioners and their crimes do not create chaos but order on earth. According to that, violence and crime turn out to be attempts to create order in chaos, to create a kind of balance.

Violence is not understood as a result of unproven motives, internal conflicts, sudden breakdown of feelings, disrespect for moral norms, but rather as a result of a proven constructed action strategy formed by executioners interpreting the situation in which they find themselves, a situation in which they must commit a crime. Violence and crime are therefore not something that comes suddenly, something that surprises the executioner himself, but it is more violence and crime accompanied by the executioner's decision.

According to Lars Svendsen, there are four types of explanations that tell us what leads people to violence and crime:¹⁹

1. Frustration-defensive explanation, according to which a person sees violence and crime as the only alternative that can prevent the victim from harming oneself and/or others;

19 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 99.

2. A frustrating reasoning where the executioner explains that the victim with his actions forced the executioner to commit a crime which he did not in fact intend to commit;
3. Malicious explanation according to which the executioner explains the victim's inclination towards the crime so that the executioner prevents the victim from committing the crime – by committing a crime;
4. Frustration-malicious explanation is a combination of frustrating and malicious explanation.

These types of explanations lead more to the perception of the executioner as something good, and the victim is understood as evil. Evil almost never exists in the executioner's eyes. Thus, at the trial in The Hague, Milošević says about the genocide of more than 8,000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica: "It was, in fact, a conspiracy against Serbs." ... "Everything that I am charged with about Bosnia and Herzegovina is a pure lie." So, it is neither small nor large lie. It is neither this, nor that. It is a "pure lie." And that, by the logic of Milošević's "pure lie", means that there was nothing that was the only thing: no expulsion, no killing, no rape, no robbery, no kidnapping, no demolition, no burning, no mass graves, no genocide. Not even a war. It is all just a "pure lie".

Instead of the truth about genocide, the ideological rhetoric of national heroism is on the scene. Instead of remorse, the pleasure of the induced self-love of the "heavenly people" enters the scene. It is the pleasure of the nation's enjoyment of official fabrications and the notorious distortion of the hard facts of a bloody, strategically planned past. War criminals Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić and others, instead of national shame, become national heroes. It all comes down to the concept of consciously projected deception of the domestic and world public. The executioner always has good motives for evil as he explains the victim himself as evil. The victim's explanation of the crime, which is considered tendentious, does not help. The victim's explanations are considered as explanations of actions that should be forgotten or suppressed in order to continue living, at the very least, as if nothing had happened.

Stupid evil is characterized by the fact that the actors of this evil do not think about whether what they are doing is good or evil. Stupid evil is thus different from that idealistic type of evil where actors think of good and evil but think wrongly.

Stupid evil is also different from instrumental/radical/everyday evil in which those who do evil know what evil is, but still do evil because they want to achieve good for themselves. This is the form of evil that Hannah Arendt speaks of when she mentions banal evil. The problem with Eichmann was precisely that there were many like him, neither perverted nor sadistically oriented. They were horribly and frighteningly normal. That normalcy of theirs was more frightening than all the horrible crimes they had committed. That normalcy seemed to make it impossible for them to realize that they were doing something abnormal?

The problem with Eichmann is that he did not have the demonic traits that a man expected in a person who has been proven guilty of such a heinous crime as the Holocaust. He did not have those inner predispositions of the criminal either. Arendt used the term banality of evil to understand persons without their own personality. This term, it is true, is not used as a contribution to the theoretical study of the nature of evil, but this does not mean that this term cannot be used in a better understanding of evil. Arendt does not think, either, that this is the only form of evil, but one of the forms that is especially manifested in modern society. To get a picture of the interpretation of stupid evil, we will use, in addition to Eichmann and his trial in Jerusalem and the studies carried out on Rudolf Hess, and Franz Stangl, a commander of Treblinka. They were completely different people in their psychological characteristics, but they worked in exactly the same way during the extermination of the Jews.

Psychiatrists concluded that Eichmann was completely normal. He did not have any sadistic instincts, he did not even have hatred towards Jews. He stated that he personally would never have been able to kill, and if he had been appointed commander of the concentration camp, he would have committed suicide. Paradoxical enough was his regret for the consequences that the German soldiers had for their attitude towards the Jews, at the same time not complaining about the consequences that the Jews had from the whole process. He does not even think that the extermination of Jews is something ugly, although the methods used, according to him, were inappropriate, but only because they left consequences on German soldiers. He repeated several times that he had nothing to do with the murders, but only with the transport. It remained unclear how he saw his responsibility in all of this and whether he saw it at all. The truth is, he claims in one place, that there is his legal responsibility but not moral. He was just carrying out orders. In choosing to carry out or not to carry out such orders, he chose to carry out the order as the “only alternative”. Purely bureaucratic, in Max Weber’s sense, without entering the personal. In this way an illusion was created where his personal

morale was out of the question. Loyalty presupposed not asking questions. Führer's order had moral and legal force.

In his closing speech in court, Eichmann claimed that he was no monster, on the contrary, he considered himself a victim. He really was not a monster because psychiatrists did not find any sadistic urges in his personality structure that enjoyed other people's torments. But it remained unclear how he was to be considered a victim. Insofar, as his central role in transporting Jews to concentration camps was proven in both the police interrogation and the trial. True, his direct involvement in the killings has not been proven. Because of that, he personally considered himself wrongly accused of events that took place far from him and in which he did not directly participate.

When Eichmann describes himself as an idealist, then he is absolutely right. He was an idealist and a thoughtless person. The unquestioning execution of the Führer's orders is idealism, but the lack of reflection on how much of a crime it is to destroy a nation was pure non-thinking. "I was just carrying out orders without thinking and I had no sense of guilt,"²⁰ Eichmann said. This is a known excuse for getting rid of all guilt. Rather, it would have been the fact that he knew what he was doing, but he subjugated the extermination of the Jews to sacrifice his individuality, personal career, and loyalty to the Führer. Eichmann was above all an idealist, a fanatic and a careerist.

We find a similar idealism in Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy. He describes himself as a fanatical National Socialist, and also declared himself an anti-Semite. He says that the mass extermination of Jews was madness, but not because of the evil done to them and the immorality that led the Nazis to it, but because it cost Germany the planned domination of the world. In his personal biography, which he wrote in prison after the war, many common features can be noticed with Eichmann, although he was true to be less intelligent than Eichmann. He did not have the characteristics of a demon either. He distinguishes between himself and SS soldiers who, according to him, enjoyed the torture of prisoners. He personally describes these soldiers as evil, but he overlooks and does not admit his personal crime. He boasted that he never hit a single prisoner with his hand, nor did he kill anyone with his personal weapon. He "only" received and issued orders, and complained about the lack of resources, the lack of qualified personnel in the camp for the efficient functioning of the camp, like any ordinary bureaucrat. There is no talk of morality. As with Eichmann and Hess, we have concerns about the consequences for German soldiers. That is why he preferred the gas chambers,

²⁰ Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 102.

which are his invention, over direct shootings, avoiding direct contact between the executioner and the victim. For him, the mass extermination of Jews was the execution of an order he did not think about. It was a monstrous order, but it had to be carried out. After being sentenced to life in prison, he said: "I do not regret anything." His deeds and actions were a glaring example of a kind of banal/stupid evil in its extreme variant.

When you come to Franz Stangl, the commander of Treblinka, then you come to a person who has his own personality. While Hess is a typical commander without personal opinion, and Eichmann a bureaucrat without thinking, Stangl proved to be a good speaker, a *causeur* and a charmer. What is paradoxical about him is his guilt. As an intelligent person he felt guilty, but he had a clear conscience? Stangl was not anti-Semitic, but he had great contempt for prisoners. Contempt did not concern race but their weakness. "These prisoners were so weak that no common ground for communication could be found."²¹ In this way, contempt for prisoners/victims is real.

In the end, it should be said that all three of them were people from their careers, true Stangl less than the two first mentioned. All three trusted Hitler extremely, true Stangl somewhat less. All three were ordinary people carrying extreme crime. They are a confirmation that horrible crimes can be committed by quite ordinary people who focus on solving a practical task without these people having sadistic motives in them. These kind of people are therefore capable of committing horrible crimes. When they are pressured to look back and see what they have done, they do not admit it at first. Mostly they say: I never did that. When they are pressured by evidence and witnesses then they start to hesitate by saying, "I'm not that guy, I could not do that." They then really try to find some trace of crime in themselves, but they fail.

The philosophy and phenomenology of evil, and especially sociology, are waiting for similar research, which Karadžić, Mladić, Krstić and others will agree to in the search for a crime in themselves.

The evil of the Holocaust against the Jews and the genocide against the Bosniaks are two images of the same fascism in the bloody mirror of ideological pogrom and state-organized evil, with which politics, science and philosophy are still unable (or unwilling) to radically reckon with human meaning and a life-promising way.

One may be surprised at how untouched these people are by the crimes they have committed. The life they later live is not burdened by their crimes.

21 Svendsen, Lars Fr. H., *ibid*, p. 105.

They generally do not feel guilty and do not repent for the crimes they have committed. The crimes they committed do not live in them. If they are brought to court they do not feel guilty. On the contrary, they are considered victims and do not sympathize with the actual victims. For thirty years, instead of the Serbian confrontation with the past, Bosnia has been suffocating in the stench of that sameness; ethno-crimes, blood, genocide and ideologically conceived lies.

Conclusion

What is characteristic of all four types of evil mentioned is the lack of consideration for different values in other people. It can be very difficult to decide what kind of evil a particular actor and learned evil belongs to. One actor can be placed in several categories (for example, a situation when the idealistic motive is supported by sadistic joy when doing harm to others). One idealist becomes a very easy fanatic, which means that he does not take responsibility for himself to think about a specific situation. In this way, idealistic evil overflows into stupid evil. One problem with instrumental/radical/everyday evil is that it can be just a basket for collecting all the mentioned types of evil.

It must be emphasized here that evil is not so much tied to sadists and fanatics, but to ordinary everyday people. And most participants in the genocide must therefore be described as ordinary people. That is why it is common to claim that we all have evil in us and that we are all capable of doing evil, it is just a question of what conditions must be met in order for people to do evil. The question that must be asked is: what is it that makes us do it?

The analysis of the persons who were members of the infamous Nazi 101st Police Battalion, showed that none of them had sadistic predispositions. However, most of the members were careerists, idealists and conformists. It is the kind of people who may not enjoy someone else's evil, because then they would be sadists, that is, people who can place themselves on the border of the normal. These are people who have a false sense that they are good when other people are suffering. The greater and more extensive these sufferings, the more they will enjoy a reputation with their commanders and advance in their careers, and the set ideals will be realized faster, they think.

In crisis situations, this is even more pronounced. People are then more burdened with hedonistic balance and career than the inner peace that comes as a result of daily moral action towards themselves, towards others

and especially towards God. Has the problem of evil, as an integral part of human action, become so complicated precisely because it is trying to separate itself from faith? As such evil is then fetishized and given the supernatural power that only divine beings have. Thus we come to the perversion of the basic thesis of the notion of evil where evil is attributed to God and not to men.

Evil is primarily a moral category that comes from people. But evil is, above all, a practical problem. Is it therefore more important to prevent and limit evil, that is, to do good, than to explain how it arises? The problem of evil is also complicated by the false dilemma expressed in the attempt to localize evil in theology or natural science, philosophy or the field of morality and politics. Until this false dilemma is resolved, man must act in accordance with his own responsibility to himself and to others. Anthropologists say that all people, in choosing good and evil, are capable of committing a crime. It is a free human choice conditioned by God's will. This, however, requires human activity in the form of opinion. Opinion contains within itself an unseen greatness contained in consciousness and conscience and a return to its starting point and origin. That, after all, should distinguish a man from an animal. In order to achieve that, man must use the ability to understand, because the goal of thinking is not the production of abstract knowledge, but understanding, among other things, what is good and what is evil. To understand means to think personally, to place oneself in the situation of others in one's opinion, to always think consistently, and which can only come as a combination of the first and the second.

Executioners think less personally and autonomously, and think more about how they will fulfill an order, how the commander will like them and thus advance in their career, how they will achieve ideals based on the non-existence of the other. They do not think about the position of the other. Executioners stand in the way of predestined human destiny by interrupting the human code and the predestined number of steps assigned to each man. That is why there is the executioner's guilt, his responsibility both to God and to people. They are guilty because they chose the crime themselves. Will that crime and their guilt remain eternal depends on whether their feeling of guilt will ever work, will they confess their crime, will they repent, will they apologize to the victim, will they ever stop doing it?

There are three possible reactions to realizing that a person has done something evil: why I did not think/understand while doing it; why I did not give up when I/if I saw that it was evil; what kind of man am I when I could do that? These reactions are one of the first steps to self-recognition. Their disgust

with themselves would show that they, in spite of everything, belong to us. The acknowledgment of personal corruption shows, in spite of everything, that man has retained something of his personal humanity, that man is not a complete moral stranger in himself. This does not mean that the executioners do not deserve punishment then. If the executioners go unpunished, it means that the crime did not even happen, despite the facts that say that it happened at a specific historical moment in which all the executioners could have acted differently, if only they had wanted to. That is what is decisive.

In the end, it must be emphasized that evil is more of a practical than a theoretical problem. Trying to prevent evil as a practical action is more important than finding a theory that explains how that evil came into the world. This is not simply because it is easier to do evil than good, because we live in a time when good people delay doing good, and ordinary people somehow have more inclination to do evil and find it more attractive to obey the devil than to accept and follow God's words and instructions. In everyday life, the decisive factor is what we choose between the two.

“Judging by the evil that the grandchildren of homo sapiens committed in the twentieth century, we have nothing to hope for after the year 2000. Judging by the hope that faith in God teaches us, even after the year 2000, there will be many people who will die a natural death.”²²

²² Karić, Enes, *Eseji od Bosne - tri bosanske enklave* -, Sejtarija, Sarajevo, 1999, p. 167.

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**CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRIAL OF RATKO MLADIĆ FOR
GENOCIDE IN SREBRENICA AND OTHER CRIMES BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA**

Summary

Ratko Mladić, the former Commander of the Headquarters of the Republika Srpska Army, was convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for participating in a) crimes of genocide against the Muslim (Bosniak) population in Srebrenica in July 1995, b) certain crimes against humanity (persecution, murders, extermination, deportation and forcible transfer) carried out against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the following municipalities: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Foča, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Novi Grad, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac and Vlasenica, and Sarajevo (murder as a form of this crime), and c) certain acts (terrorism and illegal attacks on civilians) committed as part of the sniping and shelling campaign in Sarajevo, as well as hostage-taking (members of the UN peacekeeping force), and which constitute alternative acts of committing (forms) of crimes of violation of the laws and customs of war.

The ICTY's competent judicial councils have founded Ratko Mladić's criminal responsibility for his participation and significant contribution to the realization of the four Joint Criminal Ventures (JCEs), whose creators and participants were representatives of Bosnian Serbs, who used positions of the highest-ranking political and military authority and encouraged members of the Republika Srpska Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska, and in some cases members of some of paramilitary formations, Territorial Defense and regional and municipal authorities of the Republika Srpska to commit systematic apocalyptic crimes against the population of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Bosnian Croats during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period from 1992 to 1995.

Because of all of the above, Ratko Mladić was sentenced to life imprisonment. This sentence brought some satisfaction to the victims of the mentioned crimes, but unfortunately a significant part of the public in the

Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity Republika Srpska, as well as in neighboring Serbia, considers the verdict unjust, as well as the entire legal legacy of the ICTY, perceiving it as “part of a global conspiracy against the Serbs”. Furthermore, during the last decade in the public space of the Republika Srpska and neighboring Serbia, planned campaigns and monstrous narratives of denying the nature and scale of the mentioned crimes, especially the genocide in Srebrenica, have been observed by the intellectual and political elites, but also by the common people. In certain cases, this denial of crime turns into an even more ominous phase of triumphalism, which is reflected in the glorification of Ratko Mladić, as well as other convicted criminals, and the glorification of their criminal heritage, while at the same time humiliating the victims.

One of the more credible ways of debunking that orchestrated revisionism and denialism is to confront with the same path the formal judicial truth contained in final judicial decisions of independent and impartial courts, such as (was) the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established by the United Nations. In the text that follows, the chronology of Ratko Mladić’s trial before this court is given, as well as the most significant conclusions of the ICTY Trial Chamber about his criminal activities during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1992 to 1995, which were legally confirmed by the Appellate Council.

Key words: *genocide in Srebrenica, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war, joint criminal enterprise, ICTY*

Introduction

Ratko Mladić is a former officer of the Yugoslav People’s Army (hereinafter: YPA) and a Commander of the Headquarters of the Republika Srpska Army. Prior to taking up his latter post in June 1991, during the war in the Republic of Croatia, he served as the Chief of Staff, and then as the commander of YPA Knin Corps. For certain war crimes committed in the area of Sinj and Šibenik, he was found guilty of war crimes against civilians together with six other co-accused (in absentia) by the Šibenik District Court on 8 July 1992 and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In addition, the competent prosecutor’s offices in the Republic of Croatia conducted other investigations against him for crimes committed by the members of the YPA under his command in the neighbouring state, but received no final judicial

epilogue,¹ nor were those crimes indicted and prosecuted against Mladić before the *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (hereinafter: ICTY).²

On 25 April 1992, he was appointed chief of staff / deputy commander in the command of the Second Military District of the JNA in Sarajevo.³ On May 12, 1992, the Assembly of the Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina elected Radovan Karadžić as the President of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, passed a decision on the formation of the army of this republic (which would later become the Army of the Republika Srpska (hereinafter: VRS)), and appointed Ratko Mladić as the commander of the Main Staff of this military formation. At the same session, the members of the aforementioned assembly adopted the *Decision on the strategic goals of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and among others in particular stand out:

- State demarcation from the other two national communities;
- Corridor between Semberija and Krajina;
- Establishing a corridor in the Drina River valley, that is, eliminating the Drina River as a border between Serbian states;
- Establishing a border on the rivers Una and Neretva;
- The division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and the establishment of effective state power in each of the parts;
- The exit of the Republic of Srpska to the sea.⁴

The aforementioned decision represented a kind of conceptual prelude, i.e. an overture for crimes of enormous proportions, which reached their criminal culmination in the crimes in Srebrenica during July 1995, which were committed by individual members of the VRS and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska (hereinafter: RS MUP), against members of

1 See: <https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/dorh-objavio-sve-zlocine-ratka-mladica-na-hrvatskom-teritoriju-planirao-rusenje-peruce-razarao-sinjku-kraj-i-slavoniju-napadao-zadar-6774762> (14.05.2022.)

2 The Croatian public was especially disappointed by the fact that the subject of the indictment against Ratko Mladić before the ICTY was not the war crimes in Škabrnja, which occurred in 1991 during his command of the Knin Corps of the JNA. See: Mladen Stojanović, *Karakteristični primjeri suđenja za ratne zločine* in: Dubljević, M. (ur.), *Procesuiranje ratnih zločina - Jamstvo procesa suočavanja s prošlošću u Hrvatskoj*, Documenta - Centar za suočavanje s prošlošću, Zagreb, 2014, p. 74

3 Meldijana Arnaut Haseljić, *Ratko Mladić – Lik i djelo (Osvrt na procesuiranje – Optužnice i Presuda)*, Znakovi vremena (Sarajevo), Year XXI, No. 79, 2018, p. 246

4 Lara J. Nettelfield, *Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal's Impact in a Postwar State*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 68.

the Muslim (Bosniak) population from the area of the Middle Podrinje, i.e. Srebrenica, and which is in the judgments of the International Court of Justice in The Hague (eng. *International Court of Justice*),⁵ the ICTY,⁶ the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina⁷ and by certain German courts⁸ characterized as a crime of genocide.

According to the results of certain researches, such as the one conducted by Ewa Tabeau and Jan Zwierzchowski, it is estimated that the number of victims of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. the “minimum number of war-related deaths”, amounts to 104,732 persons, of which 42,106 (40.2%) civilians and 62,626 (59.8%) soldiers. If we look at the ethnic structure of the victims, 68,101 Bosniaks, 22,779 Serbs, 8,858 Croats and 4,995 people

5 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26. February 2007. On the most significant contents of the decision see in: Enis Omerović, *Presuda Međunarodnog suda pravde: mogućnost obnove postupka i rasprava pred Vijećem sigurnosti UN-a*, Znakovi vremena (Sarajevo), Vol. 11, No. 39/40, 2008, p. 126-135; Vladimir-Đuro Degan, *Zločin genocida pred Međunarodnim sudom u Haagu*, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, Year 53, 2/2016, p. 347-360; Sakib Softić, *Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Hague on legal consequences of judgment 2007 (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro for violating the Convention on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide)*, Monumenta Srebrenica, Vol. 10, 2021, p. 318-324

6 Marko A. Hoare, *The Bosnian Genocide and the Srebrenica massacre*, Bosnian Studies (Sarajevo), vol. V., No. 1/2021, p. 38-50

7 Vedad Gurda, Dževad Mahmutović, Maja Iveljić, *Postdejtonsko traganje za pravdom: Suđenja za ratne zločine u Bosni i Hercegovini pred nadležnim sudovima*, Historijski pogledi, Year IV, No. 6, 2021, p. 267-268

8 Although the genocide in Srebrenica became known worldwide due to its apocalyptic nature, it is worth pointing out that the German judiciary has also legally qualified certain crimes that took place in other municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the crime of genocide. In this regard, members of the Army of Republika Srpska Nikola Jorgić, Maksim Sokolović and Đurađ Kušljić were legally convicted of the crime of genocide against Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in Dobož, Osmaci near Zvornik and Kotor Varoš. For more details see: Vedad Gurda, *Procesuiranje genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini pred međunarodnim, domaćim i inostranim sudovima*, Monumenta Srebrenica, Vol. 4, 2015, p. 39

For these reasons, some authors do not talk exclusively about the Srebrenica genocide, but about the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, the so-called *Bosniacide*. Compare: Adib Đozić, *Bosniacide i zločin genocida u Srebrenici: Skica za razumjevanje zločina sociocida*, Baština Sjeveroistočne Bosne, No. 10, 2018, p. 133-152

of other nationalities died^{9,10}. It is quite reasonable to assume that the largest percentage of suffering of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Croats and members of other nationalities is related to the actions of members of the Republika Srpska Army commanded by Ratko Mladić. A significant number of people died as part of actions that were taken contrary to the international rules of war, i.e. in violation of the provisions of international humanitarian law, as a result of which in the post-war period a certain number of members of the VRS were prosecuted before the ICTY, the War Crimes Department of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina¹¹ and the national courts of other countries, such as Germany,¹² Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro.¹³ Quite logically, because of all those crimes, it was necessary to investigate the (criminal) responsibility of Ratko Mladić, as the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska, and the competent prosecutor's office initiated criminal proceedings against him before *the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia* (ICTY).

9 More in: Jan Zwierchowski, Ewa Tabeau, *The 1992-95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-Based Multiple System Estimation of Casualties' Undercount*, Conference Paper for the International Research Workshop on 'The Global Costs of Conflict' The Households in Conflict Network (HiCN) and The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin, 2010, p. 16-17

See: https://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.350596.de/tabeau_%20conflict_gecc.pdf (Retrieved at 15 May 2022)

10 In addition to the number of those killed, according to the data of the Association of Victims of Genocide and War Crimes, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least 57,300 people were imprisoned in concentration camps; at least 25,500 people were raped and sexually abused; the multi-year siege of Sarajevo resulted in the killing of 11,541 civilians, of which 1,601 were children, and all Catholic churches and mosques were razed to the ground. Cited according to: Dževad Mahmutović, *Hronologija sudskog procesa Radovanu Karadžiću za zločin genocida u Srebrenici i ostale zločine*, Monumenta Srebrenica, Vol. 8, 2019, p. 56

11 Vedad Gurda, Dževad Mahmutović, Maja Iveljić, *War crimes prosecution in your own yard: Some indicators of the fifteen-year work of the War crimes chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Monumenta Srebrenica, Vol. 10, 2021, p. 269-290

12 Hikmet Krčić, *Genocid nad Bošnjacima i njemačko pravosuđe: univerzalna jurisdikcija za genocid*, Godišnjak BZK Preporod, Sarajevo, 2015.; Dževad Mahmutović, Mahir Muharemović, *Prva presuda za genocid u Evropi nakon Drugog svjetskog rata*, Monumenta Srebrenica, Vol. 2, 2013.

13 More in: Vedad Gurda, *Sporazumi o priznanju krivnje za ratne zločine u Bosni i Hercegovini: između pokajanja i konsenzualne pravde*, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Tuzli, No. 1-2/2020, p. 29-30

1. The procedure of accusation

The criminal proceedings against Ratko Mladić were initiated by the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY on July 24, 1995, by filing the original indictment, which together with him included Radovan Karadžić,¹⁴ and on November 14, 1995, an additional indictment was filed against both of them relating to Srebrenica.¹⁵ The first amended indictment dated October 10, 2002 separated the proceedings in the case against Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić.¹⁶ Ratko Mladić was on the run from the filing of the original indictment until 2011,¹⁷ when he was arrested and handed over to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities, and on June 1 of the same year, a second amended indictment was filed against him.¹⁸ Not long after, on October 20, 2011, to be precise, the ICTY Prosecution filed a third amended indictment against the accused Ratko Mladić,¹⁹ and on December 16, 2011, a fourth amended indictment²⁰ on the basis of which the Trial Chamber made a first-instance decision.

With this indictment, the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY suspected the accused on the basis of individual criminal responsibility for participating in the commission of criminal acts (crimes): a) *genocide*, b) *crimes against humanity*, and c) *violations of the laws and customs of war*, which were committed by *planning, inciting, ordering and/or by helping and supporting*.²¹ Therefore, he was not charged with directly committing any of the three mentioned crimes, but with a kind of *preparation and complicity* in the same.

In addition, the accused Ratko Mladić was accused of being responsible for committing the aforementioned crimes based on *the responsibility of his superior* (so-called *command responsibility*), because he knew or had reason

14 ICTY, The Case IT-09-92, The ICTY Prosecutor versus Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, Indictment, 24 July 1995.

15 ICTY, The Case IT-95-18-I, The ICTY Prosecutor versus Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, Indictment, 10 November 1995.

16 ICTY, The Case IT-95-18-I, The ICTY Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladić, Indictment, 10 October 1995.

17 Enis Omerović, *Odgovornost države za povredu međunarodne obaveze s posebnim osvrtom na međunarodno izvršno pravo*, Anali Pravnog fakulteta Univerzita u Zenici, 2011, p. 41

18 ICTY; The Case IT-09-92-I, Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladić, the Second Amended Indictment, 1 June 2011.

19 ICTY; The Case IT-09-92-PT, The ICTY Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladić, the Third Amended Indictment, 20 October 2011.

20 ICTY; The Case IT-09-92-PT, The ICTY Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladić, the Forth Amended Indictment, 16 December 2011.

21 Ibid, par. 29-31

to know through numerous sources that members of the VRS and/or elements of the Serbian forces are under its effective control are about to commit crimes or have already committed them, and that *he did not take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of crimes* by members of the VRS and elements of the Serbian forces over whom he had effective control and/or *to punish the perpetrators of those crimes*.²²

His individual criminal responsibility according to the indictment was reflected in his participation in four joint criminal enterprises (JCP):

- a joint criminal enterprise with the aim of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the area in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which the Bosnian Serbs claimed, by committing crimes in municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (the so-called comprehensive JCE);²³
- a joint criminal enterprise whose goal was to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo, by carrying out a campaign of sniping and shelling of the civilian population;²⁴
- a joint criminal enterprise aimed at eliminating Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica in July 1995;²⁵
- a joint criminal enterprise with the common goal of taking UN members hostage, in order to force NATO to refrain from airstrikes on Bosnian Serb military targets.²⁶

At the same time, when it comes to accusations of the crime of *genocide*, the accused was accused of participating in the commission of the aforementioned criminal offense against the Muslim (Bosniak) population in Srebrenica, as well as against the Muslim (Bosniak) and Croat populations in six other municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Foča, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Vlasenica.²⁷

On the other hand, in terms of *crimes against humanity*, Ratko Mladić is accused of committing several alternative acts (forms) of these crimes, namely:

22 Ibid, par. 31-34

23 Ibid, par. 8-13

24 Ibid, par. 54-18

25 Ibid, par. 19-23

26 Ibid, par. 24-28

27 Ibid, par. 35-46

a) *persecution of Bosnian Muslims (and/or) Bosnian Croats on a political (and/or) religious basis* in the following municipalities: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Foča, Ilidža, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Novi Grad, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Trnovo, Vlasenica, as well as for persecution of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.²⁸

b) *extermination and murder (as a form of crime against humanity)*,²⁹ as well as

c) *deportation*³⁰ and *inhuman acts*.³¹

In the end, Ratko Mladić was also suspected of certain acts that *constitute crimes of violation of the law and forms of warfare*, namely:

a) *terrorism and illegal attacks*³²

b) *murders* and

c) *taking hostages*.³³

2. Trial before the Trial Chamber (the first-instance proceedings)

The trial of the accused Ratko Mladić before the Trial Chamber of the ICTY began on May 16, 2012, and the presentation of evidence lasted more than four years. The parties in the proceedings presented their closing arguments in the period from December 5 to 15, 2016. The council sat for

28 Ibid, par. 47-59

29 Ibid, par. 60-66

30 Given their very similar meanings in the B/C/S languages, for the sake of the understanding of the general public, it should be emphasized that persecution as the first-mentioned form of crime against humanity and deportation are not identical/similar forms of committing the crime in question. Persecution is a deliberate and severe denial of basic rights, contrary to international law, due to belonging to a group of people or a community (*political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, sexual or other*), i.e. denial of rights based on a policy of discrimination or widespread discriminatory practices, which may include various actions (e.g. detention in camps, murders, destruction and looting of property, etc.), while deportation means the forced relocation of the population. See more in: Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, *Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application*, Cambridge University Press, 2011; Ivanka Marković, *Zločin protiv čovječnosti u krivičnom zakonu Bosne i Hercegovine*, Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, 2011, p. 160-161; Sadmira Karović, *Odnos između genocida i zločina protiv čovječnosti*, Civitas, Vol. 3, No. 2/2012.

31 ICTY, The Case IT-09-92-PT, the ICTY Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladić, The Forth Amended Indictment, 16 December 2011, par. 67-74

32 Ibid, par. 75-81

33 Ibid, par. 82-86

530 days of the trial, during which it was presented with the testimonies of approximately 600 witnesses and almost 10,000 exhibits. The Council also judicially took cognizance of approximately 2,000 facts that were adjudicated upon.³⁴

On November 22, 2017, the Trial Chamber composed of: Judge Alphonse Orié, Chairman, Judge Bakone Justice Moloto and Judge Christoph Flügge announced its decision, i.e. the summary of the decision, which concluded the first-instance proceedings before the ICTY against the accused Ratko Mladić. In the following period, an integral reasoned verdict was published in four volumes, totaling 2548 pages.

The most significant legal conclusions related to the criminal responsibility of the accused were that he was guilty of the crime of genocide in Srebrenica, all five forms of crimes against humanity charged in the indictment (persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and inhumane acts), as well as all four forms of violation of laws and customs of war (murders, terrorism, illegal attacks on civilians and hostage-taking) for which he was suspected by the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY.³⁵

The only count of the indictment on which Ratko Mladić was acquitted was the one imputing his responsibility for the crime of genocide in six municipalities outside of Srebrenica, i.e. in Foča, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Vlasenica.

2.1. Genocide in other municipalities

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Statute of the ICTY, the crime of genocide means any of the following acts, committed with the intention to completely or partially destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such:

- a) killing group members
- b) inflicting serious bodily injury or mental injury on members of the group
- c) deliberate imposition on a group of such living conditions that could lead to its complete or partial destruction

34 Ibid, par. 16

35 Ibid, par. 1606 - 3555

d) introduction of measures aimed at preventing births within the group

e) forced relocation of children from one group to another”.

In accordance with the practice of the ICTY, in order for an accused to be convicted of the crime in question, it is necessary for the court panel to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused committed one of the five acts (actions) of the crime of genocide listed in points a) to e), which represents *objective feature (element)* of the crime of genocide (the so-called *actus reus*). However, in addition to the performance of the aforementioned objectively verifiable actions, it is also necessary to establish that the intention to perform the aforementioned actions (deeds) was aimed at completely or partially destroying a national, ethnic, racial or religious group to which belonged those who were killed, physically abused or members of a certain group treated illegally in another way. The mentioned intention represents a *subjective feature (element)* of genocide (the so-called *mens rea*)³⁶ and in the practice of the ICTY, it is often designated as special (*dolus specialis*),³⁷ that is as *genocidal intent*.

When it comes to the objective elements of the crime of genocide, in its indictment the Prosecution charged the accused with committing the first three alternative acts of the crime of genocide (Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the ICTY, points a)-c).

The Trial Chamber in the case against Ratko Mladić undisputedly found that members of protected groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were killed in the area of the six mentioned municipalities by members of the VRS commanded by the accused Ratko Mladić.³⁸

36 Tadija Bubalović, Nezir, Pivić, *Međunarodno krivično procesno pravo (Struktura i pravila postupka pred međunarodnim krivičnim sudovima)*, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Zenici, Zenica, 2021, p. 71

37 See: First Instance Judgment of the ICTY in the *Krstić* case, para. 572-573; First-instance judgment of the ICTY in the *Tolimir* case of December 12, 2012, par. 744

38 In this regard, based on the evidence presented by the Prosecution in this case, the Trial Chamber established that 46 Bosnian Muslims were killed in the area of the municipality of Foča, as well as hundreds of detainees in the KP Dom Foča, 266 Bosnian Muslims in the area of the municipality of Ključ, and 266 Bosnian Muslims in the area of the municipality of Kotor Varoš 185 Bosnian Muslims, in the area of the municipality of Prijedor 993 Bosnian Muslims and 536 Bosnian Croats, in the area of the municipality of Sanski Most 94 Bosnian Muslims and 9 Bosnian Croats and in the area of the municipality of Vlasenica 169 Bosnian Muslims. See: *Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the case of Ratko Mladić*, para. 3446

Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found that Bosnian Muslims in the municipalities of Foča, Prijedor and Vlasenica and Bosnian Croats in the municipality of Prijedor were exposed to severe physical or mental injuries and that these injuries contributed to the destruction of protected groups.³⁹

Finally, when it comes to the alternative action from point c), i.e. the deliberate imposition on Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of living conditions calculated to lead to the complete or partial physical destruction of those groups, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not recognize the specific case and the events listed in the indictment characteristics of this act of committing the crime of genocide.⁴⁰

However, according to the statutory definition of the crime of genocide, in order for an accused person to be declared guilty of this criminal offense (crime), it is not enough to establish the commission of some of the alternative acts of commission as objective elements of genocide, but it is necessary for the judicial panel to establish beyond any reasonable doubt the cumulative existence and the subjective element of this crime, that is, *the intention to completely or partially destroy one of the groups protected by the Statute* (the so-called special intention, mens rea). In the specific case, the Trial Chamber found that “*the physical perpetrators of the prohibited acts in the municipalities of Sanski Most, Vlasenica and Foča, as well as the named perpetrators in the municipalities of Kotor-Varoš and Prijedor, intended to kill Bosnian Muslims in those municipalities mentioned in point 1 of the Indictment as part of the protected group*”.

However, according to the statutory definition of genocide, it is not enough to establish the existence of any intention to destroy a protected group, but a specific intention to “*completely or partially*” destroy a certain group must be established.

Quite reasonably, the Prosecution did not claim in the indictment that there was an intention to completely destroy the groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, but it did claim that there was an intention to *partially* destroy the groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as such in the municipalities in question.

In the practice of the ICTY, a standard has been established that the phrase “intention to partially destroy a group” means the intention to destroy

39 Ibid, par. 3451

40 Ibid, par. 3451

“an essential part of the group”,⁴¹ i.e. the intention to destroy a “substantial part of the group”,⁴² i.e. the intention to destroy a “substantial part of the group”, and what was the position taken by the judicial panels of the ICTY, *exemli gratia*, in the *Sikirica*⁴³ and *Krstić* cases⁴⁴.⁴⁵ Considering this issue, the Trial Chamber in the case of Ratko Mladić found that beyond reasonable doubt it did not establish that the physical perpetrators of the prohibited acts against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats commit these prohibited acts in the observed municipalities with the intention of destroying Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as a *significant part* of those protected groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴⁶.⁴⁷

41 ICTY First Instance Verdict in the *Jelisić* case, para. 80-83.

42 The standard that the intention to partially destroy the group implies a “substantial part of the group” is also accepted in the jurisprudence of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Compare: First-instance judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Stupar Miloš et al., p. 65; First-instance judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Trbić Milorad case, para. 784

43 The Decision in the *Sikirica* case on defense motions for an acquittal, para. 65.

44 First Instance Judgment of the ICTY in the *Krstić* case, para. 8

45 It should be noted that the Trial Chamber in the case of Goran Jelisić distinguished between the intention of partial destruction of the group in a quantitative and a qualitative sense. And while in the quantitative sense we mean an important (significant) part of the group, in the qualitative sense the destruction is also to be considered the destruction of the “most representative representatives of the targeted community”, whereby we mean the destruction of its leadership (political and religious leaders, intellectuals, etc.) , provided that such a thing would be reflected in the survival of the group as such. See: Vedad Gurda, *Procesuiranje genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini pred međunarodnim, domaćim i inostranim sudovima*, Monumenta Srebrenica, Vol. 4, 2015, p. 62

46 The Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the *Ratko Mladić* case, para. 3536.

47 Explaining this conclusion, the Trial Chamber stated, among other things, the following: “In light of the above, the Trial Chamber states that Bosnian Muslims in the municipalities of Sanski Most, Vlasenica, Foča, Kotor-Varoš and Prijedor were targeted by physical perpetrators of prohibited acts mainly in their own municipalities. The Trial Chamber notes that the physical perpetrators had limited geographic control or jurisdiction over their actions. The Bosnian Muslims who were targeted in each municipality constituted a relatively small part of the Muslim population in the territory claimed by the Bosnian Serbs or in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. The Trial Chamber was presented with insufficient evidence indicating the reason why the Bosnian Muslims in each of the above-mentioned municipalities or municipalities as such had some special or symbolic significance in relation to the protected group as a whole. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the accompanying facts and circumstances is that the physical perpetrators had the intention to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in the municipalities of Sanski Most, Foča, Kotor-Varoš, Prijedor and Vlasenica. as a significant part of the protected group”. *Ibid*, par. 3535

In accordance with the above, as well as on the basis of the conclusion that the intention to destroy groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, i.e. the crime of genocide, was not the goal of the comprehensive joint criminal enterprise of Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Bogdan Subotic, Momčilo Mandić, Mića Stanišić and Ratko Mladić,⁴⁸ the Trial Chamber acquitted the accused Mladić of responsibility for the crime of genocide in Foča, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Vlasenica.

2.2. Genocide and the crime against humanity in Srebrenica

When it comes to the part of the indictment that refers to Ratko Mladić's responsibility for the genocide in Srebrenica, as previously mentioned, the Trial Chamber found that the accused is responsible for the crime of genocide committed against the Muslim population in Srebrenica in July 1995.

In this regard, regarding the objective features (elements) of the crime of genocide, the Trial Chamber found that after the fall of Srebrenica, several thousand members of the protected group of Bosnian Muslims in that area were killed by the VSR, the RS MUP and other (para)military formations, and which represented the prohibited act (action) of killing a member of a protected group from Article 4, paragraph 1, point a) of the Statute of the ICTY.⁴⁹

In addition, the Council found that "...thousands of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica were exposed to severe physical or mental harm, which included: death threats or actions that led to their death or suicide; the knowledge of impending death, which people have come to in many cases because of the horrible way they were treated before they were killed; and long-term injuries to physical and mental health. Those injuries that the perpetrators inflicted on the victims preceded the sufferings that in themselves represent part of the act of killing. Consequently, the Trial Chamber finds that the severe physical and mental injuries suffered by thousands of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica as a result of the actions of the physical perpetrators contributed to the destruction of that protected group."

However, in order to determine the commission of the crime of genocide, in addition to the objective actions (crime) of killing and inflicting

48 Ibid, par. 4237

49 Ibid, par. 3539-3540

severe physical and mental injuries on the members of the group of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, it was necessary to examine the existence of *mens rea*, i.e. the subjective intention to *partially destroy the protected group as such*.

In this regard, the Trial Chamber found that “none of the victims of the killing in Srebrenica actively participated in the hostilities at the time when the killing was carried out.” The killing was carried out by members of the VRS, among whom were soldiers from the Military Police, as well as members of the following groups: the 2nd Detachment of the Special Police Brigade from Šekovići, the 10th Sabotage Detachment, the 1st Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade and the Zvornik Brigade in General, the 6th Infantry battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, a platoon of the Military Police of the Bratunac Brigade, the 1st Company of the Jahorina Police Training Center, Vukovi sa Drine (the Wolves of the Drina), the Škorpioni (Scorpions) unit, paramilitary formations, the Special Police Detachment, the Special Police Unit from the MUP and “Chetniks”. Furthermore, the members of the Trial Chamber also concluded that the perpetrators “...intended to commit mass killings...”, that they “...committed the killing of Bosnian Muslims on a political, racial or religious basis...”, and that they “...members of the VRS, the military police, civilian police, special police, Vukovi sa Drine (the Wolves of the Drina) and paramilitary formations terrorized and abused Bosnian Muslims in Potočari before the execution, mistreated and beat men and boys, Bosnian Muslims, and intended to cause severe physical or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims who were separated or detained”.⁵⁰

In addition to the scale of the criminal event in Srebrenica, i.e. the fact that in this particular case, the murder of a very large number of men and boys, Bosnian Muslims, was established, the Council also took into account the fact that “*The killing was carried out according to a pattern. The victims were male Bosnian Muslims who had previously been captured and detained. Many detainees were transported to other locations before being taken to execution sites; then they lined them up before killing them or just summarily killed them. They were often kept in desperate conditions. The killing was often accompanied by ethnic insults.*” Based on all of the above, the members of the council concluded that “*...the killing, when taking into account the organized and systematic way in which it was carried out, demonstrates the clear intention of the perpetrators to kill all or a significant part of all able-bodied Bosnian Muslim males from Srebrenica.*”⁵¹

50 Ibid, par. 3546

51 Ibid, par. 3547

In addition to the aforementioned, the Trial Chamber concluded that “...the VRS and soldiers identified as “Chetniks” destroyed houses belonging to Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, mosques in Srebrenica and the building where the archives and library of the Majlis of the Islamic Community of Srebrenica were located. Those acts of destruction were also committed in the days immediately preceding the killing by the same perpetrators who committed murder and cruel and inhuman treatment”, as well as that “... in addition to murder, terrorizing and abuse, harassment and destruction of property suffered by the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, all or a significant part of all the remaining Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica were forcibly relocated from Potočari by the VRS and MUP.”⁵²

Based on all of the above, the members of the Trial Chamber stated that “... the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that *the physical perpetrators of the prohibited acts intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, as part of a protected group.*”⁵³

The verdict established that the crime of genocide was committed as part of a joint criminal enterprise whose main goal was to “...remove Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing men and boys from Srebrenica, as well as forcibly taking away women, children and some older men from Srebrenica”, and which was created and in which Radovan Karadžić, Radislav Krstić, Vujadin Popović, Zdravko Tolimir, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Svetozar Kosorić, Radivoje Miletić, Radoslav Janković, Ljubiša Beara, Milenko Živanović, Vinko Pandurević and Vidoje Blagojević participated.⁵⁴ After a very extensive explanation of specific criminal acts and events⁵⁵ the Trial Chamber concluded that the accused Ratko Mladić’s actions “...to a considerable extent contributed to the achievement of the goal of removing Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica by killing men and boys, as well as forcibly taking away women, children and part of the elderly men from Srebrenica...”, by committing various criminal acts, including the criminal act of genocide,⁵⁶ as well as that he intended to carry out these removals by committing the criminal act of genocide, i.e. that he had “...a special intention to commit genocide.”⁵⁷

Therefore, it can be concluded that the accused Ratko Mladić was one of the creators and participants of the mentioned joint criminal enterprise

52 Ibid, par. 3548

53 Ibid, par. 3548

54 Ibid, par. 4987-4988

55 Ibid, par. 4990-5098

56 Ibid, par. 4987-4988

57 Ibid, par. 5130

related to Srebrenica and that he contributed to it to a considerable extent, which was realized by committing terrible crimes, including the crime of genocide, in such a way that the actors members of the RS MUP and the VRS, commanded by the accused Ratko Mladić, were used as direct executors of the joint criminal enterprise in question.

In accordance with the above, the Trial Chamber declared the accused Ratko Mladić guilty of the criminal offense (crime) of genocide against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.

However, apart from genocide, as a crime upon crimes, the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY charged the accused with committing other "war crimes", which took place in the wider area of Srebrenica during the indicated period.

In its decision, the Trial Chamber stated that several perpetrators, among whom were members of the VRS and MUP, committed several crimes that represent alternative acts of committing the crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY.

In this regard, the Council determined that individual members of the VRS and the MUP committed the crimes of *murder* against Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, and that those incidents of murder represented acts of *persecution* as a form of crime against humanity. In addition, the Council determined in its decision that certain unfortunate events that were prosecuted have characteristics of a) *extermination*,⁵⁸ b) other acts of *persecution* (illegal

58 Murders, depending on the circumstances and the way they were committed, as well as other characteristics, can represent an act (crime) of persecution or extermination, as one form of crime against humanity. When it comes to murders in the area of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber subsumed the following criminal events under the act (crime) of extermination: a) the murder of approximately 1,000 male Bosnian Muslims detained in a warehouse in Kravica, in the period from July 13 to 14, 1995 (incident 3.1 from Annex E of the Indictment); the July 13 murder of 15 male Bosnian Muslims immediately after they were taken out of the warehouse in Kravica (incident 1.1. from Annex E of the Indictment); the murder of 150 male Bosnian Muslims in the period from July 13 to 17 (incident 2.1); the murder of approximately 21 male Bosnian Muslims who were detained in Luka (incident 5.1.); the murder of at least 819 male Bosnian Muslims who were detained in a school in Grbavci, who were taken away and killed in two meadows near Orahovac (incident 6.2); the murder of 20 male Bosnian Muslims who were detained at the school in Petkovci and 401 at the dam in Petkovci (incidents 7.1. and 7.2.); the murder of 575 and 12 male Bosnian Muslims in a school in Ročević (incidents 8.1. and 8.2.); the murder of at least 8 male Bosnian Muslims at the school in Kula near Pilica on July 14 or 15, 1995, and between 1,000 and 1,200 male Bosnian Muslims at the Branjevo military farm on July 16, who were previously detained at the school in Kula near Chickens (incidents 9.1. and 9.2.); approximately 500 Bosnian Muslim men and women were gathered in the Dom kulture in Pilica and killed in one day, on July 16,

detention, destruction and looting), as well as c) *forced transfer (deportation)*,⁵⁹ and which represent forms (deeds, alternative acts of committing) of the criminal offense of crime against humanity.⁶⁰

However, in addition to committing some of the alternative actions (deeds), the statutory definition of crimes against humanity from Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY, as a feature of this crime, additionally requires that these acts: a) *were committed in an armed conflict* and b) *directed against any civilian population*.⁶¹ When it comes to armed conflict, it is irrelevant whether it is an international or internal conflict.⁶² On the other hand, according to judicial practice, the civilian population as part of a population against which these crimes may be directed are considered not only civilians “in the strict sense of this term” (e.g. women and children), but also those persons who

1995 (incident 10.1), and the murder of 39 men and boys at a location in Bišina on July 23, 1995 (incident 12.1.).

Ibid, par. 3099-3104

However, in order for individual murders to be legally qualified as a crime of extermination, which represents one of the alternative acts of commission that constitute a crime against humanity, in accordance with the statutory definition and the practice of the ICTY, it is necessary to establish that certain murders took on the pattern of killing on a large scale, and that did the perpetrators intend to participate in such murders. The Trial Chamber established that the mentioned criminal events (incidents) of the killing of Bosnian Muslims in the area of Srebrenica had the character of “large-scale killings”, and that the perpetrators shared the intention to participate in just such (large-scale) killings. Ibid, para. 3105 and 3116

Regarding the murders that are marked as incidents 4.1. 6.2.; 14.1.; 14.2; 13.1.; 15.1. and 15.3., the Trial Chamber established that these murders did not have the character of large-scale killings, and accordingly did not qualify them as extermination (a crime against humanity). Ibid, para. 3106-3110

On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that the murders between about 4500-4700 Bosnian Muslims from the area of Srebrenica, which took place within the criminal events (incidents) mentioned above, in the specific case against Ratko Mladić, are legally qualified as a crime of extermination , that is, part of the crime against humanity.

However, in order not to misunderstand this data, it should be emphasized that in explaining this decision, the Trial Chamber referred to the fact established in previous proceedings before the ICTY, that between 7,000 and 8,000 were systematically killed in the area of Srebrenica during July 1995. men, Bosnian Muslims. Ibid. par. 3042

59 In the decision in question, the Trial Chamber found that approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims, mostly women, children and the elderly, who left Potočari to go to Bosnian Muslim-controlled territory, were forcibly relocated, that is, they had no real choice but to leave the Srebrenica area. Ibid, par. 3159

60 Ibid, par. 3044

61 Christopher Roberts, *On the Definition of Crimes against Humanity and other Widespread or Systematic Human Rights Violations*, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change, Vol. 20., No. 1, 2017, p. 9

62 The Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the *Ratko Mladić* case, para. 3022

“...belong to some movement of resistance, as well as those who were fighters, regardless of whether or not they wore a uniform, but at the time of committing the crime they no longer participate in hostilities, either because they left the army, because they no longer carry weapons or because they are disabled for fighting, among other things, because of wounds or deprivation of liberty”.⁶³ Based on the above, it can be concluded that “...for the position of the victim as a civilian, it is necessary to take into account her specific situation at the time of the crime, rather than her status”.⁶⁴ The aforementioned positions of the ICTY court panels are particularly important in the context of the prosecution of the crimes that took place in Srebrenica in July 1995, where the victims were mostly demobilized, captured or wounded soldiers who could not defend themselves, and according to the earlier jurisprudence of the ICTY, they *were considered civilians*.

However, apart from the above-mentioned characteristics, the jurisprudence (jurisprudence) of the ICTY⁶⁵ and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)⁶⁶ a standard was established that the acts in question as part of an attack on the civilian population cannot be “isolated (isolated) criminal attacks”, but must represent part of *a widespread or a systematic attack*.

The analyzed decision established beyond any reasonable doubt that the aforementioned crimes were committed within the framework of an armed conflict,⁶⁷ that they were *part of a widespread and systematic attack on the victims (civilian population)*,⁶⁸ that the immediate perpetrators were *aware of such a nature of the attack* and that their actions are part of a pattern of such criminal activity (attack).⁶⁹

In addition, the Council found that the aforementioned crimes were committed on the basis of a joint criminal enterprise related to Srebrenica, the aim of which was to remove Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica “...by killing the men and boys of Srebrenica and forcibly removing women, children and

63 The ICTY first-instance judgment in the Blaškić case, para. 214

64 The Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the *Ratko Mladić* case, para. 3022

65 See: ICTY second-instance judgment in the Kunarac et al. case, para. 85.

66 For example, such a standard is established in: First Instance Judgment of the ICTR in the *Akajesu* case, para. 580 and in the First Instance Judgment of the ICTR in the case of *Kajišema and Ruzindana*, para. 123. See: Džon R. Džouns, Stiven Pauls, *Međunarodna krivična praksa*, Fond za humanitarno pravo, Beograd, 2006, p. 211

67 Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the *Ratko Mladić* case, para 3045

68 Ibid, par. 3030

69 Ibid, par. 3047

some of the older men from Srebrenica”,⁷⁰ and that the previously mentioned actors of that joint criminal enterprise (Radovan Karadžić, Radoslav Krstić and other previously mentioned officers of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)) used VRS units in order to realize the joint criminal enterprise.⁷¹

In conclusion, the Trial Chamber established that the accused Ratko Mladić “...led and commanded the VRS and MUP units during the operation in Srebrenica and after it.” Mladić did not take appropriate steps to investigate the crimes and/or punish the members of the VRS and other elements of the Serbian forces under his effective control who committed those crimes. Mladić’s acts were so crucial to the commission of the crime that without them the crimes would not have been committed as they were”,⁷² and stated that the accused’s actions “...to a considerable extent contributed to the achievement of the goal of removing the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica”, as well as that he *shared the intention* to achieve the common goal of the joint criminal enterprise related to Srebrenica,⁷³ as well as that he *shared the intention* to achieve the common goal of the joint criminal enterprise related to Srebrenica, by committing, among others, the crime of “persecution, forced transfer, murder, extermination...”⁷⁴ and other (evil) acts that represent the characteristics of crimes against humanity, and on the basis of all the above, declared responsible for crimes against humanity committed in the area of Srebrenica.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the allegations in the ICTY indictment against the accused Ratko Mladić related to the crime (criminal act) of *violating the laws and customs of warfare* did not refer to the criminal events in and around Srebrenica from July 1995, which is understandable given the horrific character and scale of the crimes in Srebrenica, as well as the fact that the crime of violating the laws and customs of war in the hierarchy of “war crimes” is a milder crime compared to the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.

70 Ibid, par. 4987

71 Ibid, par. 4989

72 Ibid, par. 5098

73 Ibid, par. 5098

74 Ibid, par. 5128

2.3. *Other crimes in other municipalities*

As previously pointed out, the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY accused the accused Ratko Mladić that, in addition to the joint criminal enterprise related to Srebrenica, he was also individually responsible for participating in three other joint criminal enterprises, which resulted in the commission of terrible crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, namely:

a) a joint criminal enterprise with the aim of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which Bosnian Serbs claimed rights, by committing crimes in municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (the so-called *comprehensive JCE*);

b) a joint criminal enterprise whose goal was to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo, by conducting a campaign of sniping and shelling of the civilian population; and

c) a joint criminal enterprise with the common goal of taking UN members hostage in order to force NATO to refrain from airstrikes on Bosnian Serb military targets.

When it comes to the first joint criminal enterprise, the Trial Chamber established that there was a so-called comprehensive JCE aimed at the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina to which Bosnian Serbs claimed rights, through persecution, extermination, murder, inhumane acts (forced relocation) and deportation, and that this undertaking had existed since 1991 until November 30, 1995,⁷⁵ which was designed and participated in by: Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Bogdan Subotić, Momčilo Mandić and Mićo Stanišić.⁷⁶

The joint criminal enterprise in question was realized by the fact that its participants used the subordination of members of the VRS, the MUP of the RS, other forces, and other authorities of the RS, who in the period from May 12, 1992 to November 30, 1995 committed a huge number of crimes of persecution, murder, extermination, inhumane acts (forced relocation) and deportation in the municipalities of: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Foča, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Novi Grad, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac and Vlasenica^{77, 78}

75 Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the *Ratko Mladić* case, par. 4232

76 Ibid, par. 4224

77 Ibid, par. 4224-4227

78 The verdict established that the aforementioned crimes were committed by members of

The Trial Chamber specifically considered Mladić's actions in relation to the VRS, given that many of the main perpetrators of the crimes were members of the VRS. Bearing in mind, among other things, that Mladić managed and commanded units of the VRS and issued orders to other groups, the Council stated that Mladić's actions "...were so crucial to the commission of the crime that without them the crimes could not have been committed as they were committed." On the basis of everything, it was concluded that the accused, with awareness and will (intention)⁷⁹ by his actions contributed to a significant extent to the achievement of the goal of the so-called comprehensive JCE, i.e. the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina to which Bosnian Serbs claimed rights, through persecution, extermination, murder, inhumane acts (forced relocation) and deportation,⁸⁰ i.e. that he participated in the subject joint criminal enterprise.

In the analyzed decision (judgment), the Trial Chamber determined that the aforementioned crimes committed in the mentioned municipalities have the characteristics of *murder and/or extermination and/or persecution and/or forced transfer and/or deportation*, as *crimes against humanity*,⁸¹ and given that were committed on the basis of and within the previously mentioned so-called a comprehensive joint criminal enterprise, the Council declared the accused Ratko Mladić guilty (responsible) for the aforementioned *crimes against humanity*.

With regard to the joint criminal enterprise related to Sarajevo, the Trial Chamber found that in the period from May 12, 1992 to November 1995, there was a joint criminal enterprise with the primary goal of spreading terror among the civilian population through a campaign of sniping and shelling, and

the VRS and MUP of the RS in all the mentioned municipalities. However, it is interesting that the Trial Chamber found that members of crisis headquarters, war presidencies, war commissions and municipal assemblies also committed crimes of persecution in municipalities; Banja Luka, Foča, Kalinovik, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Sokolac and Vlasenica, while the crimes of persecution, murder, inhumane acts (forced relocation) and deportation in the municipalities of Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most and Vlasenica also took part members of the Territorial Defense (TO). The council found that certain paramilitary formations also participated in certain crimes, whereby: Mauter's men, Pere Elez's unit, Čosa's unit, SOS, Kunarč's unit, Andžić's unit, Praštal's unit and units under the command of Branko Basara, at the time of the crime, were subordinated to the VRS and MUP of the RS, while: the Šešeljevci, the White Eagles, the Suva Rebra and the Martićevci only cooperated in crimes, but were not subordinated to the VRS and the MUP of the RS. Ibid, par. 4228-4230

79 Ibid, par. 4686-4688

80 Ibid, par. 4611-4612

81 Ibid, par.

that they were being implemented with the participation of members of the Bosnian Serb military and political leadership, including Radovan Karadžić, Stanislav Galić, Dragomir Milošević, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević.⁸²

During the court proceedings, the Trial Chamber established that the immediate perpetrators of terrorizing the inhabitants of Sarajevo through sniping and shelling campaigns were members of the Sarajevo-Romanian Corps of the VRS (SRK),⁸³ and that Ratko Mladić, among other things, (i) worked on the establishment of the SRK in May 1992; (ii) made personnel decisions in SRK; (iii) commanded SRK units in various operations from 1992 to 1995; (iv) ordered the production and use of modified aerial bombs by members of this corps, (v) failed to investigate the crimes and/or punish the members of the SRK who committed them, and (vi) frequently issued orders for limiting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. In view of this, the Council found that the accused, with his acts with intent (*mens rea*),⁸⁴ *significantly contributed to the achievement of the goal of the joint criminal enterprise in question*, i.e. contributed to the spread of terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo by conducting a campaign of sniping and shelling, by committing criminal acts of *terrorism, illegal attacks on civilians and murders*.⁸⁵

Bearing in mind this contribution and participation of Ratko Mladić in the aforementioned joint criminal enterprise, on this basis the Trial Chamber declared him guilty (responsible) for acts of a) *violence with the primary aim of spreading terror among the civilian population (terrorization), as a form of violation of the laws and customs of war*, b) *unlawful attack on civilians, as a form of violation of laws and customs of war*,⁸⁶ te c) and c) *murders*, which were committed as part of crimes against humanity.⁸⁷ and c) *murders*, which were committed as part of crimes against humanity.⁸⁸

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense in the analyzed decision, the Trial Chamber established beyond a reasonable doubt that from around May 25, 1995, when NATO airstrikes on Bosnian Serb targets began, until approximately June 24, 1995, when the last member of the

82 Ibid, par. 4740

83 Ibid, par. 4892

84 Ibid, par. 4921

85 Ibid, par. 4895

86 Ibid, par. 3189-3206; 3207-3212

87 Ibid, par. 3044-3052, 3057, 3063-3065

88 Ibid, par. 5141-5142

UN staff was freed, the aforementioned joint criminal enterprise existed, and that the participants in that enterprise were members of the Main Staff of the VRS, members of the VRS corps command, Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević.⁸⁹

For the implementation of the mentioned criminal enterprise, the participants of the same used individual soldiers and officers of the VRS (including members of the Military Police and policemen) as direct executors, who captured and detained between 260 and 400 UN military observers and members of UNPROFOR during the indicated time period in Pale, in Banja Luka, Brčko, in Sarajevo and its surroundings and in Goražde,⁹⁰ which represents the criminal act of taking hostages.

With regard to the accused Ratko Mladić, the Council stated, *inter alia*, that he was directly involved in every stage of hostage-taking, as well as that he ordered the VRS units to detain members of UNPROFOR, and that his contributions were key to the realization of the joint the goal of this joint criminal enterprise.⁹¹

Accordingly, the Trial Chamber on this basis declared him guilty (responsible) for the criminal offense of *taking hostages*, which is a form of *crime of violation of the laws and customs of war* referred to in Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY.

Given that the accused Ratko Mladić was convicted of the aforementioned crimes on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the ICTY), the Trial Chamber acquitted him of the charge of superior responsibility (*so-called command responsibility*) (Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Statute of the ICTY), referring to the earlier practice of the ICTY⁹² that in the case when someone is accused of both forms of responsibility based on the same facts, the court should declare him responsible only for the first form of responsibility, and *the position of his superior should be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance when weighing penalties*^{93, 94}

89 Ibid, par. 5141-5142

90 Ibid, par. 5136

91 Ibid, par. 5056-5063

92 The ICTY second-instance judgment in the *Aleksovski* case, para. 183; The ICTY second-instance judgment in the *Čelebići* case, para. 745; The ICTY second-instance judgment in the *Blaškić* case, para. 91; The ICTY second-instance judgment in the *Kordić and Čerkez* case, para. 34

93 The Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Ratko Mladić case, para. 5166

94 In accordance with the provisions of Art. 7. paragraph 3 of the Statute of the ICTY if any

Taking into account the character and scope of the aforementioned crimes, and appreciating certain mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Trial Chamber sentenced the convicted Ratko Mladić to *life imprisonment*.⁹⁵

3. The Appeal procedure

Given that the ICTY ceased to operate in 2017, appeal proceedings against individual defendants who were prosecuted in the first instance before this court, including the defendant Ratko Mladić, continued before *the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Courts (IMRC)*,⁹⁶ as a body of the United Nations which represents the legal successor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Rwanda, which ceased to operate in 2017 (ICTY) and 2015 (ICTR),⁹⁷ and which, in addition to conducting the remaining appeal procedures, is also responsible for some other questions.⁹⁸

of the criminal acts under the jurisdiction of the ICTY were committed by a subordinate, his superior cannot be exempted from criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had already committed them, and he did not take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators. In this regard, it should be pointed out that in some cases the Trial Chamber undoubtedly established certain facts that imply the command responsibility of the accused Ratko Mladić, as, for example, in the case of sniping and shelling of Sarajevo by members of the Sarajevo-Romania Corps (SRK) of the Army Republika Srpska, whereby the accused failed to conduct investigations into criminal acts and/or to punish members of the SRK who committed them (Ibid, para. 4921). However, due to the aforementioned practice, the ICTY did not explicitly declare him responsible for this form of responsibility. See more about the Institute of Command Responsibilities in International Criminal Law in: Bakone Justice Moloto, *Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals*, Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. vol. 3, 2009, p. 12-25; Miodrag N. Simović, Milan Blagojević, Vladimir M. Simović, *Međunarodno krivično pravo*, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Istočnom Sarajevu, 2013, p. 169-182

95 Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Ratko Mladić case, para. 5212

96 In the meantime, appeal proceedings in the cases of Radovan Karadžić, Vojislav Šešelj and Ratko Mladić have been completed before the Mechanism's department in The Hague, while repeated proceedings against Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović are ongoing. (See: <https://www.irmct.org/bcs/cases/mict-15-96> Retrieved at 23 May 2022.)

97 The IMRC has two branches: a) in Arusha (Tanzania), which took over the functions of the ICTR, and b) in The Hague (Netherlands), which took over the functions of the ICTY.

98 In this regard, the IMRC is also responsible for possible repeated trials, i.e. the implementation of procedures for reviewing final judgments passed by the ICTY, monitoring the execution of sentences for those convicted before this court, keeping and managing the ICTY archives and performing other so-called of residual functions More

At the end of 2018, the accused Ratko Mladić and the Prosecution, as parties to the proceedings, submitted their final appeal submissions (appeals) to the Trial Chamber's decision to the Appeals Chamber of the MRMKS.

The Appeal Panel of the MRMKS (hereinafter: the Appeal Panel) composed of: Prisca Matimba Nyambe (Chairperson), Aminatta Lois Runeni N'gum, Seymour Panton, Elizabeth Ibanda-Nahamya and Mustapha el Baaj after the previously conducted procedure on June 8, 2021 made a decision (verdict) on appeals.⁹⁹

The appeal panel, with *the dissenting opinion* of presiding judge Prisc Matimba Nyamba, rejected Mladić's appeal regarding a) the so-called comprehensive joint criminal enterprise b) joint criminal enterprise related to Sarajevo, c) joint criminal enterprise for Srebrenica, as well as d) arguments related to alleged violations of his rights to a fair trial. Also, the Council rejected his appeal allegations regarding e) the joint criminal enterprise of taking hostages of UN military observers and members of UNPROFOR, unanimously.

Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the conclusions of the Trial Chamber on the responsibility (guilt) of Ratko Mladić for the crime of *genocide in Srebrenica*, for persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and other inhuman acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity, as well as for murder, terrorism, unlawful attacks on civilians and hostage-taking as *a violation of the laws and customs of war*.

In the end, the Appeals Chamber rejected the prosecution's appeal in its entirety, with *the dissenting opinion* of Judge Aminatta Lois Runeni N'gum and Judge Seymour Panton, and accordingly confirmed the conclusion of the Trial Chamber that Ratko Mladić was not guilty of the crime of genocide committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in Foča, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Vlasenica.

In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Ratko Mladić by the Trial Chamber, with the dissenting opinion of Judge Prisca Matimba Nyamba.

in: Marin Bonačić, *Međunarodni rezidualni mehanizam za kaznene sudove: funkcije i odnos sa hrvatskim pravosuđem*, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 64, No. 5-6, 2014, p. 1067-1078.

99 See: <https://www.irmct.org/bcs/cases/mict-13-56> (Retrieved at 23 May 2022.)

Concluding remarks

Ratko Mladić, former commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, was indicted by the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY on the basis of the original indictment from 1995 and four amended indictments for participating in the commission of criminal acts (crimes): a) *genocide*, b), *crimes against humanity*, and c) *violations of the laws and customs of war*, committed by members of the VRS, RS MUP and certain paramilitary formations against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1992 to 1995.

The prosecution based his individual criminal responsibility on his alleged participation in four joint criminal enterprises. Since 1995, the accused Ratko Mladić was on the run until 2011, when he was arrested and handed over to the jurisdiction of the ICTY.

The initial proceedings before the Trial Chamber of the ICTY began on May 16, 2012, and the presentation of evidence lasted more than four years. The parties in the proceedings presented their closing arguments in the period from December 5 to 15, 2016. On November 22, 2017, the Trial Chamber concluded the first-instance proceedings in the case of Ratko Mladić and announced its decision (verdict), by which it declared the accused responsible (guilty) for participating in and significantly contributing to the achievement of the criminal goals of four joint criminal enterprises, which resulted in the commission of terrible crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, namely:

- a) a joint criminal enterprise with the aim of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which Bosnian Serbs claimed rights, by committing crimes in municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (the so-called *comprehensive JCE*);;
- b) a joint criminal enterprise whose goal was to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo, by carrying out a campaign of sniping and shelling of the civilian population;
- c) joint criminal enterprise with the aim of eliminating Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica in July 1995, and
- d) a joint criminal enterprise with the common goal of taking UN members hostage in order to force NATO to refrain from airstrikes on Bosnian Serb military targets.

The Trial Chamber established that the masterminds and participants of these criminal enterprises were Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić and other high-ranking representatives of the military and political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, who used their official political and military authority to influence individual members of the VRS, the MUP of the RS and of certain paramilitary formations to commit horrific crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1992 to 1995.

On the basis of the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused Ratko Mladić had a significant contribution to the achievement of the goals of all four joint criminal enterprises, which resulted in the commission of terrible crimes, and which the Trial Chamber found to have the legal characteristics of a) genocide, b) persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and other inhuman acts that constitute *crimes against humanity*, as well as c) murder, terrorism, illegal attacks on civilians and taking hostages as part of *the crime of violating the laws and customs of war*.

Regarding genocide, which is a “crime upon crimes”, the Trial Chamber found him guilty of genocide in Srebrenica, while acquitting him of responsibility for genocide in other municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Taking into account the character and scope of the aforementioned crimes, and appreciating certain mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Trial Chamber sentenced the convicted Ratko Mladić to *life imprisonment*.

In response to this decision of the Trial Chamber, Ratko Mladić and the Prosecution, as parties to the proceedings, submitted their final appeal submissions (appeals) to the IMRC Appeals Chamber at the end of 2018. The appeals procedure was conducted before the Appeals Chamber of the *International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Courts* (IMRC), which represents the legal successor of the ICTY, which ceased to operate in 2017. On June 8, 2021, the Appeals Chamber of the IMRC issued a decision (judgment) on the appeals, rejecting all appeal allegations of the Prosecutor’s Office and the defense of Ratko Mladić, and confirmed the verdict of the Trial Chamber.

In this way, the proceedings against the accused, who during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1992 to 1995, commanded the Army of the Republic of Srpska, whose individual members committed crimes of an apocalyptic nature against the non-Serb population

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and who reached its criminal culmination in July 1995, when members of the Army of the Republika Srpska and other formations under the command of Ratko Mladić committed genocide in Srebrenica, which is often referred to by the public as the biggest crime in Europe after World War II.

And although the conviction and life sentence imposed on this “bloodthirsty of Srebrenica” brought some satisfaction to the families of the victims of genocide, due to the frequent occurrence of denial and trivialization of this crime, but also a kind of triumphalism¹⁰⁰ that is reflected in the fact that part of the public in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbia Mladić and other convicted war criminals are celebrated as national heroes, the families of the victims of the genocide in Srebrenica are today experiencing additional trauma and secondary victimization.

* * *

In the end, bearing in mind that the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the IMRC rejected all grounds of appeal of the defense of Ratko Mladić and the Prosecutor’s Office, and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Chamber in all relevant conclusions, the content of the judgment of the Appeals Chamber is not analyzed in detail in this paper.

100 Although, within the framework of studies on genocide over the past few decades, certain scientific authorities (Gregory Stanton) have determined that the crime of genocide does not occur and does not end at one moment, but that it takes place through several (ten) stages, the last of which is the denial of genocide, certain Bosnian-Herzegovinian researchers point out with reason that the denial of genocide does not necessarily represent the last phase of it, and that an even more terrible phase can follow that phase. It is a phase that is reflected in the celebration of the criminals who committed genocide and the glorification of their criminal heritage, while at the same time humiliating the victims, which during the last decade is more and more often observed in the narratives used by certain individuals in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbia. Hariz Halilović, an Australian researcher of Bosnian-Herzegovinian roots, marks this new (eleventh) phase of genocide as the phase of triumphalism. See: Hariz Halilovich, *Globalization and Genocide*, in: Ali Farazmand (eds.), *Global Public. Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*, 2017, p. 7

More about specific manifestations, examples and phases of denialism and triumphalism over the victims of the Srebrenica genocide in: Hikmet Karčić, *Triumphalism: The Final Stage of The Bosnian genocide* u: John Cox, Amal Khoury, Sarah Minslow (eds.), *Denial: The Final Stage of Genocide*, Routledge, 2021., p. 108-110; Hamza Karčić, *The Four Stages of Bosnian Genocide Denial* in: Sead Turčalo, Hikmet Karčić (eds.), *Bosnian Genocide Denial and Triumphalism: Origins, Impact and Prevention*, Faculty of Political Science University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 2021, p. 47-52

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**ANTIRATIONALISM, LIE, HATRED AND THE GENOCIDE
AGAINST BOSNIAKS**

- A contribution to the study of genocidal content in the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of the Serbian great state-

ABSTRACT

It is more or less known that the spiritual and cultural carriers, inspirers and ideologues of the political programs of the Serbian great state are: the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), the Association of Writers of Serbia (UKS) and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC). On the influence and role of these institutions, through the various program contents they built, on the war against the Bosnian society and state in from 1992 to 1995, and the crimes of genocide against Bosniaks, it is true, an enviable number of papers have been written, but not all segments of the role of their program contents have been fully explained in a scientifically relevant way. Also, science has determined that the most important social factors of national integration, not only in South Slavic peoples, but in general are: state, culture and church. This is particularly pronounced in the development of Serbian national identity. National-political, national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical Serbian great-state projects were created on those bases, not separately from each other, but on the contrary, they form a unique structure of the entire Great Serbian national ideology and practice. In previous works on the causes of the genocide against Bosniaks, the influences of the national-political Great Serbian programs were emphasized and quite explicitly analyzed. The genocidal content in the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of the Serbian great state has been scientifically treated much less. For these reasons, on this occasion we will analyze some examples of anti-rationalism, lies, hatred, in the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of Greater Serbia and their influence on the crime of genocide against Bosniaks, not only in the war against the Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995, but since the beginning of the so-called national liberation movements in South Slavic areas.

Ključne riječi: antirationalism, lie, hatred, genocide, Bosniaks, nacional-cultural Great Serbian programs.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of realizing the ideology of one nation, one state in South Slavic areas caused very negative impacts on the self-realization of the Bosniak nation and the establishment of a sovereign and independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a “testing ground” for competing large-state projects from Serbia and Croatia, whose regular occurrence was the genocide of Bosniaks. The national programs of the Serbian and Croatian great states deny both Bosnia and Bosniaks as socio-historical and political subjects. The crudest and most brutal forms of denial and contestation of the Bosniak nation and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina are found in the ideological content of large-state ideologies and their political projects. Planned and systematic, the Bosniak nation is contested and denied with the intention of taking away its right to exist¹ and thus the right to a state. In order to implement great state programs, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s neighbors used the most monstrous means, such as genocide. Every social practice, including genocide, is preceded by an idea, that is, an idea-spiritual preparation. On this occasion, we will deal with the analysis, understanding and explanation of anti-rationalism, lies and hatred contained in the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of the Serbian great state and their influence on the formation of genocidal ideology, and the realization of the genocidal process itself. There are several reasons why this topic should be explained scientifically. We will mention only a few, in our opinion, the most important. Many authors deny or perfidiously cryptoize the role of culture and religion, more precisely the abuse of culture, religion and science,² in the crime of genocide against Bosniaks.

1 Indeed, there are few living peoples on planet Earth who have been “contested” in a national sense for longer and more recklessly, in various ways, disavowed, persecuted, killed, their past encrypted, etc., as is the case with Bosniaks. It is an indisputable and well-known truth that Bosniaks are the only living European people who, today, live more in communities in diaspora around the world than in their own state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 It is justified to ask the question where are the strongholds of the (mis)use of science as a basis for stereotypes and prejudices and interpretations of the Bosnian state and society, the Bosniak nation and false narratives about “national liberation” movements. We think that they are in opposition to scientific and ideological truth through scientific truths and false narratives about Bosnian society and Bosniaks. In order to understand the genocide against Bosniaks, it is necessary to recognize the truth that the power of science

The second reason is that, which is indisputable truth, Bosniaks are the only European people³ against whom the crime of genocide was committed in the twentieth century. This crime has been perpetrated against Bosniaks continuously, by the same spiritual-ideological and state-political entities for more than three hundred years. The third reason why we believe that this topic should be dealt with is that the result of the content of the mentioned national programs is a frightening amount of untruths, i.e. lies, anti-rationalism and hatred towards Bosniaks, which has so far resulted in two, simultaneous, socio-historical processes. The first is not only the effort for the political disappearance of Bosniaks, but also the effort for their complete biological disappearance due to continuous genocide or ethnic cleansing in their own country with further ideological production of an ideology that stereotypically portrays Bosniaks as “Poturice (exp. somebody who became a Tuk)”, “Turks”, “Muslims”, “traitors of the people and the ancestral faith”, “killers of Christ” (read “Tsar Lazarus”) and the alleged greatest threat to Christian Europe. Those are all the very lies that produce hatred, undesirability and ultimately genocide towards Bosniaks. The fourth reason is to point out the need for a critical review of the literature written on this topic in general, and especially the demystification of certain quasi-scientific books such as: “Bosanski rat”, by Dobrica Ćosić;⁴ “Srebrenica: deconstruction of a virtual genocide”, by Stefan Karganović and Ljubiša Simić.⁵ There is also the book “Konfesija u

and ideological power rest on different intentions. Science thinks reality and ideology manipulates with thinking about reality. The socio-historical facts are indisputable that Bosniaks and the state of Bosnia (and Herzegovina) exist as objective realities, but that by using anti-rationalism, lies and hatred in the national ideologies of the Serbian and other great states, they try to deny the end result of genocide. In order to avoid ideological manipulation, it is necessary to respect the basic scientific postulates, namely objectivity and experiential verifiability. Scientific objectivity and truth must also be impartially measured. The basic measure of human existence is, precisely, life. There is no such idea, including the idea of national freedom, which would include the crime of individual and collective killing of people for its realization. The very idea of a national state, which is reached through national liberation movements, is essentially ethnocentric and destructive.

- 3 It is an indisputable truth that the crime of genocide was committed against the Jews in the Second World War, but it is also true that Jews, in the territorial and political sense, are not a European but a Middle Eastern people.
- 4 Ćosić, D., *Bosanski rat*, Službeni list, Beograd, 2012. More in: *Ćosićev rat*, - A collection of papers from scientific and technical conversation on a book “Bosanski rat“ by Dobrica Ćosić, held on May 3rd, 2012. at the Rectorate of the University of Sarajevo - University of Sarajevo, Institut for the Research of Crime against Humanity and International Law, Sarajevo, 2013.
- 5 Ćosić, D., *Bosanski rat*, Službeni list, Beograd, 2012. More in: *Ćosićev rat*, - A collection of papers from scientific and technical conversation on a book “Bosanski rat“ by Dobrica Ćosić, held on May 3rd, 2012. at the Rectorate of the University of Sarajevo - University

ratu” by Ivan Cvitković,⁶ which, in truth, does not belong to the categories of books mentioned above, but, in a very “argued” way, quasi-scientifically, it cryptifies the genocide against Bosniaks⁷ and the role of the SPC in the same crime, committed in the war against of Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995. A particularly important issue is the content of the literature used as school literature and textbooks. The fifth reason for dealing with this topic is to point out that the genocide against Bosniaks is not a local phenomenon, some local, unimportant war crime, but on the contrary, it is a global crime, equal to the crime of the Holocaust, Auschwitz,⁸ the Gulag, the death fields in Cambodia and other places of execution and shame of an inhuman spirit that is made up of “crazed bipeds”⁹ all over the planet, and is caused, among other things, by the contents of the Serbian national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs, in which anti-rationalism, lies and hatred towards Bosniaks are most dominantly present. The work and works of many Serbian writers, linguists, historians, theologians and other “cultural workers”, strongly influenced the creation and political practice of the Greater Serbian national policy.¹⁰

For a more explicit analysis of these issues, it is necessary to write a separate and comprehensive study. On this occasion, we will mention, in our opinion, only the most significant names of Serbian cultural workers¹¹ and church dignitaries and briefly analyze their works and publicly expressed views, as a kind of national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of the Serbian great state, emphasizing the content of anti-rationalism, lies and hatred towards Bosniaks and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is impossible to completely separate the contents of anti-rationalism, lies and hatred because they are dialectically connected in the texts, condition each other, complement each other and together form a complex spectrum of socio-cultural and socio-religious conditions for the emergence of fascist Serbian genocidal ideology.¹²

of Sarajevo, Institut for the Research of Crime against Humanity and International Law, Sarajevo, 2013.

6 Cvitković, I., *Konfesija u ratu*, Svjetlo riječi, Blicdruk centar, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2004.

7 Cvitković, I., *Konfesija u ratu*, Svjetlo riječi, Blicdruk centar, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2004.

8 Cvitković, I., *Konfesija u ratu*, Svjetlo riječi, Blicdruk centar, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2004.

9 Cvitković, I., *Konfesija u ratu*, Svjetlo riječi, Blicdruk centar, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2004.

10 Cvitković, I., *Konfesija u ratu*, Svjetlo riječi, Blicdruk centar, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2004

11 The most significant names of national-cultural activity of the Serbian national ideology were: Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Jovan Cvijić, Dositej Obradović, Stojan Novaković, Milenko M. Vukičević, Radovan Samardžić, Ljubo Jovanović, Živan Živanović, Dušan Vasiljević, Vaso Pelagić, Petar Kočić, Jovan Dučić, P. P. Njegoš, Ivo Andrić, Vuk Drašković, Matija Bečković and others.

12 The most significant names of national-cultural activity of the Serbian national ideology

The question is justifiably asked whether neo-Chetnism, the ideology that carried out the genocide against Bosniaks, is a South Slavic form of neo-fascism. The facts of destruction, the types of crimes committed, including genocide, show that it is. How did it happen? Fascism as an ideology does not need to be “reborn”, regardless of the fact that the fascist regimes were defeated in the Second World War. Fascism as an ideology continued to live in various socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-religious contents. With the defeat of the fascist political regimes, the other socio-cultural prerequisites for the emergence of various forms of neo-fascism today were not defeated at the same time, the most important of which are neo-Chetnism and neo-Ustašism. In order to be able to recognize and identify neo-fascist forms today, especially those directed against Bosnian society and Bosniaks, it is necessary to briefly familiarize ourselves with the basic characteristics of fascism as an ideology. **The basic elements of fascism are: anti-rationalism**, revolution, struggle, terror, community, inequality, leader, racism and nationalism.¹³ Let us look only at anti-rationalism in the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical contents of the Serbian great state. Anti-rationalism as a direct tool uses lies and other forms of stereotypes and prejudices, which all together produce hatred as the form and content of the genocidal process towards the Bosniak nation. It is indisputable and visible to both eyes the truth that Bosniaks are the only European nation that, due to committing genocide against it, today lives more in communities in diaspora around the world than in their own state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. Antiracionalism in national-cultural and national-religious programs of the Serbian great state

Anti-rationalism, as one of the most significant characteristics of the ideology of fascism, in the national-cultural and national-religious programs of Serbian great state is most explicitly expressed in the denial of the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state and Bosniaks as objective socio-historical, socio-political and socio-national identities. Anti-rationalism in culture and church documents and activities aims to enable the formation of the national state of Serbs in the multi-ethnic society of Bosnia and Herzegovina through

were: Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Jovan Cvijić, Dositej Obradović, Stojan Novaković, Milenko M. Vukičević, Radovan Samardžić, Ljubo Jovanović, Živan Živanović, Dušan Vasiljević, Vaso Pelagić, Petar Kočić, Jovan Dučić, P. P. Njegoš, Ivo Andrić, Vuk Drašković, Matija Bečković and others.

13 More in: S. Ravlić, *Savremene političke ideologije*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2003, p. 241-246.

the political sphere of society. In order to achieve this, everything is Serbized, Bosnia and Bosniaks¹⁴ are disputed and denied. Serbian nationalists claim: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a Serbian country”, “All inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina are Serbs of the Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic faith.” The symbolic content expressed in the names of streets, schools and other public institutions is completely Serbized. Saint Sava, Jug-Bogdan, Tsar Dušan, Tsar Lazar, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and other historical and mythical figures were moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to express its so-called Serbian character. In order to realize such projects, anti-rational misuse of history, culture and religion is resorted to for political purposes. Consciously or unconsciously, the socio-cultural, political and ethnic identity content of Bosnia and Herzegovina, above all Bosniak, is encrypted and stereotypically represented. Bosnia has never ceased to be strategically interesting to its neighbors. The goal of Serbian and Croatian¹⁵ national-cultural and great state policies is to prevent the national emancipation of Bosniaks and make them people without a nation, culture and country.¹⁶ All the national-ideological wars that were fought in the South Slavic areas had the goal of encrypting the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a way as to wrap it in Croatian or Serbian state “cellophane”. So it is no wonder that Serbian and Croatian national ideology “disputes the very existence of Bosnia as a historical entity, confidently asserting that Bosnia was never a state”.¹⁷

Many analysts¹⁸ consider Vuk Stefanović Karadžić¹⁹ not only a reformer of the Serbian literary language, alphabet and spelling, a folklorist, but also one of the founders of the first national-political Serbian great state

14 More in: O. Ibrahimagić, *Srpsko osporavanje Bosne i Bošnjaka*, Magistrat, Sarajevo, 2001.

15 Just like the Serbian national-cultural ideology, the ideology and practice of the Croatian great state also existed on almost identical ideological programs. Due to space limitations, this time we will not deal with the analysis of Croatian national-cultural, national-political and national-religious programs.

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18 More in: Lj. Antić, *Velikosrpski nacionalni propgrami, Ishodišta i posljedice*, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2007, p. 23-63.

19 More in: Lj. Antić, *Velikosrpski nacionalni propgrami, Ishodišta i posljedice*, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2007, p. 23-63.

program. The first line refers to his article *Srbi svi i svuda*.²⁰ Spending and working a good part of his life in Vienna, getting acquainted with the European ideological and literary ideas of the national integration processes that had been completed in most of Europe, Karadžić realized the importance of working on the affirmation of the Serbian national identity. He realized that two social elements were very important for any national identity: religion (church)²¹ and language. For these reasons, even before the text *Srbi svi i svuda*, he began to work on the establishment of the ethnic and linguistic boundaries of the Serbian people. Thus, in the book *Montenegro und die Montenegrinen*,²² he claims that “all Montenegrins are Slavs of the Serbian branch of Greek law” but also disputes the position of “French Colonel Vial” who wrote in 1813 that the Montenegrin language is a “dialect of Greek”. Karadžić opposes everything that is not in the interest of the Greater Serbian idea. That is how he disputes “French diplomats, who (like de Pradt) divided the Turkish Empire and spread the borders of Greece to the Danube”.²³ From Karadžić’s answer, we learn one very important characteristic of the Serbian national identity, which is manifested in many literary works of Serbian authors to this day. This is how Karadžić responds to the “French diplomats”. “They could not have these ideas, if they knew that between Greece and the Danube there lives a people (Serbs, by A. Đ.), more numerous (sic) than the Greeks, and who clearly differ from them not only in language, origin and character, but also **national hatred** (pointed out by A. Đ.) and contempt”.²⁴ According to Karadžić, one of the significant characteristics of the Serbian national identity is: “national hatred and contempt”. Indeed, in the following texts we will see a large amount of hatred, above all towards Croats and Bosniaks and Islam as a religion. One hundred and fifty years after Karadžić’s claims, Vojislav Šešelj, and not only him, will confirm them with the words: “We are chauvinists, we hate Croats, what is fascist about that.”²⁵ Realizing the role of religion in the creation and overall identity of the Serbian nation, Karadžić opposes the expansion of the space and name of the “Greek” church beyond ethnic Greece, because he knew that the expansion of the church could also expand the Greek nation. When it comes to language, Karadžić, by proclaiming Novoštokavian as an

20 More in: Lj. Antić, *Velikosrpski nacionalni programi, Ishodišta i posljedice*, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2007, p. 23-63.

21 More in: Lj. Antić, *Velikosrpski nacionalni programi, Ishodišta i posljedice*, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2007, p. 23-63.

22 More in: Lj. Antić, *Velikosrpski nacionalni programi, Ishodišta i posljedice*, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2007, p. 23-63.

23 Ibid, p. 13.

24 Ibid, p.13.

25 Ibid, p.13.

exclusively Serbian language, expanded the borders of Serbia beyond its real ethnic boundaries. He did this most explicitly in the article *Srbi svi i svuda*,²⁶ which, in addition to the somewhat provocative title, also had the hallmarks of not only a cultural but also a political program. Karadžić's article began by listing the areas inhabited by Serbs in his time, then showed their religious affiliation and religious spatial distribution, claiming that there were 5 million of them.²⁷ According to Karadžić's data, we see that out of the 5 million Serbs at that time, only one million lived within the borders of ethnic Serbia, and three outside it. The rest of the Serbs are of "Turkish law" and "Roman law", that is, Muslims and Catholics. He planned, quite anti-rationally, to integrate them into one Serbian ethnic community by means of language, advocating the position that they were all Serbs who spoke the Štokavian dialect. Karadžić was aware that of his 5 million Serbs, which he stated, only three million were called Serbs and the rest were not. He is of the opinion that Serbs can also be those who are not called that at the moment²⁸ and who are not of "Greek law",²⁹ that is, they are of other religions. Karadžić wants to achieve this imagined, anti-rational, Serbian national integration, which is the function of the Serbian state, through language, because the language is the only thing left for him as an integrating factor. For these reasons, Karadžić's "program" is most often called "linguistic nationalism" in science. Karadžić finds the basis for his "linguistic nationalism" in *Pismu Haralampiju*³⁰ and other texts by Dositej Obradović. The way he conceals the ethnic names of other South Slavic peoples who "will not accept this name", Karadžić, most likely, uses the opinion of D. Obradović, who claims that all Serbs are not called the same

26 We will analyze the text and cite according to a book V. S. Karadžić, *Crna Gora i Boka Kotorska*, Beograd, 1969, p. 113-135.

27 We will analyze the text and cite according to a book V. S. Karadžić, *Crna Gora i Boka Kotorska*, Beograd, 1969, p. 113-135.

28 "Again we see a typical example of anti-rationalism. "Only the first three million are called Serbs or Serbljs, and the rest will not accept this name, but those of Turkish law think that they are real Turks, and so they are called, (...) and those of Roman law call themselves after the places where they live (...) or, as writers usually do, in a more ancient but God knows whose name."

29 Again we see a typical example of anti-rationalism. "Only the first three million are called Serbs or Serbljs, and the rest will not accept this name, but those of Turkish law think that they are real Turks, and so they are called, (...) and those of Roman law call themselves after the places where live (...) or as writers usually do, more ancient but God knows whose name."

30 "There is also a claim that all South Slavs but Bulgarians and Slovenians speak the same language". (Dragutin Pavličević, *Dva stoljeća velikosrpskih težnji prema Hrvatskoj 1793 – 1993*, Društvena istraživanja 4-5/1993, p. 247.)

in different regions but speak “purely Serbian”.³¹ From these positions we can clearly see since when the process of nationalizing Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Croats into Serbs has been going on and on what political and cultural premises. Today, we also see that history has denied the ideas of Serbian national-political and national-cultural programs, the truth is with many crimes against non-Serbs, including genocide. One of the biggest problems today is that in educational practice, the views of Serbian ethnologists and folklorists, as well as the contents of Kosovo and other warrior myths, are still studied as truths. There are even advocacy of at least the moral responsibility of ethnologists, folklorists and other spreaders of various forms of false historical narratives.³²

One of the most significant examples of the national-cultural program of the Serbian great state, along with examples of anti-rationalism, hatred and stereotypically false portrayal of Bosniaks that are difficult for the human mind to understand, can be found in Njegoš's³³ *Gorski vijenc*³⁴, rooted in the spiritual-dogmatized foundations of Orthodox, i.e. Saint Sava or Serbo-Slavic spirituality, which makes the “foundation” of the Great Serbian nationalist ideology and culture. In that song, Njegoš interprets Bosniaks as “Poturica”, because they accepted Islam and because they express their religious content in a different way, different from the Orthodox. The key idea of Njegoš's interpretation of “Poturica” (local Muslims by religion, Bosniaks by ethnicity) is to portray and designate them as members of a foreign religion and culture and to say that as such they have no place in these areas. That is why he calls for their extermination, instead of living together.

31 Again we see a typical example of anti-rationalism. “Only the first three million are called Serbs or Serbljs, and the rest will not accept this name, but those of Turkish law think that they are real Turks, and so they are called, (...) and those of Roman law call themselves after the places where live (...) or as writers usually do, more ancient but God knows whose name.”

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33 Radivoj Rade Petrović, Montenegrin ruler Petar II and poet Njegoš (1813-1851), is one of the founders of Serbian nationalist ideology with his literary and political work.

34 Radivoj Rade Petrović, Montenegrin ruler Petar II and poet Njegoš (1813-1851), is one of the founders of Serbian nationalist ideology with his literary and political work.

“Hit the cross, the heroic face” (...)

“Let’s baptize with water or blood!”

Let’s exterminate leprosy from the prison.”³⁵

In his demand for the establishment of the state of Montenegro, according to the nation-state formula, and according to the model of the countries of Western Europe, Njegoš does not leave even the minimum prerequisites for the other and different.³⁶ On the contrary, Bosniaks, as members of a different religious tradition, are presented as “foreigners” even though they are not; they are presented as people of counter-religion, even though they are only of a different confession of one and the same holiness, with characteristics of cultural and moral inferiority.³⁷ Indeed, even today, elements of fascist ideological content can be found in the contents of educational programs, first of all, in novels, short stories, epics, dramas and other literary genres, provided for in school literature but also in textbooks. “There is, for example, the problem of reading *Gorski vijenc* or the works of Ivo Andrić. Dr. Novak Kilibarda said that, if he were a Bosniak, he would not send his child to a Montenegrin school until a new reading of *Goski vijenac* was performed.”³⁸

In contrast to this ideological exclusivity and bigotry of the other, in this case Bosniak on the national level, and Islamic on the spiritual-ideological level, and in *Gorski vijenc* itself, unnoticed in previous interpretations, from the mouths of the Bosniaks Mustaj Kadi and Kavaz-baša “Ferat Zaćir” utters amazement to the offered anti-rationalism and expresses the possibility of the simultaneous living of two religions and two peoples in one space and in a unique political organization of society.³⁹

35 Njegoš, *ibid.*, p. 14.

36 E. Džudžević, *Kroz udžbenike se vrijeđaju Bošnjaci*, *Dnevni avaz*, 14 December 2002, p. 21.

37 E. Džudžević, *Kroz udžbenike se vrijeđaju Bošnjaci*, *Dnevni avaz*, 14 December 2002, p. 21.

38 E. Džudžević, *Kroz udžbenike se vrijeđaju Bošnjaci*, *Dnevni avaz*, 14 December 2002, p. 21.

39 „What are you talking about, have you lost your mind? (*ibid.*, p. 62.)

(...)

Although the country is pretty tight

Two faiths, I can agree

Like in a bowl that the soups go together

We live as brothers before

Well, they don’t need love anymore” (*ibid.*, p. 68.)

Njegoš is not alone in presenting prejudices and stereotypes towards Bosniaks.⁴⁰ The most striking example of the fetishization and satanization of Bosnia and Bosniaks can be found in the work of Ivo Andrić.⁴¹ His production of prejudices and stereotypes towards Bosniaks and Bosnia is all the more disastrous because he “expelled” the entire Bosniak culture, built under the influence of Islam and oriental civilization, but authentically Bosnian, not oriental, from Bosnia. He calls Bosniaks, as one of the socio-historical identities of the Bosnian “unity of differences”, “our Turks”, turning against them the entire negative memory, formed in the people of Bosnia, during the Ottoman rule. Andrić in his doctoral dissertation “*Razvoj duhovnog života u Bosni pod uticajem turske vladavine* (Development of spiritual life in Bosnia under the influence of Turkish rule)”⁴² refers to substantial Bosnian multilateralism, i.e. the meeting of Islam and Christianity, with the phrase “forced symbiosis”⁴³ and “forced coexistence.”⁴⁴ Andrić’s thesis is especially disastrous, stereotypical and inaccurate that the spiritual life of Bosniaks was “petrified in the forms of a foreign religion and an unknown language.”⁴⁵ It is obvious that Andrić understands Christianity as a domestic religion, and Islam as a foreign religion, although even less educated people know that both Christianity and Islam, by their territorial origin, are from the Middle East, and that they “came” to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in favorable historical moments, becoming at home in it, and in symbiosis with Bosnian tradition, each in its own way, influenced the dynamic development of autochthonous Bosnian ethno-confessional, cultural and national identities, which for millennia form the Bosnian “unity of differences.” One of the authentic Bosnian cultural

40 More on Andrić’s attitude towards Bosniaks and Bosnia see in:

- *Andrić i Bošnjaci*, BZK, Preporod, Tuzla, 2000.

- *Sveske*; Zadužbina Ive Andrića, god. I, Sveska. Beograd, 1982.

41 More on Andrić’s attitude towards Bosniaks and Bosnia see in:

- *Andrić i Bošnjaci*, BZK, Preporod, Tuzla, 2000.

- *Sveske*; Zadužbina Ive Andrića, god. I, Sveska. Beograd, 1982.

42 More on Andrić’s attitude towards Bosniaks and Bosnia see in:

- *Andrić i Bošnjaci*, BZK, Preporod, Tuzla, 2000.

- *Sveske*; Zadužbina Ive Andrića, god. I, Sveska. Beograd, 1982.

43 More on Andrić’s attitude towards Bosniaks and Bosnia see in:

- *Andrić i Bošnjaci*, BZK, Preporod, Tuzla, 2000.

- *Sveske*; Zadužbina Ive Andrića, god. I, Sveska. Beograd, 1982.

44 More on Andrić’s attitude towards Bosniaks and Bosnia see in:

- *Andrić i Bošnjaci*, BZK, Preporod, Tuzla, 2000.

- *Sveske*; Zadužbina Ive Andrića, god. I, Sveska. Beograd, 1982.

45 More on Andrić’s attitude towards Bosniaks and Bosnia see in:

- *Andrić i Bošnjaci*, BZK, Preporod, Tuzla, 2000.

- *Sveske*; Zadužbina Ive Andrića, god. I, Sveska. Beograd, 1982.

values, alhamijado literature, Andrić qualifies as “hybrid poetry.”⁴⁶ He seems to mean by this that Bosnia’s entire encounter with oriental culture and Islam is hybrid. Perhaps this is best confirmed by Andrić’s following position: “The literary activity of Muslim writers (Bosniaks, by A.Đ.) in the Turkish language, even when it was not insignificant and certainly deserved attention, cannot be the subject of our work, because by language and in spirit they belonged to the sphere of another culture.”⁴⁷ Given that he was fascinated by the name and literary work of Njegoš, Ivo Andrić accepts his description of the “Turkification” of the Serbs. The presentation of the Bosnian society and the Bosnian lifestyle as backward and anachronistic, buried by orientalism, which Andrić clearly does not understand, are the main content of Andrić’s literary works such as “Omer Paša Latas”, “Travnička hronika”, “Na Drina ćuprija”, “Nemirna godina” and “Pismo iz 1920. godine”. Andrić became famous for his descriptions of hatred⁴⁸ and intolerance in Bosnia. According to Andrić, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a wonderful and unusual country, but at the same time it is also “a country of hatred and fear”.⁴⁹ The Bosnian man is not aware of that hatred, whose correlative is fear. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are more people who are ready to kill or be killed in acts of unconscious hatred, than in other Slavic and non-Slavic countries that are much larger in terms of population and size.”⁵⁰ Bosnians were condemned. to live “on deep layers of explosives that are ignited from time to time precisely by the spark of your love and your fiery and ferocious sensitivity. Perhaps your greatest misfortune is precisely that you have no idea how much hatred there is in your loves and passions, traditions and pieties.”⁵¹

46 *Sveske, Zadužbina Ive Andrića*, p. 189.

47 Ivo Andrić, *Razvoj duhovnog života u Bosni pod uticajem turske vladavine*, p. 118.

48 I. Andrić, *ibid*, p. 117

49 *Sveske, Zadužbina Ive Andrića*, p. 189

50 I. Andrić, *Razvoj duhovnog života u Bosni pod uticajem turske vladavine*, p. 117.

51 If we accept Andrić’s position on the issue of Bosnia, in the sense that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country of hatred, how do we explain the father’s reaction to the wounding of his three-year-old daughter, who was wounded by a Serbian sniper in the Sarajevo settlement Olimpijsko selo at the beginning of the anti-Bosnian war. When he described that event in front of the TV cameras, he said: “I would like to see that man, drink coffee with him and ask him why he shot my child.” (*Srbi o Srbima*, „Jesmo li čudovišta“, CID-Centar za istraživanje i dokumentaciju Saveza logoraša Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, 2001, p. 246.). Therefore, Ivo Andrić’s claim is provisional and scientifically unfounded. This event, and numerous others, denies Andrić’s claim that Bosnia is a country of hatred, because the reaction of a desperate man, the father of a seriously wounded girl, is not hatred. “The root of that hatred should also be sought among the articles and books that were published before the war, publishing production, above all historiography, which glorified “own” and slandered “foreign” nation, developing towards it a model of relationship that we call hatred.” It seems that a part of

Serbian orientalists Aleksandar Popović, Darko Tanasković, Nada Todorov, Miroljub Jeftić and Mile Nedeljković⁵² are a special example of labeling Bosniaks with a colorful array of anti-rationalisms and untruths. They present, in the service of the implementation of the Serbian nation-state program, Bosniaks as remnants of the past, bearers of violence, traitors to Serbia, and all with the aim of isolating Bosniaks, depriving them of the right to organize political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “The key thread of the Orientalist campaign is centered on the idea that Muslims belong to an exotic and foreign religion and culture, and that the conclusion follows that they could never have a place in Europe! Therefore, Muslims supposedly have less legitimacy to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina than Serbs, despite the fact that Muslims are actually the native population, while Serbs are the newcomers.”⁵³ Serbian Orientalists, in their intent to present all Muslims (Bosniaks by A. Đ.) as a threat, not only to Serbia and the Serbian people, but also to modern civilization in general, and Islam “as something foreign and hostile”, in fact, they intend to form hostility⁵⁴ towards Muslims among the wider strata of the population and thereby justify planned crime. Since all Bosniaks, that is, Muslims as nominated by the Orientalists, are not believers, but on the contrary, a large number of them are secularists, even during socialism, members of the Communist Party, and according to the Serbian Orientalists, all of them should have been satanized as a “threat to modern civilization”, they invent, anti-rational, new phrases, such as “communist Islam”, “secular” and “secular Islamic fundamentalism”,⁵⁵ thus expanding its definition of “Islamic fundamentalism”. In presenting Bosniaks as traitors who still carry the guilt of alleged past crimes against the Serbian people, Jeftić claims: “Those who accepted Islam, accepted the *de facto* invaders as their brothers and their crimes as their own. This means that their hands are also stained with the blood of their own ancestors, the former Bosnian non-Muslim population.”⁵⁶

the Serbian literature suffered from the “anti-Serbism” complex. In it, Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians always hate Serbs because they are Serbs. Ivo Andrić claims that religious and national hatred is the historical fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A foreigner who walks through this ruined, burnt and desolate country, flooded with cemeteries and execution grounds, might think that Ivo Andrić was right.

52 Andrić I., *Priča o Vezirovom slonu*, Biblioteka DANI, Sarajevo, 2005, p. 285.

53 Andrić I., *Priča o Vezirovom slonu*, Biblioteka DANI, Sarajevo, 2005, p. 285.

54 Andrić I., *Priča o Vezirovom slonu*, Biblioteka DANI, Sarajevo, 2005, p. 286.

55 More in: N. Cigar, *Uloga srpskih orijentalista u opravdavanju genocida nad Muslimanima Balkana*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti I međunarodnog prava, Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo, 2000

56 More in: N. Cigar, *Uloga srpskih orijentalista u opravdavanju genocida nad Muslimanima Balkana*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti I međunarodnog prava, Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo, 2000

It is a truly rarely comprehensible construction of anti-rational guilt. Jeftić also claims that those who accepted Islam, as if people do not have the right to freely choose their own worldviews, “enabled the Ottomans to rule Bosnian Christians for a long time.” Darko Tanasković also holds a similar opinion about Bosniaks as traitors.⁵⁷

Writers Vuk Drašković and Matija Bečković made a significant contribution to the national and cultural programs of the Serbian great state, through, above all, the construction of false, imaginative, above all, anti-rational portrayals of Bosniaks as “insidious”, “foreigners”, and “not belonging to the European family of nations”. In his controversial novel *Nož*, published for the first time in 1982, which was later printed in several more editions, Drašković presents Bosniaks, or Muslims, as he calls them, as descendants of Serbs who changed their religion and thus betrayed their own nation. In addition to presenting them as “insidious”, “cold-blooded killers”, which is not in accordance with the real background of the Second World War, about which he writes in the novel, Drašković denies the very existence of Bosniaks as a legitimate socio-historical fact. In his other written works, Drašković continued the “frenzied offensive of intolerant Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sandžak and Herzegovina.”⁵⁸ Slaughter, bones, pits and graves are most often the subject of literary works by Serbian writers. The goal is to misuse those terms to mark “Serbian borders” even where there are no Serbs. Vuk Drašković is explicit in marking Serbian borders, and writes that they are “where Serbian pits and graves are!” The Serbian national program has an obligation to mark those boundaries.⁵⁹ Matija Bečković writes: “Graves are the greatest shrine and the oldest church of the Serbian people.” The grave is our longest and most persistent faith. We still swear by bones and graves, we still don’t have firmer support, better medicines, or firmer beliefs. (...) States fought because of bones, states stand on bones, fences are fortified with bones.”⁶⁰ That “Greater Serbia” should be even where there is not a single Serb, but that is what its planners want, confirms the position expressed by M. Bečković on the occasion of celebrating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Bečković says that Kosovo is “Serbia and that fact does not

57 More in: N. Cigar, *Uloga srpskih orjentalista u opravdavanju genocida nad Muslimanima Balkana*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti I međunarodnog prava, Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo, 2000

58 V. Drašković, *Šta menjati u ustavu*, a speech in the association of writers, Febrzary 5, 1988. In: *Koekude Srbijo*, 4. izdanje, Nova knjiga i Glas crkve, Beograd, 1990, p. 74.

59 V. Drašković, *Šta menjati u ustavu*, a speech in the association of writers, Febrzary 5, 1988. In: *Koekude Srbijo*, 4. izdanje, Nova knjiga i Glas crkve, Beograd, 1990, p. 74.

60 Ibid, p. 77.

depend on the Albanian birth rate, nor on the Serbian mortality rate. There is so much Serbian blood and Serbian holy places, that it will be Serbian even when not a single Serb remains there.”⁶¹

It is an indisputable fact that in the past, Orthodoxy and the Serbian Orthodox Church played the main role of the main bearer of national, cultural and religious identity among the Serbian people. Serbian nationalism is directly derived from the religious doctrine of St. Sava, it is perceived as a supreme collective value with a specific Serbian-Sacred Sava mentality, instead of a Serbian-Orthodox mentality.⁶² The followers of Svetosavlje as a specific Serbian-Orthodox teaching - in the lap of the SPC - assume the role of the leading ideological-theological doctrine of the Serbian national ideology.⁶³ In order to establish their ideological doctrine of sanctity in the Christian religious dogma as impressively as possible and thereby justify the “baptism in blood”,⁶⁴ read the killing of Bosniaks, the “Poturica”, “Serbian Jerusalem” is being built. And it was built in Kosovo, that is, by anti-rational mythologizing of everything related to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. It is important to note that until the emergence of national-political movements on the Balkan Peninsula at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Battle of Kosovo was not a significant theme of the Serbian epic. Until the nineteenth century, the main Serbian epic hero was Marko Kraljević. Since the nineteenth century, the role of the main Serbian epic hero has been taken by the Kosovo prince Lazar instead of Marko Kraljević. The reconstruction of Serbian mythology was carried out by Vuk Stefanović-Karadžić under the influence of German romantic nationalism, whose most significant representative was Johann Gottfried Herder. “As early as 1814, Vuk Karadžić began to emphasize the importance of the story about Lazar and Kosovo, when he published the first version of the famous Kosovo curse: ‘Whoever does not come to fight in Kosovo,/ his hand will not produce anything/ not even in the field of white wheat/ in the hill of vines.’”⁶⁵ The complete acceptance of the mythologized legend about Kosovo “Serbian Jerusalem”, which designated Bosniak “Slavic Muslims” as traitors of the Serbian race and murderers of the “Serbian Christ” Prince Lazar, was accepted in the second half of the nineteenth century. Petar

61 Ibid, p. 77.

62 D. Stojanović, *Traumatični krug Srpske opozicije, Srpska strana rata*, p. 80.

63 Ibid, p. 77-78.

64 Ibid, p. 77.

65 In a methodological sense, without analyzing the wider historical context of the activities of the SPC, we cannot understand the role of the SPC in the genocide against the Bosniaks in the period of 1992-1995. It is also necessary to get familiar with the phenomenon that we denote by Serbian Orthodox theology, which is inextricably linked with the national ideology of Great Serbia, of which he is both the main inspirer and an integral part.

II Petrović, the Montenegrin bishop, is a striking example of secularized Orthodoxy in the sphere of national politics.⁶⁶ At the same time, Njegoš is a key figure in the reconstruction of the story of Prince Lazar and his transformation into a holy church figure.⁶⁷ These events are an unequivocal example of the anti-rational nationalization of church holidays, all in the interest of realizing the political goals of the greatness.

The question justifiably arises, on what elements and premises is Serbian Orthodox theology based as an integral and inspiring part of Serbian great-state ideology?⁶⁸ Perhaps it is best to immediately state one point about the character of the Serbian Orthodox Church from its inception until today. “Since it was created, by the clairvoyance of St. Sava Serbian Church was more the bearer and guardian of Serbianness, that is, the Serbian national consciousness, than it was a religious institution.”⁶⁹ From where, then, does the Serbian Orthodox theology “spring” as part of the Serbian genocidal ideology?⁷⁰ It is precisely from the combination of national (Serbian) and theological (Christian-Orthodox). Even deeper roots go back, as philosophers would say, in the ontological sense, to the central, continuous and powerful symbol of Christianity, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, that is, the story of his martyrdom and death on the cross. It is logical to ask, what does this central symbol of Christianity have to do with the genocide of Bosniaks, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in the Balkans in general? The same question can be asked when it comes to the suffering of the Jews. The answer to this question will be clearer if we compare the genocidal suffering of the Bosniaks with the genocidal suffering of the Jews. The answer comes from understanding the relationship between the Church and the clericalization of society.⁷¹ The Serbian Orthodox Church⁷² has always appeared on the social

66 Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji*, Zagreb, 1988, p. 73.).

67 “Baptism in blood” implies killing people and how else to understand it than as anti-rationalism. A practice that has no basis in Christianity.

68 Ibid, p. 59-60

69 “We will illustrate this type of retheologizing of politics using the example of the political theology of Karl Schmitt, a political scientist, jurist and ideologist of German Nazism. His entire political theory and his entire political doctrine, both in their scientific and in their pseudo-scientific content, he will deduce from the basic thesis that all fundamental concepts of politics are nothing but secularized concepts of Christian theology. **Modern politics**, in his understanding, **is secularly prepared Christian political theology**. (emphasized by A. Đ.) In this sense, Schmidt will be explicit: all of them are: ‘... meaningful concepts of modern science of the state, secularized theological concepts.’ (Esad Zgodić, *Ideologija nacionalnog mesijanstva*, VKBI, Sarajevo, 1999, p. 22-23.).

70 Michael A. Sells, ibi, p. 65.)

71 E. Zgodić, ibid, p. 16-17.)

72 One more important fact of theological nature should be emphasized, namely that

scene as an ideological force seeking a place of power, not only religious, but also political in society. In order to gain power in all spheres of society, the SPC most often used anti-rational mythomania, which further produced deification.⁷³

Let us go back a bit to the explanation of the central symbol of Christianity (Christ's crucifixion and martyrdom) and its application (use and abuse) in the past, first of all, in relation to the suffering of the Jews. "In church services on Good Friday, in sermons that narrate the story of Good Friday by quoting the Gospels, as well as in the content of medieval depictions of the Passion of Jesus, Jews play a central role in Jesus' death. For those who want to harness the emotions produced by the performance of the Passion of Jesus for their own purposes, it was quite easy to fabricate and manipulate the accusation that the Jews were the murderers of Christ... Words from the New Testament that speak of Jesus' condemnation, such as: "His blood on upon us and upon our children" (Matthew, 27:25), could be taken out of context and applied to all Jews, with dire implications. From the time of the First Crusade in 1096, the accusation that the Jews were the killers of Christ was used to incite attacks on Jewish communities, which often reached the proportions of genocide. As official celebrations of Good Friday with depictions of the Passion of Jesus developed in Europe, attacks on Jews became a standard part of Easter Sunday, and until World War II, Jews in Europe stayed indoors during Easter Sunday to avoid being attacked. In the destruction of Jewish communities organized by the Nazis, accusations of the murder of Christ were often invoked. That accusation was particularly effective in inciting European churches and individual Christians in order to encourage them to cooperate with the persecutors."⁷⁴

Orthodoxy does not have a single, institutional organization, nor does it have a "all-Orthodox structure". On the contrary, Orthodoxy is divided according to the principle of autocephaly, and for this reason it is impossible to say what is Orthodox and what is not. Each Orthodox (national) church determines for itself what is Orthodox. That's why we use the phrase Serbian Orthodox Church, ideology or theology here, which corresponds to the socio-historical reality..

73 The simplest meaning of deification is that persons, institutions or natural phenomena are revered as divine beings. More simply, turning the ungodly into a god. Here is an example of turning Serbian into divine:

„Nebo je modre srpske boje
Na njemu stanuje Srbin Bog
Do njega anđeli Srbi stoje

I dvore Srbina Boga svog.“ (Navedeno prema: Lj. Antić, n.d., str 42.)

74 Michael A. Sells, *Iznevjereni most, religija i genocid u Bosni*, Sedam, Sarajevo, 2002, p. 50-51.

The Serbian-Orthodox theology of the martyrdom and death of Prince Lazar of Kosovo was built on the same ideological matrix, based on the misused Christian theology of the “Passion of Jesus” and accusations that Jews are the murderers of Jesus, only now the culprits, that is, the murderers of Prince Lazar, are not Jews but Muslims. “At the heart of the agitation launched by Serbian radicals against Yugoslav Muslims ⁷⁵ was a mythology that depicted Slavic Muslims as the murderers of Christ. **How could members of a religion that arose six centuries after Jesus’ death be responsible for his death?**⁷⁶ (emphasized by A. Đ.). The answer lies in the central event of Serbian national mythology, in the martyrdom of Prince Lazar. (...) According to Serbian tradition, Lazar’s death marked the end of Serbian independence and the beginning of the five-year reign of the Ottoman Empire. During the nineteenth century, Serbian nationalist writers transformed Lazarus into an explicit historical figure, surrounded by a group of disciples participating in the last supper, betrayed by Judas. Lazar’s death represents the death of the Serbian nation, which will not be resurrected until Lazar is resurrected from the dead, and the descendants of Lazar’s killers are purged from the Serbian nation. According to that story, the Ottoman Turks play the role of Christ’s killers. Vuk Branković represents those Slavs who converted to Islam under the Ottoman Turks, as well as all Serbs who are ready to live with the Turks.”⁷⁷

One of the most extreme anti-Islamists in the Serbian Orthodox Church and certainly one of the most significant founders of the Serbian Orthodox, that is, the Serbian-Serbian theology of genocide, is Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović.⁷⁸ In his work *Iznad istoka i zapada*, Velimirović Velimirović speaks of Bosniaks, that is, all Slavic Muslims, as persecutions and thus continues the shaping of the Serbian-Svetosava genocidal theology whose ontological essence is found

75 The most dominant ethnic-national group of South Slavic Muslims are Bosniaks.

76 It is an unequivocal example of anti-rationalism in the Serbian great-state ideology based on the anti-rationalism of the national-church programs of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

77 Michael A. Sells, *ibid*, p. 51- 52.

78 Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović was born on January 5, 1881 in the village of Lelići near Valjevo. He graduated from the Faculty of Theology and continued his education in Russia, Germany and Switzerland and earned a doctorate in theological sciences. He obtained the title of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Oxford. Nikolaj Velimirović was elected bishop of Žiža in 1919, and was then transferred to the Ohrid Eparchy, then returned to Žiža in 1934. At the end of World War II, Patriarch Gavriilo and Bishop Velimirović, after being released from the Dachau concentration camp, stayed for a while in Western European countries, from where Bishop Velimirović went to the USA and Patriarch Gavriilo returned to Serbia. Nikolaj Velimirović died in the USA on March 18, 1956. In May 1991, in the organization of the SPC, the remains of Bishop Nikolaj were transferred from the USA to Serbia.

in Christ-Slavism.⁷⁹ The presentation of Bosniaks, Slavic Muslims, as traitors to the “great-grandfather’s faith” is also clearly recognized in this statement by Velimirović: “They break crosses in their houses, and they wear turbans around their heads, and they start performing ablutions and worshiping in mosques.” Thus, he extended his earthly life for a little while and lost his face forever. There is no shame in the blood of Lazarus in Kosovo.”⁸⁰ Many Serbian Orthodox theologians consider Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović “the greatest Serb after St. Sava.”⁸¹ Such a high opinion of the SPC church authorities on Nikolaj Velimirović influenced the church’s decision to transfer his remains to Serbia, in order to use the dead Velimirović to revive his theology because he is “always current and contemporary”. This means that the ideas of his teaching are “always current and contemporary”. Velimirović’s position on the similarity between Saint Sava and Adolf Hitler is particularly interesting. The interesting point of highlighting the similarities between the world’s greatest fascist-Nazi ideologue and leader and the greatest Serbian theologian and “enlightener”, the “Serbian saint St. Sava” is really big and deserves a more detailed analysis than the space of this paper allows. In the work *Nationalism of St. Sava*, bishop Velimirović points out: “that the national church, i.e. the fight for it, ‘the basis of true, evangelical and organic nationalism’ and that such a church was created for the Serbian people by Saint Sava. He finished that work, he finished it without a fight and without blood, and he finished it not yesterday or the day before, but 700 years ago. Hence, Serbian nationalism is, as a matter of fact, the oldest in Europe. What the Serbs have had for a long time, many, even the most cultured nations of the West have not yet achieved. “No one of all the European peoples has succeeded completely in this business as Saint Sava succeeded. Well, neither the English, nor the Scandinavians.’ (...) But, while the intellectual and political leaders of European countries took desperate steps and created unbridgeable chasms between themselves and the people, in one European country its leader did not make such a mistake. Of course, we are talking about the Third Reich and its Führer (leader) - Adolf Hitler. “Nonetheless, respect must be paid to the current leader of Islam,” says Bishop Nikolaj, “who, as a simple craftsman and a man of the people, saw that nationalism without faith is an anomaly, a cold and uncertain mechanism. And here in the 20th century, he came up with the idea of Saint Sava, and as a layman he undertook the most important work among his people, that only befits a saint, a genius and a hero. And for us, Saint Sava,

79 Michael A. Sells, *ibid*, p. 73.)

80 <http://www.rastko.rs/svecovek/duhovnost/vnikolaj/vnikolaj-istokzapad.html>

81 Milorad Tomović, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, Medijska knjižara Krug, Beograd, 2001, p. 37.)

the first among saints, the first among geniuses and the first among heroes in our history, completed that work.”⁸² The results of Adolf Hitler’s ideology are known to everyone, one of the results of that ideology is the Holocaust of the Jews in World War II. The results of Serbian-Saint Sava theology as the basis, the central point of Great Serbian nationalism, “the oldest in Europe”, are still insufficiently known, both to scientists and to the wider European and world public, and they should be known. What is known and what is one of the results of the Serbian Orthodox theology of genocide is the genocide of Bosniaks, committed not only in the war against Bosnian society from 1992 to 1995, but which, unfortunately, has been going on since the beginning of the emergence and political activity of Serbian “organic nationalism”, which was “created by Saint Sava” and which is “the oldest in Europe.” The killing of Muslims, above all Bosniaks, turns into a supreme ritual national value which gradually forms the basic mental characteristic of the Serbian army, but also of the majority of the Serbian people.⁸³ The Great Serbian ideology of “holiness” is characterized by three main ideological elements: militarism in the political sphere, larceny or getting rich by robbery in the economic sphere, and dishonor in the moral sphere. This social process could not have happened without the inseparable connection and mutual interactive interpenetration of church and politics. “By offering communion to the Serbian warriors, even though they were not previously asked to confess, the Serbian Orthodox priests took the “investigation of poturica” out of the category of blood revenge. Instead, they presented the investigation as a sacred act in itself, implying a baptism in blood. However, there lies the catch. In the Christian doctrine of baptism in blood, a martyr is one whose sins are washed away by baptism. Through this investigation, the murderers who baptize the little ones in blood become worthy of communion and receive complete forgiveness for their sins. Killing Turks or poturica becomes not a self-important but a holy act, elevated to the same level of sacredness as baptism or confession.” to the axiomatic saying: “a pot is worse than a Turk.”⁸⁴ Za iznalaženje opravdanja za zločin nad Bošnjacima, te da bi ga prikazali kao opravdan čin, izmišljena je negativnija karakteristika za njih nego za Turke u aksiomatskoj izreci: „poturica gori od Turčina“. As we see, the “Poturica investigation”, from its spiritual-ideological foundation, as a Serbian-Orthodox theology of genocide, and practical political implementation, with the aim of forming a national state of Montenegrins, i.e., Serbs, continues to work, even as time goes on, it intensifies, intensifies the

82 Milorad Tomović, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, p. 40.

83 Mujo Slatina, *Socijalno-psihološko razumijevanje srpskoggenocidnog ponašanja, u: Genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995, Zbornik radova, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 1997, p. 121.)*

84 Michael A. Sells, *ibid*, p. 64

brutality of killing and spreads territorially.⁸⁵ The intensification of the crime of genocide against Bosniaks is especially intensified after the acquisition of the status of a vassal autonomous principality of Serbia⁸⁶ within the Ottoman Empire in 1830.

2. Lie as the essence of “Serbian patriotism and confirmation of our (Serbian by A. Đ.) innate intelligence“

In addition to anti-rationalism, one of the basic characteristics of the content of the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of the Serbian great state is a lie. The Greater Serbian national programs are leading the fight against the thousand-year-old socio-historical state of the Bosnian society and the state, which is the harmonious existence of the “unity of differences”. What kind of anti-rationalism and lies it is, it doesn’t take much effort to understand. One only has to ask: is there anything more normal in the entire existence of the human race than society as a *sui generis* phenomenon, which in its ontological essence can only exist as a unity of differences (racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, sexual, regional, etc.). The difference in the unity of the Bosnian society and the state is not an exception to the universal rule of existence of human society. None of the teachings (scientific, philosophical, theological, and others) except the fascist one bring or deny the unity of the differences of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s multilateralism. The main directions of non-patrimonialism as a modern form and result of the ideology of the Serbian great state, it was shown as “left-wing fascism”,⁸⁷ i.e. “rationalist secularism”⁸⁸ expressed in the politics of “left-wing” political parties in the

85 More in: S. Ćekić, *Historija genocida nad Bošnjacima*, Muzej grada, Sarajevo, 1997. The paradigmatic nature of the genocidal suffering of Bosniaks at the hands of the same national-ideological persecutors, and the mental structure of the persecutors, as a characteristic of their national consciousness, is perhaps the most striking evidence of the opinion of a Serbian peasant, a neighbor of Bosniaks from Užice during their persecution. “When they set off for Bosnia, the head of the column was in Kadinjača, and the tail was in the town.” The Serbian army followed them singing. ‘When you decide to move again’ - one of the ‘eras’ said to the neighbors the day before yesterday - ‘don’t look for someone else, but tell me to come and move you again’.” (Safet Bandžović, *Muslimani u Smederevskom sandžaku: progoni i pribježišta (1804-1862)*, in: „150 godina od protjerivanja muslimana iz kneževine Srbije, Zbornik radova, Medžlis Islamske zajednice Orašje, Orašje, 2013, p. 40.)

86 Muhamed Filipović, *Korijeni agresije*, u: *Genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995*, Zbornik radova, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 1997, p. 156.)

87 H. Arendt, *Totalitarizam*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 1996, p. 226.)

88 The phrase “rationalist secularism” is used by Benedikt Anderson in the book: *Nation:*

Republic of Serbia and the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska, or as a “right-wing” nationalist ideology of the Serbian great state, are aimed at negating Bosnia and Herzegovina, everything Bosnian (and Herzegovinian) and Bosniaks as the quintessential Bosnian people. For the creators of the Greater Serbian national programs, there is nothing Bosnian, the adjective Bosnian in the names of cities,⁸⁹ streets, institutions, and language⁹⁰ is negated. There is no Sociology of Bosnian Society in the curricula and programs of universities in the Republic of Srpska, but that is why there is Sociology of Serbian Society. Individuality is suppressed and the dominance of the (Serbian) community is imposed. Why? Because one of the highest values and characteristics of the fascist ideology is the community understood either as a state or as a nation and it precedes the individual but also completely determines him. In this way, a new type of man is built, like Nietzsche’s superman. It is important to be a Serb, everything else is irrelevant, unimportant, all that is not Serbian does not even have to exist. The Serbian man is a soldier, he defends the community, he is a hero, a “liberator” even when he commits crimes, when he kills, rapes, slaughters, burns, demolishes and destroys cities. In order to achieve all that, they resort to anti-rationalism and various forms of lies. The lie as a means of manipulating the truth and its denial in the contents of the national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of Serbian nationalism is most visible in the abuse of history in politics. We will mention only a few typical examples from the recent history of the “Serbian lie”. Example one: Dobrica Ćosić in the novel *Deobe* confirms our claim in the most explicit way. Ćosić says: “We lie to deceive ourselves, to comfort another, we lie out of compassion, we lie out of shame, to encourage, to hide our misery, we lie for honesty, we lie for freedom.” A lie is a form of Serbian patriotism and a confirmation of our innate intelligence. We lie creatively, imaginatively, intuitively.” The second example refers to the denial of the genocide against Bosniaks in the

The Imagined Community, Plata, Belgrade, 1998, p. 22

- 89 Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Bosanska Kostajnica, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanski Novi and many other towns named with the adjective Bosnian no longer bear that name, but only Brod, Šamac, Kostajnica, Dubica, Novi Grad. This was done only after the intervention of the institutions of the international community and the judgments of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because those cities were given names with the adjective Serbian, e.g. Bosanski Brod was named Serbian Brod. A rarely seen lie and anti-rationalism, isn’t it.
- 90 In order to avoid the name Bosnian language, which is the mother tongue of Bosniaks and other peoples who consider it their mother tongue, in the entity constitution of the Republika Srpska, Article 7 paragraph 1 states: “The official languages of the Republika Srpska are: the language of the Serbian people, the language of the Bosniak people and the language of the Croatian people.”

“UN Protected Zone of Srebrenica” in July 1995. In addition to the obvious evidence that the crime of genocide against Bosniaks was committed and that it was done by the army and police of Republika Srpska⁹¹ the authors of the Great Serbian ideology lie. Stefan Karganović and Ljubiša Simić (claim) lie: “The official version of Srebrenica is a colossal bluff.” In another place, they repeat the lie claiming that: “everything related to Srebrenica is just one big lie and that nothing significant happened there in July 1995.”⁹² Example three: in the book with the cryptographic title *Bosanski rat*, Dobrica Ćosić lies about the causes of the war against Bosnian society and state in 1992 and claims: “Muslims (Bosniaks, o.p. A. Đ.) declared war on the Serbs until the complete conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the extermination of the Serbs from the first Muslim republic in Europe.”⁹³ Everyone knows that never in history have nations declared war on each other, but states. In the case of the war against the Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995, it is clear to all objective analysts that it was an aggression by the state of Serbia and Montenegro and the JNA, which was the armed force of that state, against the sovereign and internationally recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today’s Serbian lie as a specific and original content, not only of the national programs of the Serbian great state, but also the creator of Neo-Chetnism, as a Serbian neo-fascist movement, is not a recent phenomenon, nor did it originate with Dobrica Ćosić, but has a long tradition and represents a separate and autochthonous socio-ideological and a cultural phenomenon that deserves

91 To this day, for the crime of genocide, he blames Bosniaks in the war against Bosnian society and the state in 1992-1995. a total of 23 persons were sentenced by the ICTY, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the German courts. The ICTY convicted 7 persons, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 13 and the German courts 3. More than 700 years of prison sentences were handed down before the same courts for genocide and other crimes committed in Srebrenica. Let’s remember that the entire civilian and military leadership of Republika Srpska was convicted of genocide against Bosniaks: Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Ljubomir Beara. Vujadin Popović, Dragan Nikolić, Radoslav Krstić, Milorad Trbić and others.

In the *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, in three places (pp. 125, 215, and 637-640), it is explicitly mentioned about the genocide of Bosniaks in the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995. In April (1992 by A.Đ.) Bosnian Serbs, supported by paramilitary forces from Serbia, began a carefully planned campaign in which they systematically expelled Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks, by A.Đ.) from towns and villages in the eastern and northern Bosnia, and there were also numerous examples of genocidal massacres of Muslims (Bosniaks, by A. Đ.) carried out by Serbs. (*Encyclopedia of genocide*, p. 640) (emphasis added by A.Đ.)

92 S. Karganović, Lj. Simić, *Srebrenica: dekonstrukcija jednog virtualnog genocida*, Fond „Istorijski projekat Srebrenica“, Beograd, 2011, p. 16. It should be noted that this foundation is financed by the RS Government.

93 D. Ćosić, *Bosanski rat*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2012, p. 9.

separate scientific research and explanation. In this appendix, we will cite one, in a series of authentic anti-rational, difficult to understand for a healthy human mind, example of lies as the dominant form of the content of the Greater Serbian national programs. In Zagreb's "Srbobran",⁹⁴ the ideologue of the Serbian Independent Party and its member since 1890, Sima Lukin Lazić, perhaps in the most authentic way expresses the lie as the content of the Serbian national ideology and all its anti-rationality, which, unfortunately, is woven into the deepest structures of the political mentality of the Greater Serbian nationalist ideology and which has been maintained as such until today and is manifested as such. On the pages of Srbobran's calendar for the year 1894, Lazić writes, that is, he lies, that: "the cradle of the Serbs was India, and there the Serbs created their first state in unremembered times about ten years before Christ, which was divided into: Sarabarska and Panovska Srbija. But hunger, wars and large numbers forced the Serbs to migrate, so a part came to Mesopotamia and founded Nova Sarabaska there. Another part inhabited Russia, and those from Mesopotamia Asia Minor and North Africa. Those from Russia moved around Europe, and settled in Polish, Czech and German countries, where they founded Greater Serbia, then Panovska Serbia in Austrian, Hungarian and Croatian countries. Serbs also settled in Italy and Spain. Roman emperors such as Emperor Trajan, Adrian and others are Serbs. Under the leadership of their great leader Totilo, the Serbs overthrew the Western Roman Empire, but the sources of the time called them Vandals."⁹⁵ To the criticism and attacks, which he rightfully received, Lazić replied: "I would lie day and night, I would lie like a dog. The question is justified: why does he lie so anti-rationally and admit it openly and publicly. Lazić says that he is doing this so that he could "make his family and people happy" with those lies, because he is aware that he cannot build a Serbian great-state ideology with the truth. In the book "Serbs in ancient times", Lazić lies about the Serbs as the most powerful, famous, most scientific and numerous people, "to which the whole world would have to submit." Was not Hitler's fascist ideology based on the political goal of subduing the whole world? Lazić lies that the Serbs "certainly trace their descent from Noah (Nuh, by A.Đ.) and his son Japheth. There were also Serbs in the Semitic countries. (...) Lazić also writes that Jesus Christ "our Lord and Savior, according to his earthly origin, was - God forgive - a Serb! Or the Serbs are God's closest relatives."⁹⁶

94 *Srbobran* was the publication of the Serbian Independent Party in Croatia, which was launched in 1884. It significantly influenced the formation and character of the political opinion not only of Serbs in Croatia but also in other South Slavic countries.

95 M. Artuković, *Ideologija srpsko-hrvatskih sporova (Srbobran 1844-1902)*, Zagreb, 1991, p. 134-135.

96 M. Artuković, *ibid*, p. 136.

Persistence on generally accepted lies as truth created and constructed a false myth about national liberation movements and wars without going into all segments of the structural content of those movements and struggles, into their character, first of all whether war crimes were committed, human rights and freedoms were violated, and similar forms of violence and destruction. This constructed and accepted narrative represents tacit consent and approval of all crimes committed in the so-called national liberation struggles and national movements. In the entire “liberation” struggle of the Serbian people against the Ottomans/Turks and later, because it did not stop, according to the protagonists of that struggle, until Mladić’s “liberation” of Srebrenica in July 1995⁹⁷ the unity of revenge and dedication expressed in the formula “Who he does not take revenge, he does not commit himself”. This formula could only be created in the symbiosis of the nation and the church. In all documents of the Serbian Orthodox Church from the mid-eighties of the 20th century, there are statements about the sacrificial role of Serbs. Slobodan Milošević based his entire political ideology on this matrix of the threat of Serbs. The entire activity of Serbian politicians and the activity of SOC activists were dedicated to one goal, and that is to take revenge for the alleged crimes against the Serbs committed by the Turks, read Bosnian Muslim Bosniaks, and thus become holy, dedicate themselves. “In order for the stories about the ‘defensive war’ of the Serbs to reach specific people, Bishop Irinej in Greece in October 1992 presented the formula: ‘The united forces of the Vatican World Council of Churches and Muslims, mostly descendants of those Serbs who converted to Islam, turned are against parts of the Serbian population within today’s Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, with the intention of exterminating the Serbs and totally destroying them’. (...) Budapest bishop Danilo Krstić enthusiastically confirmed to the Serbs ‘not only the right, but also the duty to kill’, as protection against the papal ‘crusade against the Serbs’, which goes hand in hand with the holy war of Muslims against the Serbian population of Bosnia . The clumsy combination of a belligerent nation and the church came to light for the first time in May 1993, when four Serbian bishops together with intellectuals sent a call for help to the ‘Orthodox Russian brothers’: ‘Send your ships from the Danube to sail in the Adriatic Sea, we want your planes to appear in our skies,. Help us to get rid of our jailers’ (They meant the ‘Western

97 Presumably learned from the textbooks of Serbian history, Serbian epic tradition and teachings of the Serbian Orthodox Church, convicted of the most serious crime of genocide before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the commander of the army of the Republika Srpska Ratko Mladić said during the capture of Srebrenica: “Here we are on July 11, 1995. year in Serbian Srebrenica, on the eve of another great Serbian holiday, we present this city to the Serbian people. And finally, the moment has come to take revenge on the Turks in these areas after rebelling against the dahi.”

superpowers’).”⁹⁸ “Unification of the warlike nation and the church”, was established, as it had been countless times before, in the national-religious use of the Kosovo myth. While the new Serbian political leader, Slobodan Milošević, is organizing the celebration of 600 years since the battle in Kosovo, which was held on Vidovdan, June 28, 1989,⁹⁹ at the same time, the Serbian Orthodox Church is carrying out the remains of Prince Lazar of Kosovo as one of its activities. The bones of Prince Lazar were transferred to the Gračanica monastery, located in Kosovo, in 1988, Bishop Jovan Velimirović of Šabačko-Valjevski,¹⁰⁰ said on that occasion: “From Prince Lazar and Kosovo, the Serbs primarily created the HEAVENLY SERBIA, which has certainly grown into the largest heavenly state to this day.” If we only take the innocent victims of this last war, the millions and millions of Serbian men and women, children and the weak, killed or tortured in the most terrible torments or thrown into pits and caves by Ustasha criminals, then we can understand how much the Serbian empire is in the heavens today.¹⁰¹ On heavenly Serbia”, the theologian priest Božidar Mijač writes the following: “In Kosovo, the Serbian people voted with their souls for the Kingdom of eternity, and that was and remains their only real decision. Since then, all Serbs, faithful to that vow, become God’s people. Christ’s New Testament nation, heavenly Serbia, an integral part of the new Chosen People of God.”¹⁰² Why does the SPC need to build a mythical reality and replace the historical objective reality with it. We can find the answer in the attitude of archpriest Božidar Madžar, who, like Matija Bečković, claims that Serbia can exist where “not a single Serb remains”, and that “ideogenesis is more important than ethnogenesis”.¹⁰³

Even today, the SPC, guided by the Serbian-Orthodox theology of genocide, continues to perpetrate violence against Bosniaks in a way that justifies the crimes committed against them in the past. It “makes Serbs” and “Orthodox” exclusively Bosniak areas in the RS, as evidenced by the following facts. The Ilindan Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro is

98 Anne Herbst, *Zagovara li srpsko-pravoslavna crkva religioznu ili nacionalnu mržnju?*, u: *Genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995*, Zbornik radova, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 1997, p. 111.)

99 M. Popović, *Vidovdan i krst časni, Ogledi iz književne arheologije*, Beograd. 1976, p. 131-132.)

100 Jovan Velimirović is a nephew of the Patriarch Nikolaj Velimirović. At the time he was a Bishop of the Šabačko-Valjevska diocese.

101 Cited according to Milorad Tomović, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, Medijska knjižara Krug, Beograd, 2001, p. 20- 21.

102 Cited according to R. Radić, *Crkva i srpsko pitanje*, u *Srpska strana rata*, Beograd, 1996, p. 312.

103 R.Radić, *ibid*, p. 305.

held every year in the month of August. Thus, in 2014, at the Ilindan Assembly in Sinjajevina, Lukavica and Komovina, Amfilohije Radović, unprovoked, supported the genocide against Bosniaks, known in Montenegrin tradition and culture as the “Poturica investigation”. By justifying that crime, today’s Bosniaks are directly threatened, not only by Montenegrin Bosniaks, but also by those in Sandžak, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Amfilohije “blessed” the slaughter of the “Poturica” with the following words: “Many still object today how dared Bishop Danilo do that.” Yes, it is terrible to kill people, but even more terrible is the spiritual death that these false people, with false faith, sow around them. That is why, thanking that victim, Bishop Danilo saved Montenegro. If that had not happened, today there would be no Orthodox ear in Montenegro,¹⁰⁴ and that should be kept in mind:¹⁰⁵ “What else does this attitude mean but the most blatant example of the Serbian-Orthodox theology of genocide in which Bosniaks are called “false people, with a false faith. “The SPC is still peacefully “orthodoxizing” Bosniak towns and even courtyards and memorials to the victims of the genocide. Proof of this is the Orthodox church built in Konjević polje, Bratunac municipality, in the yard of Fata Orlović. It was finally removed in June 2021, following a court order. An Orthodox church was built a few kilometers away in the exclusively Bosniak town of Nova Kasaba. It still stands today. In the immediate vicinity of the Memorial Center and the Martyr’s Cemetery, where the victims of the genocide against the Bosniaks of the UN Protected Zone of Srebrenica were buried in July 1995, the “Inat” Orthodox Church was built, most likely as a memorial to the crime against the Bosniaks, those “false people, with a false faith”, which was committed by the army and police of Republika Srpska.

The misuse of history for ideological purposes is still present today among the advocates and implementers of Greater Serbian national programs, as shown by numerous examples. One of the freshest is the attempt by the Serbian Orthodox Church to abuse history and try to turn the city of Srebrenica and its surroundings, where the Army of the Republika Srpska committed the crime of genocide against the Bosniaks of the “UN Protected Zone of Srebrenica” in July 1995, into an exclusively ethnic Serbian area by building a myth about Srebrenica as the alleged seat of the Serbian Orthodox bishopric which, again, without a single historically relevant source, was allegedly founded by the despot Stefan Lazarević.¹⁰⁶

104 (M. Cigar, *ibid*, p. 22.)

105 e-Novine, 5 August 2014 – 17:25

106 Ž. Teofilović, *Srebrenica u vrijeme srpskih drspota*, u: Zbornik radova, *Kulturno-istorijsko nasleđe Srebrenice kroz vijekove*, J.U. Arheološki muzej „Rimski muncipijum“ Skelani Srebrenica, Srebrenica, 2012, p. 164-175.

3. Hatred against Bosniaks as a “cultural value“ in the Serbian literature and the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church

A special scientific question is represented by “cultural values” in Serbian literature and the content of hatred they express towards Muslims (Bosniaks, Turks). We find incomprehensible hatred, as a “pathology of the mind”, as a “cancer of consciousness”,¹⁰⁷ in the literary works of many Serbian writers. We have listed some of them before, but one song by B. Radičević represents a “masterpiece” of hatred, and this time we interpret it In the poem *Ajduk*, Branko Radičević, one of the most important Serbian Romantic poets, perversely expresses his hatred towards the Turks as Muslims. On this occasion, we quote only part of the lyrics of the song.¹⁰⁸ This example and many other examples in Serbian literature represent more than hate speech, more than any “outpouring of hatred”, on the contrary, they are interpreted as “artistic and cultural value”, instead of being banned forever because they directly serve the purpose of building a genocidal pathology There are numerous examples of the perverting and legitimizing function of the ideology of the genocide against Bosniaks, which requires a special and comprehensive analysis and scientific treatment, which represent not only the “pathology of ideology” but the pathology of the mind, which has become serious in the

107 More in: Duvignaud, Jean, *L'ideologie, cancer de la conscience*, u: *Cahiers internationaux de la sociologie*, vol. 46., 1969.). Terry Eagleton claims that ideology, in some specific respects, “dulls the mind” even of highly educated people. P. Ricoeur talks about the “pathology of ideology” that occurs when the “insidious articulation” of its first (perverting) and third (legitimizing). (Ricoeur, Paul. *L'ideologie et utopie*, Paris: Seul, 1997.)

108 „...Oh ala mi raste kika
Kad pušaka stane cika,
Kad zagledam turskog skota,
Pa kad mi se s konja smota,
Kad mu glavu pseću zbrijem
Pa na kolac kad nabijem. (...)
Čekaj ago koji danak
Dat bijele bijem kule,
Da boravim laki sanak
Pored tvoje vjerne bule,
Da ti, ago, lulu pijem,
A kuranom kavu grijem.(...)
Pa da t' onda dočnem sreću:
Da ti glavu srubim pseću,
Da ti kulu njom okitim,
Ispod kule meso itim,
Nek ti vrane glavu kljuju,
Psi se psine nablajuju.“(<https://sr.m.wikisource.org>).

ideology of genocide. We will cite only one monstrous example expressed in fiddlers' Chetnik songs, which the Great Serbian national-cultural ideology calls heroic, but in fact, from the point of view of science, they represent the "cancer of consciousness" of Serbian nationalism. Here are the lyrics of that song. "Sleep peacefully, Fato, everything has been slaughtered for you, only Mujo is not, he is hanging by the gate." (<http://m.facebook.com> permalink). This is just one examples¹⁰⁹ of the perverting and legitimizing function of the national-cultural Great Serbian pathological ideology, i.e. the "insidious articulation" of the genocidal act, which unfortunately not only "numbs the mind" of certain layers of Serbian society, but also insidiously becomes a "cultural value".¹¹⁰

Before the written national-cultural programs, the Serbian, not only political, but also cultural mentality was built on epic poetry, the content of which is dominated by hatred and violence towards Bosniaks, which portray mostly Turks. Serbian, epic folk poetry was a substitute for historiography. Throughout the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century, Greater Serbian national programs were available only to the Serbian elite, as the majority of the Serbian population was illiterate. In Serbia in 1921, 65.43% of the population over the age of 12 was illiterate.¹¹¹ In Serbia in 1921, 65.43% of the population over the age of 12 was illiterate. Serbian authors confirm this in their works. Sreten Vujović writes in his discussion about Vuk Stefanović Karadžić: "Vuk Karadžić writes about the 'higher class' of our people." He assesses that the core of our people is "we are all peasants and heavy workers". Varošana has Turkish and Roman laws in the cities. In Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia, where the law is Greek, "one cannot even think that there are any other people than peasants and poor people, and in Serbia they are the most predominant."¹¹²

Why do we need these insights? To get to know the whole social reality in which Serbian folk epic songs were created, which together with the fiddle as an integral part, as well as the state and the church, represent the three basic social factors in the construction of the Serbian cultural and political mentality. The revitalization of folk songs and fiddlers before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina will play an important role, not only in the preparations for war, but also for the crimes committed against

109 (N. Cigar, *ibid*, p. 44-45.)

110 A special scientific question presen "cultural values" in the Serbian literature and contents of hatred that they express towards Muslims (Albanians, Bosniaks, Torbešs, Turks).

111 D. Stojanović, *Nekoliko osobina modernizacije u Srbiji, Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara*, I, Zagreb, 2000, p. 144.

112 S. Vujović, *Nelagoda od grada, Srpska strana rata*, Beograd, 1996, p.170.

non-Serbs, which undoubtedly have analogies in the same crimes in the past. In the biography of Đorđe Petrović Karađorđe Konstantin N. Nenadović about the crime of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Muslims during the “Karađorđe Rebellion”, he writes: “when he (Karađorđe) came to Belgrade, in a secret meeting of the Soviet, it was decided that all Turks, from the lower city clean up. He told Sulejman-Paša that he would not be allowed to be wounded anymore,¹¹³ but that he and all the Turks would leave the city and Serbia. Sulejman Paša asked for free departure, through Serbia to Niš. The Serbs let him, and on February 23, 1807. left the city, and with 200 janissaries, with their families, and accompanied by Serbs, he went to Niš, where, on the way a few hours from Belgrade, he encountered an ambush, indignant Serbs, who attacked the Turks, and the escort instead of defending it and they agreed with them, where they beat all the Turks, except for the only Paša, who surrendered to them, and sent him alive to Niš. However, after the departure of Sulejman Paša, many women and children remained in the Lower Town. On that same day, a revenge killing of the Serbs against the Turks flared up in Belgrade, to which, due to the revenge and bitter rage of the Serbs, neither the Dukes themselves, either dared or could, prevent the Serbs from doing so, and that killing lasted for two days, searching for and killing the hidden Turks houses. And only those who promised to be baptized were spared, as well as the Turkish poor. Their wives and children were spared, and sent to Nis under a strong escort on March 7. On that occasion, according to Sovetski’s conclusion, all the Čivuti and some of the Cincars, who were with the Turks, will be expelled from the country.”¹¹⁴ The credibility of this event is also confirmed by the report of the Austrian intelligence service. Unfortunately, in the Serbian folk song, the perpetrators of such and similar crimes are sung as heroes.

The scenes of cruelty¹¹⁵ that abound in Serbian folk heroic songs had a significant impact on the political mentality of the Serbs, an integral part

113 Food.

114 M. Grmek, M. Gjidara, N. Šimac, *Etničko čišćenje – povijesni dokumenti o jednoj srpskoj ideologiji*, Zagreb, 1993, p. 17-18.

115 We will mention only a few examples of cruelty in Serbian epic poems. In the song “Holy Cross”, Emperor Constantine in search of St. With the cross, he kidnaps the child from the Jewish empress and puts him “between two fires alive” trying to force the empress to tell him where St. Cross. When the “cursed Jewess” refuses to “show the cross” he orders. “Bring the child closer to the fire.” In the second poem, the hajduk Tošo punishes his own sister by cutting her with a sword, causing a child to fall out of her “so it rolls on the green grass.” In the poem “Captain Leka’s Sister”, Marko Kraljević takes revenge on the beautiful Rosanda by cutting off her right hand and takes out the eyes, puts them in a silk “primrose”, “and shoves them into her right breast”.

of which is the genocidal ideology towards the Bosniaks. Actualizations of ancient heroes and events “tend to reincarnate them as eternal symbols in the function of today’s politics and ideology.”¹¹⁶ Ivan Čolović rightly claims when he says: “today’s wars waged by Serbs are just a continuation of the previous ones, or rather their repetition, and today’s leaders are incarnated ancestors.”¹¹⁷ In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are no more comprehensive scientific works on the role of folk culture expressed through folk songs and traditions on the crime of genocide and other crimes, especially those committed against Bosniaks. In Croatia, Ivo Žanić and Maja Bošković Stulli, as well as M. Grmek, M. Gjidara, and N. Šimac, dealt with Serbian epic folk songs. The authors who researched this phenomenon rightly conclude: “Violence pervades all Serbian heroic poetry: in it, people are slaughtered, hands are cut, eyes are gouged out, teeth are broken, the wombs of pregnant women are opened, children are killed and people and goods are thrown into the flames, with ease and frequency that make the reader who has not been used to such a genre of books tremble since childhood”.¹¹⁸ It is to be expected that the behavior of people raised on the values of epic heroic songs will be similar to theirs. The question arises whether the emphasis on cruelty and cruelty in only Serbian epic poetry does not contribute to the birth of even greater hatred and destruction. What about the contents of Bosnian and Croatian epic songs.

We really need to investigate the historical problems of every social content and compare them. Research that we are aware of says that “neither in Croatian nor in Muslim (Bosniak, by A.Đ.) folk poetry are there any similar examples”¹¹⁹ of violence as in Serbian. This fact should not be ignored, but should also be investigated more explicitly. Maja Bošković Stulli claims that Goethe also dealt with the phenomenon of cruelty in the Serbian epic pose.¹²⁰ Challenging Bosniaks, by presenting unfounded prejudices,¹²¹ challenging their name and copying archaic and surviving negative images of the past onto them,¹²² portraying them as dangerous foreigners, producing hatred towards them,¹²³ are part of the spectrum of causes in the Greater Serbian national-cultural programs that led to genocide and other forms crimes against them. National-cultural programs significantly contributed to the process of

116 M. Bošković Stulli, *O usmenoj tradiciji i o životu* (drugo prošireno izdanje), Zagreb, 2002, p. 280.

117 Ibid.

118 M. Grmek, M. Gjidara, N. Šimac, *ibid*, p. 2

119 Frano Glavina, *Vukodlaci kao junaci*, Večernji list, 7 November 1992.

120 M. Bošković Stulli, *ibid*, p. 142.

121 F. Saltaga, *Bosna i Bošnjaci u srpskoj nacionalnoj ideologiji*, SALFU, 1997, p. 247.)

122 A. Tanović, *Bošnjaštvo i multikulturalnost*, u: *Bosanski duh*, Sarajevo, 1999, p. 82.)

123 N. Cigar, *ibid*, p. 25.)

dehumanization of¹²⁴ Bosniaks, as one of the essential stages of the genocidal process. The ultimate goal of the bearers of Serbian national-cultural programs was to Serbize Bosniaks through literature, newspapers and journalism, all with the aim of establishing large-state creations on the territory of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus end its existence and the existence of Bosniaks in it as the quintessence of Bosnian society and the state.

Magazines published in Bosnia and Herzegovina played a significant role in the national-cultural activity of the Serbian, that is, the Croatian national ideology, in the direction of “nationalizing the Bosniaks”, with the aim of realizing great state projects. The magazine “Bosanska vila”, which had the function of developing the Serbian national ideology in Bosnia and Herzegovina, tried to gather as many Bosniaks as possible around the Serbian national idea.¹²⁵ Osman Đikić, Avdo Karabegović Hasanbegov, Hasan Fehmi Nametak and Omer-beg Sulejmanpašić also collaborated in the magazine “Zora”. All Bosniak collaborators were considered Serbs by their very collaboration with these magazines.¹²⁶ The magazines “Bosanska vila”, “Zora” from Mostar and “Gajret” tried to impose a Serbian national identity on Bosniaks. A part of the educated Bosniaks succeeded in this. On the other hand, a part of the Bosniak youth who were educated in Vienna and Zagreb after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted the Croatian national identity. “Acceptance of Croatia by some Bosniak intellectuals, educated in the West, as a national name essentially meant a formal declaration, ‘acceptance of the style of the time’, which is shown by their activity and content commitment in the newspapers ‘Bošnjak’ and ‘Behar’.”¹²⁷ Limited acceptance of Serbian and Croatian national ideas, primarily through schools, the press, and other forms of national-cultural activity, was also facilitated by the fact that there was no developed Bosniak national ideology. We see that the Serbian and Croatian large-state ideology, in their efforts to nationalize the Bosniaks, engaged not only “their cultural, political, economic, social, educational, and even scientific forces to prove the Serbian and Croatian origins and feelings of

124 Thompson and Quest, *Genocid i socijalni konflikt*, (*Genocide and a Social Conflict*), p.154-255.)

125 Bosniaks, who cooperated in “Bosanska vila“ were: Mustafa Hilmi (Muhibić), Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, Riza-Kapetanović, Safvet-beg Bašagić, Salih Kazazović, Avdo Karabegović, Osman Đikić, Ali Riza Dautović, Hakija Temin, Omer-beg Sulejmanpašić, Sejfudin Kemura...

126 More in: M. Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo,1974, p. 169

127 A. Đozić, *Bošnjačka nacija*, Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo, 2003, p. 232

Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims,¹²⁸ but also individual Bosniaks intellectuals and "cultural workers".¹²⁹

In the 1990s, the Serbian Orthodox Church was actively involved in building hatred towards Bosniaks and other non-Serbs. The entire activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church was in the function of mobilizing the Serbian people for the impending, planned, wars of conquest planned by the state of Serbia and which were obviously jointly planned, and building hatred towards the non-Serb neighbors. In order to mobilize the Serbian people as intensively and emotionally as possible for the upcoming planned wars of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in May 1990, at the session of the Parliament, she made a decision and requested that "the remains of those killed in the Second World War be removed from the pits and buried with dignity." Before Prince Lazar's mortal remains were delivered to the Gračanica monastery, in 1988, the SPC took the "prince's relics" through the following dioceses: Zvornička-Tuzla, Šabacka-Valjevska, Šumadija and Žička, with great church and national festivities. Along with the "relics" of Knez Lazar, there was also a letter sent to the enemies of "bloodied and suffering Serbia" with an explicit genocidal message: "we will try to make sure that their tribe and knee are buried, so

128 Purivatra A., *Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, BKC; Sarajevo, 1999, p. 388

129 The long-term effect of the national ideologies of Bosniak denial and their nationalization in the direction of the Serbian, that is, the Croatian national idea, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, gave limited results only among a small number of Bosniak intellectuals. As Serbs among Bosniaks, they decided: Hamzaga Rizvanbegović, Rustembeg Bišćević, Mehmed Spaho, Musa Čazim Čatić (later declared himself as Bosniak and finally as Croat), Mehmed Ali-paša Rizvanbegović, Derviš-beg Ljubović, Osman Đikić, Avdo Karabegović, Salih Safvet Bašić, Selim Muftić, Fehim Musakadić, Velija Sadović, Mustafa Fočo, Ahmed Traljić, Derviš-beg Miralem, Salih Kazazović, Avdo Sumbul, Osman-Nuri Hadžić, Husaga Čišić (later Bosniak), Suljaga Salihagić (also later Bosniak), dr. Hamdija Karamehmedović, Šukrija Kurtović, Hamid Kukić, Murat Šarić, Hasan Rebac (first declared himself as Croat), Hadži Hamid Svrzo, Mehmed Zildžić, Mehmed Čišić, Muhamed Mehmedbašić, Avdo Hasanbegović, Alija Džemidžić, Rešid Kurtaić, Mustafa Golubić i dr. Mostly formally, Croatian national declaration accepted: Osman Nuri Hadžić (later Serb), Ademaga Fazlagić, Mehmed Ali-beg Kapetanović, Hajdar Fazlagić, Ahmed-beg Defterdarević, Šemsi-beg Salihbegović, Osman Midžić, Safvet-beg Bašagić (later pronounced Bosniak), Asim-beg Resulbegović, Avdi-beg Hrasnica, Halid-beg Hrasnica, Mehmed-beg Hrasnica, Hašim-beg Banjević, Edhem Mulabdić, Ademaga Mešić, dr. Hamid Šahinović Ekrem, Musa Čazim Čatić, Hamzalija Ajanović, te narodni poslanici Hasan Miljković, Džafer Kulenović, Nurija Pozderac, Husein Alić, Ahmed Šerić, Hamid Kurbegović, Osman Vilović, Šemsudin Sarajlić, Atif Hadžikadić, Derviš Omerović, Husein Mašić, Salih Babić, Mustajbeg Kapetanović, dr. Šefkija Behmen, Ismet-beg Gavrankapetanović, and others.

that history will not mention them.”¹³⁰ **“We will do everything we can to trample their tribe so completely that even history will not remember them”** (Proclamation that accompanied the solemn procession carrying the mortal remains of Prince Lazar).

Carrying the remains of Prince Lazar, exhuming and reburial of those killed in the Second World War, should not only be seen in the way of marking the borders of the future Serbian state, but also in the context of necrocracy” Since the mid-1980s, when intensive work began in Serbia to ‘take the holy place’ and ‘enrapture the whole people’, as Laza Kostić used to say, texts written by Bishop Nikolaja were regularly published in church magazines. . In this, ‘Glas crkve’, the magazine of the Eparchy of Šabac-Valjevska, was the leader... Through this magazine, a ‘showdown with the opponents of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović’ was conducted, an action was launched for the return of his relics from America, and a request was also made for ‘the proclamation of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović for a saint.’¹³¹ As we can see in the activity to “take the holy place and to enrapture the whole people” the SPC and the political leadership of Serbia with Slobodan Milošević at the head worked at the same time. The State of Serbia and the SPC entered the “holy alliance” not only in the 19th and 20th centuries, but much earlier”.¹³² Both benefited from this alliance. The SPC occupied an important place on the political scene of Serbia, and the state of Serbia legitimized itself through the church to be an outpost of Orthodoxy against Catholicism and Islam. “At the

130 Ibid, p.312.

131 M. Tomović, *ibid*, p.37.

132 That the “holy alliance” between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the State of Serbia, and the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity RS, is still active and that they continue the policy of political expulsion of Bosniaks from the RS is also shown by the ceremony marking the anniversary of the first constitution of the RS. On February 28, 2015, a formal reception was held in the City Assembly of Belgrade on the occasion of the Republika Srpska Day and 23 years since the promulgation of its first constitution, to which; among others, the President of the RS, Milorad Dodik, the President of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, the President of the National Assembly of the RS, the Prime Minister of the Government of the RS, Željka Cvijanović and the Patriarch of Serbia, Irinej, who said on that occasion: “Republika Srpska is the republic of all Serbs in the Republic of Srpska” and in the Republic of Serbia, but not only them, but all displaced Serbs on all continents of the world today.” (Federal television, Dnevnik 2, 28 February 2015, 19:37 hours, <http://www.federalna.ba>) In the RS, as we see, according to the opinion of Patriarch Irinej, there is no place for Bosniaks, Croats and others. If genocide is a crime against an ethnic, racial, political, religious or other social group, to partially or completely destroy that group in that area, and it is, what else could this attitude of Serbian Patriarch Irinej mean, in an ideological sense? until the continuation of the Serbian-Orthodox theology of genocide.

same time, Serbian Orthodoxy plays a key role through a special form of its church teaching: the cult of St. Sava (“svetosavlje”) (...) The cult of St. Sava thus falls dangerously close to teaching about “superhumans” and at the same time degrades the statement about salvation through Christ. Arbitrary national church teaching thus displaces general Orthodox dogmatics. In connection with the Kosovo myth (the Serbian defeat in 1389 in the conflict with the Turks was turned into a heavenly victory-’cosmic catastrophe’) he developed the cult of sacrilege into a kind of transformed national masochism, which also affects non-religious generations. Belief in the metaphysical magnitude of this defeat obliges individual indoctrinated Serbs to take revenge at any time.” Serbian national messianism¹³³ in conjunction with Serbian Orthodox theologians, appropriated and popularized to the limit the phrase “Who does not take revenge, does not dedicate himself”. To what extent anti-rationalism was used in building and spreading hatred through the theological dogma of Serbian Orthodox theology as Serbian Orthodox ideology is perhaps best witnessed by the Herzegovinian Bishop Atanasije Jevtić. He glorified the position of the Serbian people in world-historical development to such an extent, claiming that the Serbs have a “special position in God’s holy plan”, emphasizing at the same time the concept of the Serbian people as the “spiritualized people of God”, which in the sense of “special election” precedes the Jewish people. Bishop Atanasije Jevtić, hyperbolizing the sufferings of the Serbian people, claims that they are greater than the sufferings of Jesus. Jevtić, regardless of the obvious blasphemy, says “He (he means Jesus Christ, Rev. A. Đ.) suffered for five hours on the cross, and the Serbian people for five hundred years under the Turkish yoke.” In this theological-national preparation of the Serbian people for revenge against the “torturers”, Bishop Jevtić is not alone. Along with him are the then Metropolitan Amfilohije of Montenegro and the then Bishop Irinej of Bačka. In his book *From Kosovo to Jadovno*, published in 1984, Bishop Jevtić talks about the suffering of Serbs in the Ustasha camp in Jadovno on Velebit. “Orthodoxy”¹³⁴ from December 1, 1990, in an article entitled “Mučenicima na videlu dana (Martyrs in the light of day)” reports on the extraction of bones from the Jagodnjača pit, which is located in Popovo polje, not far from Ljubinja. The goal of the Serbian Orthodox ideological and theological activity was to show the planned subjects of the attack by the enemies, considering them guilty of crimes against the Serbian people from the past. At the same time, by producing enemies and labeling them as

133 More on Serbian messianism in: E. Zgodić, navedeno djelo, p. 201-221.

134 *Pravoslavlje* is the official newspaper of the Serbian Orthodox Church. It is published twice a month in a circulation of 10,000 copies. The first issue of Orthodoxy was published on April 14, 1967. *Pravoslavlje* is published by the Information and Publishing Service of the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

criminals or traitors, they wanted to justify the aggression against the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to reduce the conviction for the planned crime of genocide. On March 15, 1991, in order to convince the Serbian people of the Ustashism of the new Croatian authorities in *Orthodoxy*, a text by the Slavonic Bishop Lukijan was published under the title *Antisrpsko nastupanje hrvatske države* (Anti-Serbian Action of the Croatian State). Patriarch Paul's letter to Lord Carrington was published on the front page of *Orthodoxy* on November 1, 1991. In the letter, Patriarch Pavle, among other things, points out: "Serbs cannot live with Croats in any state." Not in any Croatia". At the same time, he proposes: "Parts of Croatia must be annexed to the mother of the Serbian people, the Republic of Serbia."

One of the most important events that unequivocally points to the "holy alliance" between the Serbian state and the SPC, and the role of the SPC in creating the Serbian Orthodox ideology of "imperial genocide", as Marko Veselica would say, took place in July 1991 during the ceremonial ordination and the enthronement of Atanasi Jectić as bishop of the Banat eparchy. Hadži Dragan Antić, reporting on this event in "Politica", wrote: "You can't remember in Vršac so many people and such notable guests at one church ceremony." For the first time, people's deputies of the Serbian Parliament, leaders of parties, among whom we saw Milan Babić from Knin, Mirko Jović from Nova Pazova, Žarko Gavrilović and Milan Komnenić from Belgrade, writers and members of the Writers' Association of Serbia, attended the induction of the bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church into the throne for the first time. Dragan Dragojlović, Minister of Religion in the Government of Serbia.¹³⁵ In Bishop Jectić's speech, the Serbian-Orthodox theology of genocide is clearly and unequivocally recognized, directed, first of all, towards Bosniaks, "evil and aggressive Muslims" and Croats. The bishop precisely named the areas from Lika in the west to Kosovo in the east that should be "liberated" the Serbian people because they are "again on the cross" and in a state of "martyrdom" from those who "stood up against the cross with three fingers". A clear warning to Bosniaks and Croats, because it was they who, according to Bishop Atanasije, stood up "against the cross with three fingers", Bishop Atanasije said in the following words: "Once again, the Serbian people are on the cross in Kosovo and Metohija, and in Dalmatia, and Krajina, and Slavonia, and Bania, Lika, Kordun, Srem, Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a people who are used to carrying the cross, because we are destined to carry the cross. At this time, I am asking God that we carry that cross with dignity as we have carried it until now. And that we can say differently than the wise

135 Cited according to: Milorad Tomović, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, p. 46.

Jewish woman said to the vicious and aggressive Muslims: ‘We forgive you for killing us, but we cannot forgive you if you force us to kill you.’¹³⁶ He finds culprits for the crucified Serbian people in Croats, Albanians and Bosniaks whom he calls Muslims. “Today, that is the danger in front of my crucified people, less so here in Banat, but here too every Orthodox Serb is crucified with the crucified people from Kosovo to Jadovno, especially from Krajina to Borovi. May God allow that crucifixion to lead to the resurrection, and not only the resurrection of us, but also of those who, allegedly, in the name of Christ, stood up against the cross with three fingers. That’s what they did and, unfortunately, for centuries they cooperated with the crescent moon against the Serbian cross with three fingers.”¹³⁷ The content of Bishop Atanasije Jević’s speech clearly shows the plans and course of war events planned jointly by the Serbian state and the Serbian Orthodox Church. By highlighting the “crescent” and “infamous and aggressive Muslims”, and their cooperation with those who “in the name of Christ stood up against the Serbian cross with three fingers”, i.e. to Croats, Atanasije Jević hints at further war events in the realization of the political-ecclesiastical goal of Greater Serbia, but also the realization of the Serbian-Orthodox goal, which was especially in the interest of the SPC, the matching of the state and canonical state. From this speech, the direction and dynamics of war movements on the way to the realization of the Greater Serbia project are recognized. It was clear that the work should be completed first in Croatia,¹³⁸ which is only an intermediate station, in order to complete it in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most monstrous attitude in Jević’s speech is the one that wants to justify the planned genocidal killing in advance, namely that Croats and Bosniaks forced Serbian military and paramilitary formations to kill, displace, rape and rob them. In the war against Bosnian society and the state from 1992 to 1995, a massive and frequent shelling of civilians in Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities by the Army of the Republika Srpska, which resulted in massive civilian casualties, the Bosniaks, or their armed formations, were accused of allegedly killing themselves. Marko Veselica also draws similar conclusions about the role of the SPC in the wars on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, with somewhat different definitions (“Serbian imperial

136 Milorad Tomović, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, p. 91.

137 Ibid, p. 91.

138 The involvement, not only spiritual but also military, of Serbian-Orthodox priests in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is also told by the photograph of the then archangel Filaret in a mantle with a machine gun on an armored vehicle near the Komogovina monastery, between Kostajnica and Glina with a group of Serbian soldiers. The photo traveled almost all over the world and caused negative reviews. The photo was taken in August 1991. In the same year, Bishop Longin of Dalmatin regularly “blessed” Serbian military and paramilitary formations in Croatia.

genocide”). He says: “The greatest tragedy of this area of ex-Yugoslavia, as well as of this moment in which the Serbian imperial genocide against Croats, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Albanians is taking place, is that, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and in the process of creating a modern Serbian nation and state in I and the Second Serbian Uprising, there was the formation, dynamism and criminal application of the Great Serbian imperial syndrome over all peoples in the Serbian environment, especially over the Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians and Macedonians. (...) The biggest problem, apart from honorable exceptions, regarding the growth and criminal profiling of Great Serbian imperialism is that it was supported by almost all intellectual, managerial and spiritual elites led by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Unfortunately, the Serbian Orthodox Church has become the main birthplace and driving force of Serbian imperial genocide and expansionism. There has been a permanent mechanical interweaving and instrumentalization between the Serbian state and the Serbian Orthodox Church.”¹³⁹ No matter how much the SPC, through all official bodies, politely took different positions, there was no official record of distancing itself from the expressed individual positions of its officials. It was a way and method of action to try to cover up the organized and planned work of the SPC. This is vividly and impressively confirmed by the war and post-war activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church. We will mention only some examples of such activity. We can learn about the attitude of the SPC towards the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina from several positions, both official church bodies and individual positions that the official Church did not deny. After the referendum for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the editor-in-chief of “Pravoslavljja” writes that Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have the same status as Christians in Islamic countries, that is, Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina “would be slaves”. “Not everything that rests is a good peace, and not everything that makes war is an evil war.” Peace, as such, can be evil, and war, as such, can be good - depending on the content with which both phenomena are filled.”¹⁴⁰ This attitude, as we can see, leans more towards the justification of war than its prohibition, which is contrary to the folk tradition which says that “war is an evil brother”.

The connection, the “holy alliance”, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state of Serbia, and the extent to which the Serbian Orthodox Church was involved in the creation and making of war-political decisions, is indicated by

139 Marko Veselica, , *Temeljni izvori i akteri genocida na prostoru Hrvatske Bosne i Hercegovine i ex-Jugoslavije*, u: *Genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995*, Zbornik radova, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 1997, p. 102.)

140 *Pravoslavljje*, 15 March 1992.

the fact that an extraordinary archeological council of the Serbian Orthodox Church was convened in connection with the Vance-Owen peace plan.¹⁴¹ The Serbian Orthodox Church resolutely rejected this plan and decided to continue the war. Here is that position: “The Serbian nation has been politically fragmented and divided by unnatural borders that cut its living organism for half a century... No one bargains with the holders of power in Serbia, which does not have a mandate to act on behalf of all of Serbia, or with the organs of the Yugoslav Federation or the commanding structures of the Yugoslav army do not oblige the Serbian people as a whole without its consent and without the blessings of the spiritual mother, the Orthodox Serbian Church.”¹⁴² Without hiding its involvement in the creation of wartime genocidal ideology, its practical application through the political features of the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska, the SPC actively participates in almost all wartime parliamentary sessions. The SPC sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as the “ancestor of Saint Sava”, during the entire course of the war against Bosnian society and the state, but also after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. At the Bishops’ Assembly, held from May 14 to 28, 1992, the SPC adopted the “Memorandum of the SPC “ in which the position against the “Avnoji” borders of the future states after the dissolution of the SFRY is highlighted. The “Memorandum” denies support to the authorities of the newly founded FRY, which accepted those borders and formally withdrew from the war. The SPC did not only participate in the adoption of Greater Serbia’s political programs, but directly assisted the paramilitary formations that participated in the crime of genocide against Bosniaks. “The Serbian Orthodox Church played a role that went beyond a mere blessing to the Serbian nationalist program. In practice, for example, the master of war, Željko Ražnatović (Arkan), whose gunmen were later accused of some of the most serious war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, received ‘above all else’, as he later confirmed, initial help from the Serbian Orthodox Church for organizing, financing and arming their paramilitary formations.”¹⁴³

After the establishment of the Republika Srpska, the SPC became part of the state structure in such a way that every municipality, every entity body and the entity itself, of course, officially and formally, is of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a baptismal glory. It is a unique example of the sacralization of entity, as state, institutions in Europe. This is the best confirmation of our

141 More on Vance-Owens peace plan see in: Kasim Begić, *Bosna i Hercegovina od Vencove misije do Daytonskog sporazuma*, Bosanska knjiga, Sarajevo, 1997.

142 Announcement of the Bishops’ Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church, January 1992.

143 N. Cigar, *ibid*, p. 46. See interview of Toma Džadžić with Arkan, *Već imam kuću na Dedinju*, NIN, 13. December, 1991, p.11.

claim that the SPC still considers Bosnia and Herzegovina “the grandfather of Saint Sava.” In December 1995, the Synod of the SPC, discussing the position of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pointed out that it could not accept that a large number of Serbs “remain in the Muslim entity “. Such a position is taken because it does not coincide with the ethno-phyletic conception of the Serbian state advocated by the Serbian Orthodox Church.¹⁴⁴ There are countless proofs that the members of the Serbian Orthodox Church directly supported war crimes against Bosniak civilians and even the crime of genocide, but on this occasion we will highlight the most impressive ones. Of course, it is a world-famous video of the *Škorpion* unit, in which the priest of the Serbian Orthodox Church can be seen giving a “blessing” to the unit, which participated in many of the most cruel crimes against humanity and international law, including the shooting of captured and unarmed Bosniaks from Srebrenica, victims of the genocide in July 1995.¹⁴⁵ The public support of the policy led by the SDS led by Radovan Karadžić, who threatened the creation of the Bosniak nation from the parliamentary rostrum in Sarajevo, was visible in the actions of the Zvornik-Tuzla bishop Vasilij Kačavenda. At the beginning of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bijeljina, he gave warmongering speeches and supported the already committed war crimes by the JNA and Serbian paramilitary and parapolice units. The monstrous crimes of the Serbian military and paramilitary forces began to be reported at the beginning of the war and during the war against the Bosnian society and state in the period of 1992-1995.¹⁴⁶ The words of Bishop Atanasije at the memorial

144 That the “holy alliance” between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the State of Serbia, and the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity RS, is still active and that they continue the policy of political expulsion of Bosniaks from the RS is also shown by the ceremony marking the anniversary of the first constitution of the RS. On February 28, 2015, a formal reception was held in the City Assembly of Belgrade on the occasion of the Republika Srpska Day and 23 years since the promulgation of its first constitution, to which; among others, the President of the RS, Milorad Dodik, the President of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, the President of the National Assembly of the RS, the Prime Minister of the Government of the RS, Željka Cvijanović and the Patriarch of Serbia, Irinej, who said on that occasion: “Republika Srpska is the republic of all Serbs in the Republic of Srpska” and in the Republic of Serbia, but not only them, but all displaced Serbs on all continents of today’s world.” (Federalna televizija, Dnevnik 2, 28. 02. 2015, 19:37, <http://www.federalna.ba>) In the RS, as we see, according to the opinion of Patriarch Irinej, there is no place for Bosniaks, Croats and others. If genocide is a crime against an ethnic, racial, political, religious or other social group, to partially or completely destroy that group in that area, and it is, what else could this attitude of Serbian Patriarch Irinej mean, in an ideological sense? until the continuation of the Serbian-Orthodox theology of genocide.

145 Video available at youtube channel [https:// www. youtube.com/watch?v=84LdFA3c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=84LdFA3c)=(Retrieved at 18. 02. 2022.)

146 Danica Drašković, the wife of SPO President Vuk Drašković, publicly condemned on

service in the Vavedenje monastery on May 5, 1992 testify that the SPC was also aware of these events. Then Atanasije said the following: “Serbs under this kind of political and military command are committing crimes.” After the battle, as far as we know, around 400 Muslims,¹⁴⁷ were killed in Zvornik, and it is rumored that there was also the same in Foča. It is not a Serbian custom to kill and loot after a fight, and it seems that we will not come out of this war with a clear face, even if it was necessary at the cost of our greater victims.”¹⁴⁸ Ratko Mladić also sensed genocide in his political strategy of leading war of the SDS political leadership when in May 1992, after the discussion in the Assembly of the RS on ethnic demarcations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he said: “We cannot clean nor can we have a sieve to sift only that Serbs remain or Serbs fail, and the rest leave.” Well, that’s it, that won’t, I don’t know how Mr. Krajišnik and Mr. Karadžić will explain to the world. People, it is a genocide.”¹⁴⁹ Radovan Karadžić himself confirmed that the SPC became part of the parastate institution of the Republika Srpska when he declared in December 1992 that he must consult the bishops and the patriarch for every decision he makes.¹⁵⁰ When information reached the domestic and international public about the concentration camps organized by the armed formations of Serbs and that mass murders of civilians and rape of Muslim women were carried out in them, the SPC engaged in a very shameful activity, contrary to the basic postulates of Christianity, which is the denial of crimes. In December 1992, the Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church discussed the accusations of holding camps and rape and murder in them and issued the following statement: “In the name of God’s justice, based on the testimony of our fellow bishops from Bosnia and Herzegovina and

television the recent massacre by members of the paramilitary organization of the Serbian Reconstruction Movement (SPO), the “Serbian Guard”, against Muslims in Gacko, her husband’s native village in Herzegovina. Although Ms. Drašković’s criticisms were very limited, they still caused a storm within her own party and caused a special plenum to be held at which she should have been condemned. At the party meeting, she reinforced her accusations: ‘There were no Ustasha knives (in Gacko), there were no fights there, not a single Serb was massacred there... You did not present a single example of a similar massacre of Serbs as happened to Muslims. in Nevesinje, Trebinje and Foča.’ Then she said: “I heard from members of the Serbian Guard...they told me how they raped a thirteen-year-old Muslim girl, all twenty of them, and how they then put her on a tank and drove her around, and they laughed because that was all that was left of her.” was her skeleton”” (N. Cigar, *ibid*, p.156-126.)

147 M. Tomović, *ibid*, p.15.

148 Announcement of the Bishops’ Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church, May 1992

149 Minutes from the RS Assembly, May 1992.

150 *Zašto se u crkvi šapuće*, II dio, Transkript, p.8 (TV series *Zašto se u crkvi šapuće* was recorded in 2005 in cooperation with ANEM and has three parts. The authors are Svetlana Lukić and Svetlana Vuković.

other reliable testimonies, we declare with full moral responsibility that such camps were neither in the Republika Srpska Bosnia and Herzegovina nor in the Serbian Krajina.”¹⁵¹ Today, after the verdicts for the crime of genocide against Bosniaks by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the discovery of mass graves,¹⁵² the truth about the concentration camps: Sušica near Vlasenica, Omarska and Trnopolje, near Prijedor, Batković near Bijeljina and many others, it is best seen what it was, but still is, the moral responsibility of the Serbian Orthodox Church when it comes to all forms of crimes against Bosniaks committed by the army and police of the Republika Srpska, and numerous paramilitary formations under their command.

CONCLUSION

Serbian great state national program as ideology and practice, in a structural sense, consists of national-political, national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs. All these programs, starting with “Načertanije”, through Moljević’s “Homogeneous Serbia”, the Chetnik movement of Draža Mihajlović in the Second World War, the SANU Memorandum, all the way to the war against Bosnian society and the state in the period of 1992-1995, are essentially a single, still unfinished social process of long duration. “Today’s wars waged by Serbs are just a continuation of the previous ones...and today’s leaders are incarnated ancestors.” Each of these programs has its primary task in achieving the ultimate goal of the Greater Serbia political project. While national-political programs primarily determine the political goals of Greater Serbia, national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs, with a diverse array of “false narratives”, in history, literature and other types of cultural and church production, using, above all, anti-rationalism, lies and hatred in the interpretation of Bosniaks as a nation, Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, the Bosnian language, Bosnian-Bosnian culture and art, Islam and Oriental-Islamic culture, and the overall syncretic results of Slavic-”Bogomil”-Islamic content, not only in culture but also in the construction of ethnic of identity

151 Announcement of the Bishops’ Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church, December 1992.

152 Mass graves are a concept and a term that, in the current scientific literature, is not explained clearly enough. For more information on the phenomenon of mass graves as one of the essential components of the strategy of genocide against Bosniaks at the end of the 20th century, see: *Masovne grobnice u Bosni i Hercegovini, Sigurnosna zona UN Srebrenica*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 2010.

in Bosnia (and Herzegovina), as one of the essential contents of Bosnian-Bosniak identity, primarily dehumanize and demonize Bosniaks, in order to justify the planned crime of genocide that they themselves caused through their contents. Bosniaks, as a formed political nation, Bosnian society as an autonomous and autochthonous example of a “unity of differences” society, and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the main obstacles to the national programs of Greater Serbia defined in this way. All these Bosnian identities: Bosnian society, the Bosnian nation of Bosniaks and the Bosnian state, had to be removed in order to realize the state of Greater Serbia. All available means were used for the realization, including the crime of genocide. In order to justify the political ideology and practice of the Serbian great state, which included war, destruction, ethnic cleansing, genocide and other forms of crime, it was necessary to declare Bosniaks, through the construction of a “Muslim stereotype”,¹⁵³ as a non-Bosnian identity, calling them “Poturica”, “Turks” “, undefined, “foreigners”, “balije”, “traitors of the people and the ancestral faith”, “killers of Christ”, Muslims, as a religious, not a political, group, and the state of Bosnia (and Herzegovina) as a Serbian country and state, in one word, the Serbian national programs had the task and goal of Serbianizing everything Bosnian, not only in politics but also in culture, art, language, and religion. Such results could not be achieved by using only national-political programs. Along with the political programs of the Serbian great state, Serbian national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs were created and developed, the content of which is not truth but anti-rationalism, lies and hatred towards Bosniaks and everything Bosnian-Bosniak. Anti-rationalism is one of the characteristics of fascism as an ideology, which also gave the ideology of the Serbian great state a fascist character. This is confirmed by the genocide against Bosniaks committed by the army and police of Republika Srpska in the war against Bosnian society and the state in the period of 1992-1995, which was proven by court verdicts and genocides committed in continuity against Bosniaks in the so-called national liberation wars. The formula is quite simple. Anti-rationalism and lies or anti-rationalism + lies as the dominant structure of the content of national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical Serbian programs results in hatred towards Bosniaks. An even simpler formula looks like this: anti-rationalism+lie+hatred-genocide against Bosniaks. The results of the anti-rationalism of national-cultural and national-ecclesiastical programs of the Serbian big state, in addition to the genocide, also played a role in the

153 “They created a type of trivial Islam and a Muslim stereotype that can be shaped in such a way that Muslims are isolated and attacked. (N. Cigar, *Ulog srpskih orijentalista u opravdanju genocida nad Muslimanima Balkana*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo, 2000, p. 25.)“

ultimate profiling of the Serbian big-state national-political programs and at the same time served as an attempt to justify the crime of genocide, in such a way that Bosniaks were dehumanized to the limit in all spheres of their social -political, socio-historical, socio-cultural and socio-spiritual contents. Unfortunately, the explicit analysis of the mentioned programs indicates that this process has not yet been completed, and it should be researched, analyzed, interpreted and pointed to its danger in producing conditions for eventual the next genocide against Bosniaks.

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FROM CLASSIFICATION TO TRIUMPHALISM (THE LAST STAGES OF GENOCIDE AGAINST BOSNIAKS)

Summary

After the end of the Second World War, *the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (Genocide Convention) was adopted. The promise “never again” was made, inspired, above all, by the enormous scale of the crimes committed against Jews. Despite the goal of freeing humanity from such crimes, genocides have since been committed in many other areas, including the “heart” of Europe, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, brutal crimes, such as those against Rohingya or Uighurs, which have the characteristics of genocide crimes, have continued to be committed in the 21st century. The crime of genocide is not a crime that happens “accidentally” and is initiated by smaller groups of “paramilitary units”. It is a well-prepared state crime that has several stages, which we deal with in more detail in our work. We focus on the stage of denial of genocide against Bosniaks, especially expressed through the glorification and celebration of convicted war criminals.

Key words: *state crime, genocide, Genocide Convention, stages of genocide, denial of genocide against Bosniaks, glorification and celebration of convicted war criminals, triumphalism.*

Designation of “crime upon crime”

With the contribution of Raphael Lemkin, more intensive work was done on the naming and analysis of “crimes unmatched by any other”. In his analysis, he made a special effort to study what Winston Churchill called a “crime without a name.” The main goal he was approaching was to lay the foundations in international law in order to prevent and punish such serious forms of crime in the future. The term “genocide” was first used in 1944 in Lemkin’s book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*.¹ Lemkin’s initial reflections

¹ Lemkin, Raphael, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe; Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.

were extensive and he emphasized that death and killings were by no means the ultimate goal of the genocide process. He pointed out that the death of genocide victims is achieved by committing certain forms of crime, and the death of a member of a certain group of people, in such circumstances, is almost an inevitable consequence.²

Although “crime upon crimes”³ was officially named genocide with the adoption of the UN Genocide Convention, Lemkin showed interest in a special designation for these mass crimes even before World War II, and not only during crimes against Jews, that is crimes committed during this world war, as is often emphasized. Lemkin spoke about the destruction of ethnic, national and religious groups back in 1933 in Madrid, at *the Fifth International Conference on the Unification of Criminal Law*.⁴ At that conference, he failed to incorporate what he called a “crime under international law” into the legal framework. His proposals for “barbaric crime” and “vandal crime” were not accepted. In the first case, he refers to the physical destruction of many nations, and in the second case, other forms of crime, primarily attempts to destroy what constitutes the culture of one nation. Lemkin’s main goal in the field of naming “crimes upon crime” was to lay the foundations in international law in order to prevent and punish such grave crimes in the future. Working on the definition of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin further clarified in 1947 in an article for *the American Journal of International Law* that the crime of genocide includes various acts, including not only the taking of life but also the prevention of life (through abortion, sterilization), as well as procedures that significantly endanger life and health (artificially caused infections, forced labor in special camps, deliberate separation of families in order to displace them...).”⁵

The UN Genocide Convention refers to genocide as “any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: a) the killing of members of the group; b) causing grievous bodily harm to members of the group; c)

2 *Ibi*, 79;

3 William Shabas is one of theorists that emphasize that genocide is at top of the “pyramid” of crimes. Schabas, A. William, *Genocide in the International Law: The Crime of Crimes*, Oakland: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 9.

4 William Shabas is one of theorists that emphasize that genocide is at top of the “pyramid” of crimes. Schabas, A. William, *Genocide in the International Law: The Crime of Crimes*, Oakland: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 9.

5 William Shabas is one of theorists that emphasize that genocide is at top of the “pyramid” of crimes. Schabas, A. William, *Genocide in the International Law: The Crime of Crimes*, Oakland: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 9.

deliberately subjecting the group to such living conditions as to result in its total or partial physical destruction; d) establishing measures to prevent births within a group; e) forcible transfer of children from one group to another”.⁶

With the adoption of the Genocide Convention, genocide was legally established and defined as a term, thus realizing Lemkin’s life ideals. It is very important to emphasize, and in favor of Lemkin’s many years of efforts, that in addition to harmonizing legal norms, i.e. codifying such crimes, there is an opportunity to file indictments, bring to justice and punish perpetrators of genocide.⁷

State crime – from classification to denial and triumphalism

The crime of genocide is a carefully planned project, and is being realized in times of crisis in society. Leaders, primarily national, political and military, use political and economic crises and instabilities in society as a good time to launch a genocidal project. Lemarchand cites some examples in support of this: “Whether committed by the police, the Rwandan armed forces, paramilitaries or the Yugoslav Army, in Rwanda as well as in Bosnia, the massacres could not have taken place without a central genocidal plan elaborated and conceived by the top of the state.”⁸ Often national and political leaders create various forms of crisis to produce solutions. Ton Zwaan emphasizes that: “genocide is not a spontaneous expression of hatred between communities... genocides and other mass crimes directed against certain groups are not ‘bottom-up’ phenomena.”⁹ Zwaan actually agrees with Fein who emphasizes that virtually everyone respects the fact that genocide is primarily a state crime.¹⁰ Karl Jaspers and Zygmunt Bauman are also of the

6 Article III defines that the following acts will be punished: a) genocide; b) planning and execution of genocide; c) direct incitement to commit genocide; e) complicity in genocide. http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/PROPISI/konvencija_sprecavanje_lat.pdf.

7 On naming and typologization of the crime of genocide see more in: Džananović, Muamer, “Pregled tipologizacije zločina genocida: prilog izučavanju sociologije genocida“, *Novi Muallim*, Year XXII, No. 88, 2021, 61-67.

8 Ideology was traditionally “considered to be rigid, closed system of ideas that manage social and political activities.” Malešević, Siniša, *Sociologija rata inasilja*, Zagreb: Naklada Jasenski i Turk, 2011, p. 18.

9 Ideology was traditionally “considered to be rigid, closed system of ideas that manage social and political activities.” Malešević, Siniša, *Sociologija rata i nasilja*, Zagreb: Naklada Jasenski i Turk, 2011, p. 18.

10 Ideology was traditionally “considered to be rigid, closed system of ideas that manage social and political activities.” Malešević, Siniša, *Sociologija rata i nasilja*, Zagreb:

opinion that crimes like those committed against Jews and other nations are state crimes.¹¹ Most genocide researchers conclude that, in addition to the fact that genocide is a state crime, the crucial role in gathering the masses who will achieve a common goal is a common ideology, which in fact has the greatest role in the genocide process.¹²

The actions of movements that are ultimately recognized as genocidal, in their infancy, at the moment of sowing such an idea, are presented as positive. Then larger masses get involved and mobilized. Thomas Mann gave a lecture at *Claremont College* in Los Angeles in 1940 on a topic *War and Democracy*, after he could no longer live in Germany, but with enough experience to see the fascist movement come to power, said during the lecture: “Let me tell you the whole truth: if fascism ever comes to America, it will come in the name of freedom.”¹³

According to Gregory H. Stanton, “genocide is a process that develops through ten stages, which are predictable but inevitable. At every stage, genocide can be stopped by preventive measures. The process is not linear. Multiple stages can occur at the same time. Logically, the initial stages must precede the later stages, but all stages of genocide continue to occur throughout the process.”¹⁴ The ten stages of genocide cited and elaborated by Stanton are: classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination and denial.

Stanton understands stages and possibilities of prevention, among other things, as follows:

Classification: All cultures have categories of dividing people into “us and them”, by nationality, race, religion or religion: German, Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. In bipolar societies that do not have these mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, genocide is likely to occur. The main preventive measure at this early stage is to develop universalist institutions that will overcome ethnic or racial divisions, actively promote tolerance and understanding, and promote classifications that transcend divisions. The Catholic Church could

Naklada Jasenski i Turk, 2011, p. 18.

11 Ideology was traditionally “considered to be rigid, closed system of ideas that manage social and political activities.” Malešević, Siniša, *Sociologija rata i nasilja*, Zagreb: Naklada Jasenski i Turk, 2011, p. 18.

12 Ideology was traditionally “considered to be rigid, closed system of ideas that manage social and political activities.” Malešević, Siniša, *Sociologija rata i nasilja*, Zagreb: Naklada Jasenski i Turk, 2011, p. 18.

13 Riemen, Rob, *Vječiti povratak fašizma*, Zagreb, TIM PRESS, 2015, p. 37.

14 <http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html>

have played such a role in Rwanda, had it not been divided on the same ethnic principle as Rwandan society. The promotion of a common language in countries such as Tanzania has also promoted a trans-national identity. This search for common interest is vital to the early prevention of genocide.¹⁵

Symbolization: We give names or other symbols for classification. We call people “Jews” or “Roma”, that is, we distinguish people by color or clothing, and apply symbols to members of the group. Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily lead to genocide unless they lead to dehumanization. Combined with hatred, symbols can be imposed on members of the sacrificial group: a yellow star for Jews by Nazi rule, a blue scarf for people from the eastern region of Cambodia during Khmer Rouge rule. In the fight against symbolization, symbols of hatred may be legally prohibited (swastikas), just as hate speech is prohibited. Group marking such as gang uniforms or highlighting tribal affiliation on the body may also be prohibited. The problem is that legal restrictions will not be successful if they are not supported by the dominant culture in a given society. Although Hutu and Tutsi were banned from terms in Burundi until 1980, coded terms replaced them. However, if the denial of symbolism is widely supported, it could be a powerful tool, as was the case in Bulgaria, where the government refused to deliver enough yellow badges and at least eighty percent of Jews did not even wear them. Thus, Jews in Bulgaria were mostly spared wearing the Nazi symbol for Jews.¹⁶

Discrimination: The dominant group uses the laws, customs and political power to deny the rights of other groups. A disenfranchised group may be denied full civil rights and even citizenship. Examples include the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 in Nazi Germany, which stripped Jews of their German citizenship and barred them from being employed by the government and universities. The denial of Rohingya citizenship to the Muslim minority in Myanmar is another example. Prevention against discrimination means giving the necessary political power and guaranteeing the right to citizenship for all groups in society. Discrimination based on nationality, ethnicity, race or religion should be prohibited. Every individual should have the right to sue the state corporations and other persons if their rights are violated.¹⁷

15 Genocide Watch, „The Ten Stages of Genocide by Dr. Gregory Stanton“, available at: <http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html>

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

Dehumanization: One group denies the humanity of another group. Members of the dehumanized group are equated with animals, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes normal human aversion to murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in the press and hate radio stations are used to belittle the victim group. In the fight against this dehumanization, incitement to genocide should not be confused with guaranteed freedom of speech. Genocidal societies do not have the constitutional protection of compensatory speech and should be treated differently from democracies. Local and international leaders need to condemn the use of hate speech and make it culturally unacceptable. Leaders who encourage genocide should be banned from traveling to other countries and their financial resources frozen in other countries. Radio stations that propagate hatred should be shut down and hate propaganda banned. Hate crimes and atrocities should be punished immediately.¹⁸

Organization: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, using the militia to provide an opportunity to deny state responsibility (Janjaweed in Darfur). Sometimes the militia organization is informal (Hindu mob led by local RSS militants) or decentralized (terrorist groups). Special military units or militias are often trained and armed. Plans are drawn up for genocidal killings. In the fight against this stage, membership in the militias should be banned. Their leaders should be denied visas to travel abroad. The UN should impose an arms embargo on the governments and citizens of countries involved in genocidal massacres and set up commissions to investigate violations of rights, as was done after the genocide in Rwanda.¹⁹

Polarization: Extremists divide groups. Laws may prohibit marriage or social interaction between groups. Extremist terrorism targets moderate members of the group, intimidating and silencing those who are willing to raise their voices. Moderate members of the group that organizes genocide are the most capable of stopping genocide, which is why they are first arrested and killed. The leaders of the target group are the next to be arrested and killed. Prevention can mean providing security for moderate leaders or helping human rights groups. Extremists can be deprived of property, denied visas for international travel. The military coup of extremists should be opposed by international sanctions.²⁰

Preparation: Leaders of a national or group of perpetrators of genocide plan a “final solution” for Jews, Armenians, Tutsis or “issues” of another target

18 *Ibid.*

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*

group. They often use euphemisms to cover up their intentions, presenting their goals as “ethnic cleansing”, “purification” or “counter-terrorism”. They form armies, buy weapons and train their troops and militias. They indoctrinate the population with fear of a group of victims. Leaders often claim that “if we do not kill them, they will kill us”, disguising genocide as self-defense. There is a sharp rise in inflammatory rhetoric and hate propaganda aimed at creating fear of the other group. Prevention of preparation may include an arms embargo and enforcement commissions. This should include criminal prosecution of incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide, in accordance with Article 3 of the Genocide Convention.²¹

Persecution: Victims are identified and separated because of their ethnic or religious identity. Lists of members of the victim group are compiled for execution. In the case of state patronage over genocide, members of the victim group are forced to wear identification symbols. Their property is often seized. Sometimes they are even separated into ghettos, deported to camps or isolated in regions affected by famine for starvation. Genocidal massacres begin. At this stage, a genocidal state of emergency must be declared. In the event of the political will of major powers, regional alliances or the UN Security Council to mobilize forces, armed international intervention should be prepared or extensive assistance provided to victims to prepare for self-defense. Humanitarian aid should be organized by the UN and private humanitarian groups for the inevitable wave of incoming refugees.²²

Extermination: begins and quickly grows into mass murder, which is legally called “genocide”. This is presented as “extermination” for the killers, because they do not believe that their victims are human beings. When genocide is carried out under the auspices of the state, the armed forces often carry out killings along with militias. Sometimes genocide results in the retributive killing of groups on top of each other, creating a downward vortex - like a cycle of bilateral genocide. At this stage, only rapid and unstoppable armed intervention can stop genocide. Real security zones or refugee corridors should be established under heavily armed international forces. (Insecure “security” is a worse solution than avoiding it altogether). NATO, ASEAN, ECOWAS should be authorized to act. In the event of major interventions, multilateral forces should be approved by the UN to intervene. If the UN is paralyzed, regional alliances must act. It is time to recognize that international responsibility for protection goes beyond the narrow interests of individual nation states. If strong nations are not going to provide troops that will act

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

directly, then they need to provide an air bridge, equipment and the necessary financial resources for the countries in the region to intervene.²³

Denial is the final stage that lasts during the perpetration of genocide and always follows genocide. This is one of the surest indicators of the next genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of the genocide are digging mass graves, burning bodies, trying to conceal evidence and intimidate witnesses. They deny committing any crime and often blame the victims for what happened. They obstruct crime investigations and continue to rule until they are overthrown by force, when they flee into exile. Abroad, they remain unpunished, such as Pol Pot or Idi Amin, unless they are detained and a tribunal is set up to prosecute them. The response to denial is punishment by an international tribunal or national courts, where evidence can be heard and the perpetrators punished. Tribunals such as the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, or the International Court of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or the International Court of Justice may not deter the worst genocidal killers, but with the political will to arrest and prosecute criminals, some may be brought to justice.²⁴

Stanton's work on the stages of genocide is a significant contribution to the theoretical elaboration of genocide. It contributes to a better understanding of the same process. Among the theorists of genocide, the matrix was adopted that his division of the stages of genocide is the most meaningful. In the science of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are debates about the fact that the last stage - *denial of genocide*, as presented by Stanton, does not include all the ways and methods of genocide against Bosniaks. This especially refers to the continuous, and present today, celebration and glorification of convicted criminals, which inspired Haris Halilović to add a new stage of genocide to the denial, which he called *triumphalism*.²⁵

The *Decision* of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina Valentin Incko passed *the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina* in mid-2021, which, among other things, banned genocide denial and the celebration of convicted criminals, unfortunately did not stop the practice of these phenomena.²⁶ The explanation of the *Decision*

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*

25 More in: Karčić, Hikmet, "Triumphalism: The final stage of the Bosnian genocide", *Denial: The Final Stage of Genocide*, Routledge, 2021, p. 99-112.

26 In the Criminal Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Official Gazette BiH" No. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 53/06, 55/06, 32/07, 8/10, 47/14, 22/15, 40/15 i 35/18), in the Article 145a, after the paragraph (1), are added new paragraphs (2) do (6), that state:
“(2) Whoever publicly incites violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a

states, among other things, that they are aware of the fact that reconciliation cannot take place without acknowledging crimes and responsibilities, and that hate speech, glorification of war criminals and revisionism or open denial of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes endanger the rule of law and represent a direct obstacle to peace, reconciliation and confidence-building, and ultimately jeopardize the prospects for a secure, peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁷

member of a group determined by race, color, religion, origin or national or ethnic origin, if such conduct does not constitute a criminal offense referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article, shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to three years.

(3) Whoever publicly approves, denies, grossly diminishes or attempts to justify the crime of genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime established by a final judgment in accordance with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 or the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Court or the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, against a group of persons or a member of a group determined by race, color, religion, origin or national or ethnic origin, in a manner that could incite violence or hatred directed against such a group of persons or a member of such a group, will be sentenced to six months to five years in prison.

(4) Whoever commits the criminal offense referred to in paragraphs (1) to (3) of this Article by making available or distributing leaflets, paintings or other materials to the public, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than one year.

(5) If the criminal offense referred to in paragraphs (1) to (3) of this Article is committed in a manner that may disturb public order and peace or is threatening, abusive or offensive, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than three years.

(6) Whoever awards recognition, prize, monument, any reminder or any privilege or similar to a person convicted of genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime, or names a public building such as a street, square, park, bridge, institution, institution, municipality or city, settlement and inhabited place, or similar, or registers the name after a person convicted of a genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime, or in any way glorifies a person convicted of a genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime, shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least three years.” <http://www.ohr.int/odluka-visokog-predstavnika-kojom-se-donosi-zakon-o-dopuni-kaznenog-zakona-bosne-i-hercegovine/>;

27 In the Criminal Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official Gazette BiH” No. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 53/06, 55/06, 32/07, 8/10, 47/14, 22/15, 40/15 i 35/18), in the Article 145a, after the paragraph (1), are added new paragraphs (2) do (6), that state:

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Although several criminal charges have been filed against persons who denied genocide in various ways, the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet reacted. There have been no direct denials of genocide since the law was amended, but it is noticeable that they occur on a smaller scale within Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in public discourse. More intense drawings of murals, distributed leaflets, photographs and other similar ways of glorifying and celebrating convicted war criminals come to the fore.²⁸ The denial of genocide in such a way in Serbia has been especially intensified.²⁹ The glorification and celebration of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, the political and military leader of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, whose army and police committed genocide against Bosniaks, still stands out. Karadžić and Mladić were convicted of war crimes and sentenced to life in prison for, among other things, genocide against Bosniaks. The celebration and glorification of convicted war criminals led to the naming of the current stage of genocide against Bosniaks as *triumphalism*.³⁰ According to Halilović and Karčić, triumphalism has become a part of popular culture, entertainment and *mainstream*, especially in Serbia and among the Serbian diaspora. This is reflected through state and academic institutions and church

Herzegovina, against a group of persons or a member of a group determined by race, color, religion, origin or national or ethnic origin, in a manner that could incite violence or hatred directed against such a group of persons or a member of such a group, will be sentenced to six months to five years in prison.

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28 <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/11/15/vlasti-u-bih-nisu-uklonile-murale-ratnih-zlocinaca/?lang=sr>

29 <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/opinions/2022/1/31/murali-i-grafiti-koji-velicaju-mladica-paradigma-srbije>

30 <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/opinions/2022/1/31/murali-i-grafiti-koji-velicaju-mladica-paradigma-srbije>

institutions, but also through music, television shows, fan groups, etc. Thus, the glorification of crime has become a part of everyday life.³¹ The latest developments regarding Ratko Mladić's mural in Serbia have just shown that the triumph of genocide against Bosniaks is something of strategic interest to the Serbian state leadership. The "defense" of the Mladić mural by the Minister of Police of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vulin, proved how important historical revisionism and genocide denial is still an important segment of the policy of the Republic of Serbia.³²

Conclusion

In this paper, we have focused on the theoretical elaboration of the state crime, i.e. the crime of genocide, which has its stages. In this paper, we have conveyed in more detail Stanton's understanding of the ten stages of genocide. We are of the opinion that the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still going on and is at a stage that goes beyond denying the genocide. Denial, as the last stage of genocide, in the case of genocide against Bosniaks, does not include all the ways and methods in which the committed and convicted genocide is denied today. The adoption of the *Decision* of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which passed *the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, which prohibited the denial of genocide and the celebration of convicted criminals, unfortunately did not stop the practice of these phenomena. Considering that the celebration and glorification of convicted war criminals in various ways does not stop, the naming of the current stage of genocide against Bosniaks by *triumphalism* is very correct.

31 The glorification of crimes at the local level is visible in cities like Višegrad, where the former Vilina Vlas camp still functions as a hotel without any features. See: Karčić, Hikmet, "An Erased Memorial, a Rape Motel, and a Nationalist Disneyland: Bosnian Genocide Denial and the Fight for Memory in a Bosnian Town", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 22 (2), 2021, p. 167-173.

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SREBRENICA: THE SCENE OF DANTE'S INFERNO IN EUROPE AT THE END OF 20th CENTURY

Summary

At the end of the 20th century, a classic armed aggression against a sovereign and independent state took place in the heart of Europe. It was the armed aggression of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, in the heart of the exact same Europe during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 until 1995 numerous forms of crimes against humanity and international law against Bosniaks were committed by the aggressors and their internal helpers. Unable to prevent and stop killings, persecutions, exterminations and other crimes against Bosniaks, Europe stood passively and silently and watched these and such events on its soil. It is as if Europe itself did not feel the destruction it went through only 50 years before these horrific events. The scale and monstrosity of the crimes committed against Bosniaks, including the most serious form of crime - genocide, have been proven in the world's highest courts (ICTY and International Court of Justice). However, despite clear evidence and final court verdicts, even today, the committed crimes are continuously denied and an attempt is made to equate the victim and the perpetrator. Judgments of the highest judicial instances in the world are denied and ignored, which have passed final judgments neutrally and on the basis of objective facts and evidence. Holders of political functions in the RS entity, but also in neighboring Serbia, are at the forefront of this denial and relativization of crimes. They are certainly supported by certain intellectual, cultural and other circles.

Key words: *Srebrenica, Dante's inferno, Europe, genocide, Bosniaks, crimes*

The crime of genocide is an international crime. It is a crime committed with the intent to partially or completely destroy a particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. It is important to recall that the UN General Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1946 adopted the term ‘genocide’ for the crime of ‘denial of the right to survival to all human groups’, and that the same Resolution confirmed genocide as a crime under international law, and that the UN took the initiative to adopt a convention on the crime of genocide. After two years of work, namely on December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution adopting the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention entered into force on January 12, 1951, and the FPRY ratified it by a decree of the Presidium of the National Assembly of June 21, 1950. This convention established that genocide, regardless of whether it was committed during peace or war, is an international crime, and that the signatory states will undertake to prevent and punish genocide. In accordance with the undertaken obligation, Article 141 of the Criminal Code of the SFRY defines the criminal offense of genocide.”¹

We should not lose sight of the fact that Serbia and Montenegro (then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) is the only country in the world to be found guilty before the International Court of Justice of violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Namely, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was found guilty of doing nothing to prevent the genocide of Bosniaks in Srebrenica, the United Nations “Safe Zone”, in July 1995.

Namely, the scientific and general public should know that the international legal definition of the crime of genocide is given in Articles II and III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Punishment of Genocide.

Two elements of crime of genocide are described in Article II:²

1. mental element, denotes that the intention is to destroy completely or partially national, ethnic, race or religious group as such, and
2. physical element, that includes five acts described in sections a, b, c, d and e.

1 Srzetić, Nikola; Stajić, Aleksandar i Ljubiša Lazarević (1978). *Krivično pravo Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije – opšti deo (osmo izdanje)*. Beograd: Savremena administracija, p. 19-20.

2 *Konvencija o spriječavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida od 9. decembra 1948. godine*. Ujedinjene nacija, član 2. (*Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948*. United Nations, Article 2).

The crime must involve both elements to be named “genocide“.

Article III is described by five punishable forms of genocide: genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity.

Acts of genocide against Bosniaks in the Srebrenica area have been carried out since 1992³, culminating in July 1995, given that the Serbian army from Bosnia and Herzegovina, volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, and the former JNA, later the so-called army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia committed senseless crimes. They planned or incited genocide, even before the killing began, or aided and abetted the genocide. Namely, acts of crime include planning, direct and public incitement, attempted genocide and complicity in genocide.

Based on available data, numerous genocidal acts were committed during the aggression against the sovereign and internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they were carried out as part of a policy to destroy the existence of a group (of peoples):

1. Killing of members of a group, which includes direct killings and acts that cause death;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental injury, causing trauma to members of the group through widespread torture, rape, sexual violence, coercion to consume drugs and mutilation;
3. Deliberately subjecting a group to such living conditions with the expectation that it will cause the destruction of that people, which includes deliberately depriving the group of resources necessary for the group’s physical survival, such as clean water, food, clothing, housing or medical services. Denial of what life means can be through harvesting, blocking food deliveries, imprisonment in camps, forced displacement or expulsion;
4. Prevention of childbirth, which includes forced sterilization, violent termination of pregnancy, prohibition of marriage, long-term separation of men and women with the intention of preventing childbirth;

3 On genocidal acts against Bosniaks in Srebrenica until 1995 in: Macić, Bećir (2011). *Genocid u Srebrenici do 1995. godine*, in „Zbornik radova: Genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini – posljedice presude Međunarodnog suda pravde, knjiga 2“. Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, p. 907-918; On the impact of committed genocide against Bosniaks on demographic changes in: Džananović, Muamer (2021). *Utjecaj genocida nad Bošnjacima na demografske promjene u Srebrenici i Bratuncu 1991-2021.*, in „Monumenta Srebrenica“, Year 10, No. 10, p. 131-155.

5. Forcible transfer of children, persons under the age of 18, which may be by direct coercion or for fear of violence, imprisonment, psychological abuse or other forms of torture.

Genocidal acts do not have to kill or cause the death of members of the group. By causing grievous bodily harm, preventing births and relocating children, acts of genocide are committed as part of a policy to destroy the existence of the group.

Forced displacement, attacks on civilian targets, use of sieges and indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, looting and destruction of villages and cultural and historical sites, imminent executions, crimes in prisoner of war camps, rape, mutilation, hostage-taking, obstruction of humanitarian aid, attacks on humanitarian personnel organization of co-forms of gross human rights violations, which were present in the genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica, and their main perpetrator was the so-called Serbian army. This was also confirmed by the Hague Tribunal (ICTY).

Referring to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council, by Resolution (No. 819), declared Srebrenica a “safe zone” on 16 April 1993. However, in reality, Srebrenica was anything but a “safe zone”. This is confirmed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Ghali, who addressed the Directive to the UNPROFOR Commander, General Wahlgren, informing him that the Resolution “... **does not imply an obligation to engage UNPROFOR in the protection of the safe zone.**”⁴

The shameful role and actions of UNPROFOR members and enabling Serb military formations to commit genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica are also recognized in the document of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade Command, dated 14 July 1995, related to bringing UNPROFOR checkpoints under control. The document states, among other things: “**We directed the UNPROFOR command to issue instructions to its checkpoints not to open fire on VRS units and to simulate the action of shooting into the air if forced to do so by Muslims**”⁵ (*underlined by the authors*).

4 Čekić, Smail (2011). *Agresija na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu i genocid nad Bošnjacima*, in „Univerzitetski informativni glasnik, Specijalno izdanje br. 5 u povodu obilježavanja 16. godišnjice genocida nad Bošnjacima u sigurnoj zoni Ujedinjenih nacija – Srebrenica – jula 1995. godine“. Sarajevo: Univerzitet u Sarajevu, p. 29.

5 Komanda 1. PLPBR, *Stavljanje pod kontrolu punktova UNPROFOR-a*, GŠVRS – Kom. Odjeljenje za OBP, IKM DK N/L Gen. Krstića, Komandi 65. ZMTB, strog. pov. br. 34-528-55/95, od 14.07.1995. (Command 1. PLPBR, *Bringing UNPROFOR checkpoints under control*, GVRS - Com. Department for OBP, IKM DK N / L General Krstić,

Hague tribunal judges (ICTY) described the genocide of Bosniaks in Srebrenica as **scenes worthy of Dante's hell**. According to the ICTY, these are “... **scenes from hell written on the darkest pages of human history**.”⁶ The perpetrators of the genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica were “prepared, educated, trained and equipped to commit emergency executions, but also forms of torture, infliction of severe physical and mental pain incomprehensible to human reason.”⁷ They were pre-installed with a code “on the alleged threat to Serbs and everything that is of Serb origin”, and only Muslims (Bosniaks) were targeted as the culprits of such a situation.

The threat, according to the Greater Serbia ideologues, has been determined as a situation that is immanent to the Serbian people. That is the basic thesis of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It is an unquestionable dogma of a dominant worldview. Also, as Tomislav Marković notes, “members of the Serbian armed forces were most often threatened when they met with civilians, the elderly, women, children, prisoners and similar terrorist groups dangerous to the whole of Serbia, so they were forced to cut down the deadly threat.”⁸ *The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* from 1986, a document of a fascist and genocidal character became an unquestionable dogma and a summary of the dominant Serbian worldview. Numerous academics, poets, writers and many other intellectuals have made a great contribution to this. They tried to strengthen the ties between the imaginary endangerment of Serbs and the concrete reality. Reality was mythologized in order to present evil as good.⁹

Command 65. ZMTB, highly confidential. no. 34-528-55 / 95, dated 14 July 1995);

- 6 Muratović, Rasim i Ermin Kuka (2021). *Bol – centralni fenomen ljudske egzistencije u kontekstu počinjenog genocida nad Bošnjacima u Srebrenici*, in „Zbornik radova: Genocid nad Bošnjacima, Srebrenica 1995-2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice“, p. 797-817.
- 7 Muratović, Rasim i Ermin Kuka (2021). *Bol – centralni fenomen ljudske egzistencije u kontekstu počinjenog genocida nad Bošnjacima u Srebrenici*, u „Zbornik radova: Genocid nad Bošnjacima, Srebrenica 1995-2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice“, p. 797-817.
- 8 “Academics, writers, poets and other minds nurture and cultivate a sense of endangerment in their mental laboratories, in hermetically sealed skulls, from where they deliver their deadly goods to the world through books, mass media and even more mass graves. The connections between the feeling of threat and reality are usually quite loose or completely non-existent, which creates an ideal space for the development of this mythological monster with seventy-seven heads “(Marković, Tomislav, *Uzalud vam trud, pišači*, Antena, 15.06.2021. (Source: <https://www.antenam.net/stav/203320-uzalud-vam-trud-pisaci>, Accessed: 1.02.2022).
- 9 “Academics, writers, poets and other minds nurture and cultivate a sense of endangerment in their mental laboratories, in hermetically sealed skulls, from where they deliver their

From a series of personal statements by Ratko Mladić, commander of the so-called The General Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska, among others, can also be found data on personality structures, behaviors and motives of the main actors in the genocide and their followers, inferior and sadistic Serbian soldiers. His perfidious, sadistic and vengeful personality structure can be seen from these statements. He encourages and rewards the direct executors of genocide. The killing of “Turks” as centuries-old “oppressors” of Serbs was seen in the minds of the direct perpetrators of crimes against Bosniaks in Srebrenica as a justified and just act.

The intention to destroy members of the group (Bosniaks), i.e. the commission of the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica by Serb military formations (army and police), is evidenced, inter alia, by a document issued by IKM 65th ZMTP Borike, dated 13 July 1995, which provides instructions on how to deal with over 1,000 Bosniak prisoners of war.¹⁰

deadly goods to the world through books, mass media and even more mass graves. The connections between the feeling of threat and reality are usually quite loose or completely non-existent, which creates an ideal space for the development of this mythological monster with seventy-seven heads “(Marković, Tomislav, *Uzalud vam trud, pišači*, Antena, 15.06.2021. (Source: <https://www.antenam.net/stav/203320-uzalud-vam-trud-pisaci>, Accessed: 1.02.2022).

10 “IKM 65. ZMTO

Borike, at 2 p.m.

Procedure with war prisoners

- Commander of the General Staff, for information

- To the Assistant Commander of the General Staff for Moral, Religious and Legal Affairs, for information

- Commander of the Military Police Battalion 65th ZMTP, order

In the region of Dušanovo (Kasaba), over 1000 members of the former 28th Division, the so-called Army of BiH are captured. The prisoners are under the control of the military police battalion of the 65th ZMTP.

The Assistant Commander of the General Staff for Intelligence and Security Affairs proposes the following measures:

1. Prohibit access to all uninvited persons, recording and photographing of prisoners.
2. Prohibit the passage of all United Nations vehicles in the direction of Zvornik-Vlasenica (direct them in the direction of Zvornik-Šekovići-Vlasenica and vice versa).
3. Commander of the Military Police Battalion to take measures to remove prisoners of war outside the Milići-Zvornik highway, place them in closed rooms or in areas that are protected from surveillance from the ground and from the air.
4. Upon receiving the order, the Commander of the Military Police Battalion will contact General Miletić and obtain additional orders from him and request verification of whether this is what was proposed and approved by the Commander of the VRS General Staff.

COMMANDER

From the mentioned document, we can clearly see the expressed intention of the so-called The General Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska on the preparation of conditions for the execution of prisoners, which ultimately happened. The document is signed by the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Milomir Savčić, against whom the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has filed an indictment for genocide in Srebrenica and ordered custody. However, just hours after the decision, Milomir Savčić, the current president of the Republika Srpska Veterans' Organization, fled to the neighboring Republic of Serbia and is inaccessible to the Judicial Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After that, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an international arrest warrant on August 10, 2021, but to this day Milomir Savčić is not available to the judiciary.

The horrific “pain, suffering, torture and all the evil that the Bosniak victims of the Srebrenica genocide went through are the culmination of the expressed malice, hatred, evil and sadism, but also the pain inflicted by the Bosniaks.” Prejudice against Muslims (Bosniaks) has long been developed in Serbian criminal ideology, politics and practice, in order to justify killings, extermination and persecution, culminating in the genocide of Bosniaks in Srebrenica.¹¹

In fact, prejudices against Bosniaks, prepared, developed, affirmed and encouraged for a long time, have realized their full potential and openly manifested themselves in the circumstances of re-awakening and strengthening of Serbian radical and extreme nationalism. An important role in creating an anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim atmosphere and “encouraging nationalist sentiment” was taken over by intellectual circles within Serbian society.¹² According to Norman Cigar, Serbian nationalistic elite made path for military apparatus of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and para-military state of the Republika Srpska to commit genocide against Bosniaks. The intellectual and cultural Serbian elites managed to achieve this “with Orientalism as an aggressive and flashy embodiment of a process marked by the Manichean division into ‘them’ and ‘us’.”¹³

Lieutenant Colonel Milomir Savčić”

11 Muratović, Rasim i Ermin Kuka (2021). *Bol – centralni fenomen ljudske egzistencije u kontekstu počinjenog genocida nad Bošnjacima u Srebrenici*, in „Zbornik radova: Genocid nad Bošnjacima, Srebrenica 1995-2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice“, p. 797-817.

12 Kuka, Ermin i Hamza Memišević (2021). *Lokalizacija genocida nad Bošnjacima*, in „Zbornik radova: Genocid nad Bošnjacima, Srebrenica 1995-2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice“, p. 729-744.

13 Kuka, Ermin i Hamza Memišević (2021). *Lokalizacija genocida nad Bošnjacima*, in

Serbian culture gave full support to this and such nationalism and was, after the Serbian Orthodox Church¹⁴, a key factor in its strengthening and spreading among the masses. It was necessary to present the prepared scenarios of crimes and persecution against Bosniaks in the light of the realization of the centuries-old Greater Serbia idea “All Serbs in one state” and “cleansing the country of non-Christians”.

The horrific scenes of crimes committed against Bosniaks throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially those in Srebrenica in July 1995, “speak convincingly of atrocities that are indescribable in the current terms. They also speak of inhumanity to which it is impossible to react without the risk of man losing his human dignity. The evils of its actors lead every normal person into a situation where he simply cannot understand their monstrosity and insanity. Their atrocities paralyze with their morbidity any rational activity to adequately punish their perpetrators. The first lacks words that could express it, and the second lacks adequate means of punishment. This shows that these are horrible atrocities of persons freed from moral considerations or atrocities of the depersonalized masses. To the former belong maniacs, and to the latter the depersonalized mass, also a product of centuries of ideological indoctrination, subjects so insane that they are proud of what normal people are ashamed of.”¹⁵

It is, therefore, not only about external impulses and influences on the direct perpetrators of the crime of genocide, but also about some internal facts, internal impulses. The criminals will, want and seek to torture, execute and persecute Bosniaks. Not only did they adapt to the dark and vile goals of Greater Serbia nationalism and more vampire fascist and criminal ideologies, but they also developed internal urges to do evil and strike at the human dignity of Bosniak victims.¹⁶

The perpetrators, in their genocidal intent, aimed to exterminate 40,000 Bosniaks who were in the Srebrenica area at the time of the genocide. The verdict states: “In an effort to eliminate some Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They ordered the destruction of forty thousand

„Zbornik radova: Genocid nad Bošnjacima, Srebrenica 1995-2020: Uzroci, razmjere i posljedice“, p. 729-744.

14 On the role of Serbian Orthodox Church see more in: Tomanić, Milorad (2001). *Srpska pravoslavna crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*. Beograd: Medijska knjižara Krug.

15 Muminović, Rasim (2000). *Zarobljeni um*. Tuzla: Harfograf, p. 11.

16 Muratović, Rasim (2014). *Zlo i ljudsko dostojanstvu u djelu Arne Johana Vetlesena*. Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu.

Muslims in Srebrenica, who represented Bosnian Muslims in general. They confiscated their personal belongings and documents from all captured Muslim men, both soldiers and civilians, old and young, and deliberately and methodically killed them solely on the basis of their affiliation. Bosnian Serb forces were aware, when embarking on their genocidal endeavor, that the harm they had inflicted on Bosnian Muslims would bring lasting trouble. The Appeals Chamber declares with full conviction that justice condemns, with appropriate wording, the enormous and lasting damage inflicted and calls the Srebrenica massacre by its real name: genocide. Those responsible will bear this stigma, and it will serve as a warning for the future to all those who think of committing such a heinous act.”¹⁷

After the project of creating the so-called Greater Serbia failed, and despite such horrific crimes against Bosniaks, including genocide, the post-war period in Bosnia and Herzegovina was marked by continuous efforts to re-evaluate and downplay crimes. All this is accompanied by media-populist promotion of criminals to “national heroes”. Evil is presented as good.

Conclusion

The time in which we live is a time of ubiquitous narrative and behavior that bestially and shamelessly committed crimes against Bosniaks and glorifies, praises, portrays as role models and national heroes their perpetrators (criminals). Even after all the evil that comes with the crimes committed, an atmosphere of continuous glorification of such cruel crimes is created. Significant groups in the Serbian people in the entity of RS and in the Republic of Serbia are working systematically and systematically to affirm criminals and glorify their horrible crimes. Proven instruments such as glorifying criminals and dehumanizing victims are used for this purpose.

In this context, it is important to recall Ambassador Madeleine Albright’s statement to the UN Security Council on 10 August 1995, in which, among other things, she said: “We must not forget what happened in Srebrenica and Žepa, because there are strong reasons to believe, especially in relation to Srebrenica, that Serbs from Pale beat, raped and killed many who were fleeing the violence. These dead were not killed ‘in the midst of combat operations’, they were not killed in self-defense, they were not killed by accident, they

¹⁷ ICTY, Case no. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, 19 April 2004, paragraph 37

were systematically killed, on the instructions of the Bosnian Serb leadership. I recall the words of the poet Archibald Macleish, who in 1940, regarding the world's passive response to the rise of fascism, wrote: 'Murder is not free of immorality only because people are led to think that murder is not evil. Only a perverted mind can do that.'¹⁸ It is the United Nations and its military mission (UNPROFOR) that played this shameful role in completely leaving the "safe zone" to bloodthirsty criminals to begin the genocide of Bosniaks in Srebrenica.

Instead of shame and confrontation with criminals and their crimes from the whole society, they are celebrated, respected and elevated to the pedestal of the highest human values by individuals and some social groups, as well as holders of the most important social and political functions. It is a paradox of the modern world which, let us hope and believe, will never allow the Srebrenica scenes of Dante's hell to happen again.

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¹⁸ Albright, Madeleine (2005). *Deset godina kasnije*, u: *Srebrenica: sjećanje za budućnost*. Sarajevo: Fondacija Heinrich Böll, p. 36-37.

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***FROM BOSNIAN
PODRINJE HISTORY***

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION/FAMILIES IN GLADOVIĆI IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 19TH CENTURY

The settlement Gladović¹ is located in the southeastern part of the municipality of Srebrenica, in the region of Osat. It is about 23.7 kilometers away from Srebrenica and is connected by an asphalt road. The settlement is located in the upper part of the river basin, which flows into Perućačko Lake (about 1 km upstream from the dam). They lie on a semi-oval slope formed by the slopes of the hills Zlatovo (992 m), Kaljina (920 m) and Trnić (966 m). Parts of the settlement are located at different altitudes from 500 to 750 m. The settlement is of a broken type and has five hamlets: Borbašići, Čičci², Gladovići³, Mehmedovići and Omerići. The most populated hamlets were Čičci and Gladovići. The area of the cadastral municipality is 4.8 km², of which 62% is privately owned. Children from Gladovići attended a four-year school in Beširevići, and higher grades of primary school were attended in the central elementary school Osatica. Religious duties were carried out at the mosque in Osatica, which was demolished by VRS members in 1993.

The fundamental reforms that were carried out in the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the 19th century led to the construction of a modern administration and the emergence of new statistical books, such as censuses, or *nüfus defterleri*. Such documents were created in order to keep accurate records of the military and able-bodied population, i.e. taxpayers. The first such census in Ejalet Bosna was conducted in 1266 according to the Hijra (1850/1851).

Unlike the identification data in the Ottoman defters (in Eng. diaries) from the earlier period, which usually consist of the name of the person and the name of his father, in these defters, in most cases, the surname (family name) is also stated. That is why this list is a very useful historical source of the first order for researching the demographic structure of the population in the middle of the 19th century genealogy and origin of the population, and land ownership.

1 BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), NFS 05951. Istanbul, p. 481.

2 Name: Čičci is most probably derived from the name of the plant “burdock“, which is abundant in this area.

3 Name: Čičci is most probably derived from the name of the plant “burdock“, which is abundant in this area.

The following is a list of families-houses and male inhabitants of the Gladović settlement:

House No. 1. ⁴

1. Alija (Ibrahim) **Mandžić**. Tall with dark beard. Born in 1790. He is 60 years old. ⁵
2. His brother Medo? (Ibrahim). Tall with dark beard. Born in 1800. He is 50 years old.
3. His son Agan (Alija). Tall with light moustaches. Born in 1825. He is 25 years old.
4. His son Salih (Alija). Medium height with light moustaches. Born in 1828. He is 22 years old.
5. His son Hasan (Alija). Medium height with light moustaches. Born in 1826. He is 24 years old.
6. His nephew Mehmed (Medo). Medium height. Born in 1830. He is 20 years old.
7. His son Jusuf (Alija). Born in 1838.godine. He is 12 years old.
8. His nephew Mustafa (Medo). Born in 1839. He is 11 years old.

The characteristic for this family, in addition to being listed as the first in the settlement, is that two brothers Alija and Medo lived together, most likely Mehmed, aged 60 and 50, and that they had children-sons aged 12 and 11. So, they lived as a large family rural household. It is possible that this was the reason for their reputation and most likely wealth. The family had 8 male and certainly as many female members, which makes a total of 16 household

4 According to the official rules of the then census, the house of a village or street elder, who was usually a mutevelija - in free translation "president of the congregation of the mosque". If the settlement had no mosque, no mutevelija, no imam, which is obviously the case with the Gladovići, then the house of the most prominent resident was listed as the first house, based on some of the criteria such as education, wealth, morality, general local acceptance and respect.

5 According to the criteria from the previous note, Alija Mandžić, the son of Ibrahim, was certainly one of the most prominent inhabitants of the Gladovići settlement. His family house is listed first. At the same time, he was one of the oldest inhabitants of the settlement. He was born in 1790. The only one older in the settlement than Alija was Sulejman Gorko, son of Abdullah, He was born in 1770, whose house was listed under number 21, which means that the number of years did not determine the order of the census. According to Ejub Mandžić, all Mandžićs are from the hamlet of Čičci, which means that the other two Mandžić families, house no. 4 and no. 8. were also, from Čičci. The degree, that is, the knee, of the family ties of these three houses-families of Mandžić has not been determined yet. Most likely, they are close relatives, although it is known for sure that they are not brothers.

members. From conversations (December 13, 2021) with Sabit (1973-) and Ismail (1978-), sons of Ibrahim Mandžić (1945-1995)⁶ and information they possess from the oral tradition, it can be established with great certainty that they are precisely the descendants of this house of Mandžić.

The genealogical line of the Mandžić family looks like this. The oldest known Mandžić is Ibrahim, the year of his birth was probably in the middle of the 18th century. He had two sons: Alija (born 1790-?) and Medo, (1800-?) most likely a hypocrite of Mehmed or Mehmedalija. So, Alija and Mehmed are the second generation. Alija had 4 sons: Agan (1825-?), Hasan (1826-?), Salih (1828-?) and Jusuf (1838-?). We suppose the same number of female children were born. Alija's brother Medo had two sons: Mehmed (1838-), born in the same year as his cousins Jusuf and Mustafa (1839-?). Alija's and Medo's children are Mandžić's third generation. There are no data for the descendants of all the children of Alija and Medo, but from further or newer data from the registry books, birth books, it can be established with certainty that the fourth generation of the Mandžić family, i.e. one of the fourth generation, Ibro Mandžić⁷, father of Juso Mandžić (1890-1945). Juso is a hypocrite of Jusuf and the aforementioned Jusuf (1839-?) was Juso's grandfather. The son of Ibro Mandžić Hakija Mandžić (1921-1977) was the fifth generation of the Mandžić family. The sons of Hakija Mandžić, the aforementioned Ibrahim and Ejub are the sixth generation of the Mandžić family and Sabit (1973-?) and Ismail 1978-?), the sons of Ibrahim were seventh generation and their children eighth. So, well-known, written sources say that the Mandžić family in Gladovići, the hamlet of Čičci, has been continuously inhabited by 8 genealogical generations. The situation is similar with other families. The truth is that due to the crime of genocide, today the people of Gladovići mostly live outside Gladovići. Let us now present the simplest genealogical "lineage" of the family of Ibrahim⁸ Mandžić. Ibrahim Mandžić (the mid-18th century) ---- Alija (Ibrahim) Mandžić (1790 -?) --- Ibro (Ibrahim) (Alija) Mandžić (1825?

6 Ibrahim (Hakija) Mandžić was killed in the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in the war against the Bosnian society and state. His remains are still not found. Ibrahim Mandžić is the brother of abovementioned Ejub Mandžić.

7 The year of birth and death of Ibro (Ibrahim) Mandžić could not be confirmed and he was most probably named after his great-grandfather Ibrahim.

8 Ibrahim is the most dominant male name in the Mandžić family. Only in this family it is mentioned three times.

-?) --- Juso (Jusuf) Mandžić (1890-1949)⁹ --- Hakija¹⁰ (Juso) Mandžić (1921-1977).

The most famous Mandžić whose ancestors are from Gladovići and certainly belong to one of the three houses of Mandžić¹¹ listed here and who moved to the village of Bajramovići was Smajo (Idriz) Mandžić born in 1967. Smajo Mandžić is a hero of the 1992-1995 liberation war. He was awarded the “Golden Lily” Badge and the “Golden Lily with a Golden Wreath” Order. He was a war commander of three brigades in Srebrenica. In addition to all, he is an honest and good man.¹²

House No. 2.

1. Mustafa (Mehmed) **Silajdžić**. Medium height and brown mustaches. He was born in 1820. He is 30 years old.
2. His brother Ibrahim (Mehmed). Medium height and light mustaches. He was born in 1825. He is 25 years old.
3. His brother Rustem (Mehmed). Medium height and light mustaches. He was born in 1830. He is 20 years old.
4. His son Mehmed (Mustafa). He was born in 1847. He is 3 years old.
5. His brother Husejn (Mehmed). A young man born in 1832. He is 18 years old.
6. His brother Atan (Mehmed). He was born in 1842. He is 8 years old.

9 According to Ejub (Hakija) Mandžić, his grandfather Juso graduated from the Gazi Husref Bey's Madrasa in Sarajevo and was an imam at the mosque in Osat. Ejub's father Hakija did not go to the Madrasa but his father taught him. When he was supposed to go to Sarajevo to take the official diploma exams, he gave preference to someone else whom he thought it was more necessary and so he never officially received the diploma.

10 Hakija Mandžić was most likely named after Haki(ja) Effendi Đozić, the son of Kadi Husejn Đozić and Kadira Mandžić from the Mandžić family from Gladovići. According to Ejub Mandžić, he says that it was Haki's father who told him that they had a family in Đozići in Srebrenica. According to Sabit Mandžić, his great-grandfather Juso and grandfather Haki had a sister named Kadira. Also, they say that their father, the late Ibrahim, told them that they had a family in Đozići, but that he could not explain in what capacity they were related. More on marriage of Kadira Mandžić and Kadi Husejn Đozić see in: Adib Đozić, *Đozići iz Srebrenice - Skica za znanstvenu monografiju-*, BAŠTINA Sjeveroistočne Bosne, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla, 2010, No. 1, p. 81-95.

11 Despite a lot of effort, we could not determine exactly which of these three families from Gladovići is the descendant of Smajo Mandžić. We only know that his grandfather moved from Gladovići to Bajramovići and got married there.

12 In the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica, Smajo's father Idriz and three brothers were killed. The surviving two brothers are war invalids.

House No. 3.

1. Hasan (Husejn) **Okanović**. Medium height with grey mustaches. He was born in 1798. He is 52 years old.
2. His son Osman (Hasan). Short with light mustaches. He was born in 1830. He is 20 years old.
3. His son Salih (Hasan). A young man born in 1833. He is 17 years old.
4. His son Mustafa (Hasan)a. He was born in 1849. He is one year old.
5. His son Mahmud (Hasan). He was born in 1843. He is 7 years old.

House No. 4.

1. Mustafa (Mustafa) **Mandžić**. Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1828. He is 22 years old.
2. His brother Mehmed (Mustafa). Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1830. He is 20 years old.
3. His brother Ismail (Mehmed)9. He was born in 1843.¹³ He is 7 years old.
4. His son Sulejman (Mustafa). He was born in 1848. He is 2 years old.

House No. 5.

1. Hasan (Osman) **Kardašević**. Tall with brown mustaches. He was born in 1805. He is 45 years old.
2. His brother Ibrahim (Osman). Tall with brown mustaches. He was born in 1808.¹⁴ He is 42 years old.
3. His brother Mustafa (Osman). Medium height with bron mustaches. He was born in 1815.¹⁵ He is 35 years old.
4. His son Omer (Hasan). He was born in 1838. He is 12 years old.
5. His son Alija (Hasan)9. He was born in 1841. He is 9 yeras old.
6. His son Husejn (Hasan). He was born in 1845. He is 5 years old.
7. His brotherić Ibiš (Ibrahim). He was born in 1841. He is 9 years old.
8. His son Mušan (Hasan). He was born in 1849. He is one year old.
9. His nephew Šaban (Mustafa)9. He was born in 1849. godine. He is one year old.

13 Insight into the land ownership books OZ 8D from 1867, p. 115, original number of the defter 5933, a copy of which is in the Archives of the Tuzla Canton, Ismail inherited from his father Mustafa several fields with a total area around 10 dunums. A total of 7 fields.

14 Insight into the land ownership books OZ 8D from 1867, p. 115, original number of the defter 5933, a copy of which is in the Archives of the Tuzla Canton, Ibrahim inherited from his father Osman 12 fields with a total area of 30 dunums. In the same defter on p. 102, it was recorded that Ibrahim owned five more fields with a total area of 33 dunums.

15 In the same defter Mujo (Mustafa) son of Osman was recorded as the owner of 4 fields with a total area of 12 dunums.

House No. 6.

1. Ibrahim (Husejn) **Buljubašić**. Tall with dark mustaches. He was born in 1794. He is 56 years old.
2. His son Ibiš (Ibrahim). Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1829. He is 21 years old.
3. His son Selim (Ibrahim). He was born in 1835. He is 15 years old.
4. His son Redžo (Ibrahim). He was born in 1845. He is 5 years old.
5. His son Hamid (Ibrahim). He was born in 1840. He is 10 years old.
6. His son Salih (Ibrahim⁹). He was born in 1849. He is one year old.

House No. 7.

1. Mustafa (Mujčin) **Okanović**. Medium height with dark mustaches. He was born in 1817. He is 33 years old.
2. His son Omer (Mustafa⁹). He was born in 1848. He is 2 years old.

House No. 8.

1. Salih (Mehmed) **Mandžić**. Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1825. He is 25 years old.¹⁶
2. His son Mehmed (Salih). He was born in 1849. He is one year old.

House No. 9.

1. Osman (Mustafa) **Karadžić**. Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1790. He is 60 years old.
2. His step-son Ibrahim (Mehmed). Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1825. He is 25 years old.¹⁷

House No. 10.

1. Alija (Husejn) **Hamzić**. Tall with grey beard.¹⁸
2. His neohew Omer (Ahmed). Tall with blond beard. He was born in 1827. He is 23 years old.
3. His son Mustafa (Alija). He was born in 1835. He is 15 years old.
4. His son Mumin (Alija). He was born in 1838. He is 12 years old.
5. His son Salih (Alija).. He was born in 1849. He is one year old.

16 Salih (Mehmed) was registered as the owner of 11 fields that he inherited from his father Mehmed. OZ 8D from 1867, p. 11. Original number of defter 5933, a copy can be found in the Archives of the Tuzla Canton.

17 It was recorded in the note that he was missing in 1850.

18 The year of birth was mistakenly recorded as 1164 according to the Hijra which is 1743.

House No. 11.

1. Jašar (Omer) **Malčić**. Medium height with grey beard. He was born in 1785. He is 65 years old.
2. His son Ferhat (Jašar). Medium height with light mustaches. He was born in 1825.¹⁹ He is 25 years old.
3. His grandson Selim (Ferhat). He was born in 1848. He is 2 years old.
4. His grandson Sulejman (Ferhat). He was born in 1849. He is one year old.

House No. 12.

1. Abdija (Omer) **Malanić**. Medium height with blond mustaches. He was born in 1810. He is 40 years old.

House No. 13.

1. Hasan (Mujčin). A young man of medium height. He was born in 1832. godine. He is 18 years old.

House No. 14.

1. Husejn (Ismail) **Palić**. Medium height with blond mustaches. He was born in 1822. godine. He is 28 years old.

House No. 15.

1. Salih (Alija) **Palić**. A young man of medium height. He was born in 1832. He is 18 years old.

House No. 16.

1. Hašim (Mustafa). Tall with light mustaches. He was born in 1828. He is 22 years old.
2. His brother Muharem (Mustafa). Mladić He was born in 1832. He is 18 years old.

¹⁹ Insight into the land ownership books OZ 8D from 1867, p. 102, original number of the defter 5933, a copy of which is in the Archives of the Tuzla Canton, Ferhat inherited 5 fields with a total area of about 5 dunums from his father Jašar.

House No. 17.

1. Orlica Mehmed (Jašar). Medium height with brown mustaches. He was born in 1800. He is 50 years old.
2. His son Ahmed (Mehmed). Medium height with brown mustaches. He was born in 1820. He is 30 years old.
3. His grandson Osman (Ahmed). He was born in 1849. He is one year old.

House No. 18.

1. Sulejman (Mehmed) **Havkić**. Medium height with blond mustaches. He was born in 1806. He is 44 years old.
2. His son Mehmed (Sulejman). Medium height with light mustaches. He was born in 1825.²⁰ He is 25 years old.
3. His grandson Ramazan (Mehmed). He was born in 1848. He is 2 years old.

House No. 19.

1. Abdija (Hasan). Medium height with brown mustaches. He was born in 1812. He is 38 years old.²¹
2. His son Hasan (Abdija). He was born in 1846. He is 4 years old.
3. His brother Mustafa (Abdija). Medium height with brown mustaches. He was born in 1815. He is 35 years old.²²

House No. 20.

1. Salih (Kadrija). Tall with dark mustaches. He was born in 1815. He is 35 years old.
2. His step-father Husejn (Abdija). Medium height with grey mustaches. He was born in 1795. He is 55 years old.
3. His brother Osman (Kadrija). Tall with dark mustaches. He was born in 1820. He is 30 years old.
4. His brother Mustafa (Kadrija). Tall with dark mustaches. He was born in 1825. He is 25 years old.²³

20 Insight into the land ownership books OZ 8D from 1867, p. 101, original number of the defter 5933, a copy of which is in the Archives of the Tuzla Canton, 5 fields with a total area of about 15 dunums was registered to Mehmed son of Sulejman.

21 Abdija inherited from his father Hasan several fields in Gladovići. OZ 8D from 1867, p. 2. original number of deftera 5933, a copy can be found in the Archives of the tuzla Canton.

22 It is mistakenly written that Mustafa is Hasan's son.

23 It is written in the note that he is in the army

5. His brother Abdija (Kadrija). A tall young man. He was born in 1830. He is 20 years old.
6. His son Rustem (Salih). He was born in 1844. He is 6 years old.

House No. 21.

1. Sulejman Gorko (Abdulah). Medium height with grey beard. He was born in 1770. He is 80 years old.
2. His son Sulejman (Sulejman). Medium height with some mustaches. He was born in 1825. He is 25 years old.
3. His grandson Mustafa (Sulejman). He was born in 1847. He is 3 years old.
4. His nephew Alija (Agan). He was born in 1846. He is 4 years old.

House No. 22.

1. Ibiš (Kadrija). Tall with grey beard. He was born in 1800. He is 50 years old.
2. His step-son Hasan (Mustafa). Medium height with dark mustaches. He was born in 1823. He is 27 years old.
3. His step-son Ibrahim (Mustafa). Medium height with light mustaches. He was born in 1828. He is 22 years old.
4. His step-son's son Mustafa (Hasan). He was born in 1849. He is one year old.

House No. 23.

1. Adem (Kadrija) **Kadrić**. Tall with grey mustaches. He was born in 1800. He is 50 years old.
2. His son Adil (Adem). He was born in 1845. He is 5 years old.

House No. 24.

1. Sulejman (Kadrija). Tall with blon mustaches. He was born in 1810.²⁴ He is 40 years old.
2. His helper Hasan (Hasan). Medium height. He was born in 1830. He is 20 years old.

²⁴ This Sulejman had no male heirs and in 1867 his daughter Emina Hatun inherited 16 fields with a total area of about 60 dunums, OZ 8D, p. 117. On page 105 of the same defter, 7 more fields with a total area of about 70 dunums were registered on Emina's name. If we observe the 19th century in the context of the suffering of the population of this part of the Bosnian eyalet due to wars, diseases and uprisings against the Ottoman administration, we can say that this settlement at the time of the census was a medium-sized settlement.

Conclusion:

The settlement of Gladovići, in the municipality of Srebrenica, belongs to the old settlements. Based on the Ottoman census of 1850/51, 24 houses and 24 families were registered. A total of 85 male residents, ranging in age from one to 80, were enumerated. If we add to that number the approximate number of women, which is not included in the census, we get a number of about 170 inhabitants. Of the total male population, 42 were able-bodied, 28 minors, 14 elderly and 1 was in the army. We can say that this settlement was a medium-sized settlement at the time of the census. The average number of male members per family was 3.55 members. If the same number of female members is added, on average, just over 7 household members lived in the family. The most numerous family are the Mandžićs with three houses/families. The house with the most male members of the household belonged to Hasan Kardašević with 9 members. The characteristic of many families is the fact that the household consisted of two brothers with children and women. Such households numbered a total of 18 to 20 members. Four families were single. One family had no male members while the other family had male members, a total of 3, all step-children. When it comes to the anthropological and physical characteristics of the male population, all of them were tall and medium height. No short men were recorded at all. That is also one of the characteristics of the Gladovići settlement.

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IN MEMORIAM

MEMORY: TWENTY-FOUR WOUNDS OF THE MOTHERS FROM THE ZUKIĆ FAMILY: FATA, ZAHA, MUNIRA, KADA, ŠIDA, RASEMA AND HAJRA

Introduction

In the last three issues of “Monumenta”, we remembered the mothers of the martyrs of Srebrenica and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Hatidža Mehmedović, Begija Malagić, Ajša Dozić, the daughters of Havka Bektić: Kadira, Zehra, Zehta and Fatima, whose sons, husband’s grandchildren, brothers and many other relatives were killed in the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in the war against Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995. This is indisputable evidence of genocide. There are many mothers from Srebrenica to whom the criminals in the deliberate crime of genocide killed three generations of male family members: father, sons and grandchildren. In the above examples of mothers and in previous issues, this genocidal fact has been proved with arguments. Through the analysis of the facts about the memories of the mothers of the victims of genocide, we come to two, in our opinion, very important scientific questions that need to be explicitly investigated. It is a crime against a mother and a child¹ and a crime against a family in genocide. It is necessary to make a comprehensive scientific research project on the crime against the Bosniak family, not only in the last genocide against Bosniaks, but also in all the previous ones. By analyzing the examples known so far, as a rule, two and three generations of male family members were killed in genocide. There are many cases of examples where four generations were killed, as is the case of Fata Zukić’s family from the village of Karačići. Also, there are a large number of murders of all family members, so they have completely disappeared physically. They should not disappear from the Bosniak collective memory, for the sake of all the families of the world and all the children of the world. That is why this type of scientific research has two social and scientific justifications and an urgent need. In order to fully understand the magnitude of the genocidal suffering of the Bosniak family, not

1 More on crime against a mother and a child in: A. Dozić, *Majka i dijete u zločinu genocida nad Bošnjacima*, Monumenta Srebrenica, No. 10, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2021, p. 91-130.

only in Srebrenica, but in general, it is necessary to investigate the genocidal suffering not only in the direct vertical line, i.e. the parents' children, but also in the "lateral" line, i.e. the suffering of members of siblings, that is, brothers and sisters, because they represent the closest blood-related content of the family. In the last issue of "Monumenta", in the case of the genocidal suffering of Havka Bektić's daughters, i.e. sisters, we determined that 22 of their closest family members were killed in the crime of genocide in 1995: sons, husbands, brothers, grandchildren, cousins.² This time, we will deal with the analysis of the genocidal suffering of mothers from the Zukić family, who married from different families into the Zukić family, more specifically, the descendants of Ibrahim Zukić, who he had with his wives Fata and Zaha.³

The ZUKIĆ family and its mothers

In the village of Karačići, the hamlet of Greben, the hard-working host Ibrahim (Suljo) Zukić (1904-1957) was born, lived, worked and moved to the hereafter.⁴ He married twice and had children with both women. His first wife was Fata, née Hasić (1908-1943) from the village of Dedići. With Ibrahim, she gave birth to three sons: Alija (1941-1995), Husejn (1932-1995) and Bego. She died in childbirth in 1943. After the Second World War, Ibrahim married Zaha, née Čamdžić (1927-1991) from Karačići.⁵ Zaha and Ibrahim had two sons, Ramo (1950-1995) and Šaban (1954-). We will follow the genocidal suffering of the members of the Zukić family through two genealogical lines⁶: Fata's and Zaha's, because their children are brothers by father.

- 2 For a more explicit investigation of the crime of genocide against Bosniaks, it is necessary to continue research on the following research topics: A mother and a child in the crime of genocide, genocidal suffering of Bosniak families with separate projects of suffering of sisters and brothers, and generational genocidal suffering of male family members. These research topics are also the most explicit proof that the murders were committed as a crime of genocide.
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- 4 We see that Ibrahim had a relatively short lifespan, he died when he was 53 years old, but his father Suljo (Bego) Zukić lived 97 years.
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The Zukić family before genocide

FATA ZUKIĆ, née Hasić (1908-1943), as we already stated, had three sons with Ibrahim Zukić. In the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica in July 1995, her sons Alija and Husejn were killed. In addition to her sons, her grandsons: Hajrudin, Fikret, Izet and Zurijet, Husejn's sons, were also killed. The fifth grandson of mother Fata who was killed in the crime of genocide was Senahid Zukić (1968-1995), a son of Alija. Senahid's mother was KADA ZUKIĆ, née Mehić (1945-). Mother Kada experienced that her husband Alija and son Senahid were killed, that is two generations – a father and a son. More data on these martyrs from Srebrenica will be given in the next chapter on mother Munira's, a wife of Husejn, incurable wounds. The example of mother Fata Zukić testifies to the fact that four genealogical generations, or, to put it popularly, four generations of male family members were killed in the crime of genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica in the war against the Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995. In addition to the sons Husejn and Alija, Fata's grandchildren were killed: Hajrudin, Fikret, Izet, Zurijet, the sons of Husejn and Senahid's son Alija. In addition to Fata's sons and grandsons, a great-grandson was killed: Fahrudin (1976-1995), the son of Sulejman Zukić, a.k.a. Fadil, Fata's only grandson, Husejn's son, who survived the crime of genocide.

MUNIRA (Ibro) ZUKIĆ, née Izmirlić (1934-2001), in a happy marriage with Husejn Zukić, gave birth to five sons: Hajrudin, Fikret, Izet, Zurijet and

Sulejman, a.k.a. Fadil. She had no idea that in the crime of genocide, criminals would kill her husband Husejn and four sons, grandson Fahrudin, that is, three generations of male descendants. To make the tragedy and pain of mother Munira greater, the criminals complete by killing her brothers: Hasib (Ibro) Izmirlić (1936-1995) and Ismet (Ibro) Izmirlić (1938-1995) and her nephews: Ekrem (Ismet) Izmirlić (1963- 1995), Hazret (Hasib) Izmirlić (1964-- 1995) and Hazim (Hasib) Izmirlić (1965-1995). In the crime of genocide, mother Munira also lost in Srebrenica in 1995 a mother Šaha (Salih) Izmirlić (1898-1995), aged 97. Let us now look at the basic information about Munira's husband and sons, victims of genocide and Munira's "severe wounds" that she took with her to the grave.




Munira Zukić

Her husband Husejn, son of Ibrahim and Fata (1932-1995) is still not buried in the Martyrs' Cemetery Potočari because a very small part of his remains was found.



Husejn Zukić

Hajrudin (Husejn) Zukić, Munira's eldest son (1958-1995), was a car-mechanic and worked in „Srebrenicaremont“ before the war against the Bosnian society and state from 1992 to 1995. His remains are still not found. Hajrudin was married to Mirsada née Mehić and they had two daughters: Šejla and Mersa. Šejla got married and lives with her husband in Italy and Mersa lives in Germany.



Hajrudin Zukić with his wife Mirsada and daughter Šejla

Fikret (Husejn) Zukić, Munira's second son (1962-1995) was a construction worker and worked in Bajina Bašta. Fikret had three children with his wife Sabaheta Muminović from Raošići: a daughter Samila who lives in France today and sons: Samedin and Ekrem. Ekrem lives in Germany and Samedin lives in the Netherlands.

Izet (Husejn) Zukić, (1966-1995) was the third Munira's son killed in the crime of genocide. He was married to Mejra Hasanović, a.k.a. Šehada, from a village Buće near Kutuzero. They had two sons: Mirnes and Mirza. Today, Mirnes lives in France and Mirza lives in Čapljina.

Zurijet Zukić was Munira's fourth son killed in the 1995 genocide. He was a farmer and had his own farm before the aggression on Bosnia and

Herzegovina. He was married to Hurija Alemić from the village of Kutuzero and had two children, twins: a son Aldin and a daughter Aldina, who were born during the war in sieged Srebrenica. They both live abroad.

From the data analyzed we see that all of the children of killed brothers Zukić do not live in Srebrenica and Bosnia and Herzegovina except for Mirza (Izet) Zukić who lives in Čapljina. They all live in the western Europe. Inability of survivors of the genocide in Srebrenica to return to the place of their parents' birth is a direct consequence of the genocide against Bosniaks, not only in Srebrenica, but in all other places in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The youngest son of mother Munira, Sulejman (Husejn) Zukić, a.k.a. Fadil (1954-) is the only survivor of the genocide but unfortunately his son Fahrudin did not survive, and he was a son of Rasema and a grandson of mother Munira, and a great-grandson of Fata Zukić. Sulejman returned to Greben together with his wife Rasema, renewed his house, cleared his estate, raised an orchard and is successfully engaged in beekeeping.



Sulejman Zukić

In Fata's genealogical line, there is, in addition to Munira, another grieving mother Zukić, whose son was killed. It is a mother of Fahrudin (Sulejman) Zukić (1976-1995) and Sulejman's wife, Rasema.



Rasema Zukić

RASEMA (Selmo) ZUKIĆ née Smajlović (1956-) from the village of Peći had two sons in a marriage with Sulejman, a.k.a. Fadil: Fahrudin (1976-1995) and Faruk (1978-). After the occupation of Srebrenica by the Army and Police of Republika Srpska, Fahrudin was hiding in Srebrenica's forests and destroyed houses and crossed into the Republic of Serbia and surrendered to the Serbian police. After some time in the camps in Serbia, the Serbian police handed him over to the Republika Srpska police. It is known that he was in a camp in Višegrad. Fahrudin's remains were found in the bed of Lake Perućac after it was emptied in 2010 and he was buried in the Cemetery in Potočari. Mother Rasema also lost her maternal half-brothers: Nedim (Bekto) Mandžić (1963-1995), Hedib (Bekto) Mandžić (1963-1995), Nurija (Bekto) Mandžić (1969-1995). Nurija's and Hedib's remains are still not found. It is known with certainty that Nurija was detained in the Višegrad camp.



Fahrudin Zukić

Now, let us look at the victims of the genocide from the Zukić family, which refers to the genealogical line of mother Zaha.

ZAHA (Juso) ZUKIĆ, née Čamdžić (1927-1991) from Karačići was a second wife of Ibrahim Zukić and a mother of Ramo (Ibrahim) Zukić (1950-1995) and a grandmother of Jasmin (Ramo) Zukić (1978-1995) and Senad (Ramo) Zukić (1980-1995). Zaha had two sons with Ibrahim Zukić: Ramo and Šaban (1954-) because Ibrahim died in 1957. In the crime of genocide Šaban's son Šefik, Zaha's grandson and a son of mother Hajra Zukić, née Salkić, was killed. HAJRA ZUKIĆ, (1958-) is the seventh mother from the Zukić family whose son was killed in the crime of genocide.

After Srebrenica was occupied in July 1995 by the Army of the Republic of Serbia, Ramo (Ibrahim) Zukić (1950-1995) decided with his sons Jasmin and Senad not to go "through the forest" but to go to the UNPROFOR Base in Potočari hoping that international peacekeepers would protect them since Srebrenica was the "UN Safe Zone" However, it was a huge misconception. On the contrary, unarmed Bosniak civilians were "at the disposal" of the criminals. Ramo and his son Jasmin were slaughtered right there in the area

that was allegedly under the control of the International peacekeepers. Bida Latifović from a village of Sase is a witness who saw with her own eyes slaughtered Ramo Zukić and his son Jasmin. Ramo's remains were found in a mass grave in Dugo Polje and buried in the Memorial Cemetery in Potočari. Thus, mother Zaha's son and two grandsons, Ramo's sons, were killed.



Ramo Zukić

There is another grieving mother Zukić in Zaha's genealogical line. It is Šida, Zaha's daughter-in-law, Ramo's wife and the mother of the murdered sons Jasmin and Senad.

ŠIDA (Omer) ZUKIĆ, née Mehić (1956-) comes from a village of Dimnići. She was married to Ramo (Ibrahim) Zukić and had two sons: Jasmin and Senad, and two daughters: Faketa (1974-1975) and Sevdina (1976-). She hoped that her sons would grow up, get married and have children and build their own houses. Unfortunately, it never happened. The criminals killed not only her husband Ramo, but both her minor sons, Jasmin was 17 and Senad was 15.



Šida Zukić

Jasmin (Ramo) Zukić, (1978-1995). As we pointed out above, according to Bida Latifović from Sase, he was seen “slaughtered by the water” where the detainees went either to drink water or to bring it to the sick and infirm. Jasmin’s remains were found in a mass grave in Dugo Polje, local community Potočari. He was buried in the cemetery of the Memorial Center. The remains of Jasmin’s father Ramo were found in the same mass grave, which confirms the fact that they were killed, or slaughtered, in Potočari.



Jasmin Zukić

Senad (Ramo) Zukić, (1980-1995), a fifteen-year-old boy, at the very beginning of his youth, experienced a fate that no normal person would wish to anyone. Nothing is sacred to the criminal, not even a child's life.⁷ They interrupted his life, for no reason, took from mother Šida a smile and joy and brought pain and sorrow. It is difficult for the human mind to comprehend, let alone explain, the killing of helpless children who not only did not think anything bad of anyone but also did not do anything bad to anyone. The remains of Senad Zukić were found in the Pilica mass grave and buried in the martyr's cemetery of the Memorial Center in Potočari. May mercy be upon the innocent Senad's soul and the souls of all innocently killed boys and other helpless Bosniak civilians.




Senad Zukić

⁷ Many Serbs accused of crimes in Srebrenica, among others, testify to the genocidal intent, a conscious and organized crime of genocide by the political and military leadership of the Republika Srpska. Vaso Todorović, charged with crimes against humanity in Srebrenica, told the court of Bosnia and Herzegovina that “in July 1995, Rade Čuturać gave them an order that we must all go to Srebrenica to kill Bosniaks.” They were told that all able-bodied men had to be “solved in a quick procedure, i.e., killed”, which means whether they were civilians or soldiers, minors or adults. About those who were killed, and they were captured Bosniaks who surrendered voluntarily, Vaso Todorović says: “None of them had weapons, nor did we find weapons with any of the prisoners, only some of them had military pants. The people in the columns were hungry, thirsty, tortured, and there were wounded.” “We were ordered to kill all the men, “NEZAVISNE, October 16, 2008, p. 5.


Mother Šida Zukić in addition to her husband and sons lost two nephews (from her brothers) and a nephew (from her sister) in the crime of genocide.

Ahmo (Ševko) Mehić's, (1973-1995), remains were found and buried in the cemetery in the Memorial Center.



Ahmo Mehić

Kemal (Ševko) Mehić, (1978-1995). The minor Kemal's remains were found and buried in the cemetery in the Memorial Center in Potočari.



Kemal Mehić

Mother Šida had a sister named Šehra who was married to Aljo Jusufović from Karačići. Šehra had the same destiny. Šehra's husband Aljo got killed in 1992 while defending his house, family and state and son Fahir Jusufović (1976-1995) was killed in July 1995. Fahir's remains were found and buried in the cemetery in the Memorial Center in Potočari. Šida's daughter Sevdina (1976-) is happily married to Nermin (Daut) Latifović (1972-), from Sase near Srebrenica. They have two children: a son Sanel (1994-) and a daughter Jasmina (1998-). They live in Podlugovi, the municipality of Ilijaš.

Conclusion

The magnitude and scale of the genocidal suffering of Bosniaks cannot be expressed only in individual deaths, which are the most important evidence, but the generational dimensions of the genocidal crime must be emphasized. In addition to the generational "width" of genocidal crime, which represents the vertical line of family suffering (grandfather, father, grandchildren, great-grandchildren) on the example of mothers from the Zukić family, we see the "lateral" relative "width" of genocidal suffering and it refers to brothers and nephews from their side, as well as sisters and nephews from their side.

One of the most striking examples of the genocidal suffering of the Bosniak family in the 1992-1995 war against Bosnian society and state, or more precisely in July 1995 in Srebrenica, as the final act of the genocide that began, the court-proven verdict in Doboj in 1992⁸ and the scientifically verified genocide of Bosniaks in Prijedor Kozarac⁹ and its surroundings,

8 See more in:

- Dž. Mahmutović, M. Mahmutović, *Prva presuda za genocid u Evropi poslije Drugog svjetskog rata*, Monumanta Srebrenica, Book 2, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2013, p. 129-157.

- V. Gurda, *Procesuiranje genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini pred međunarodnim, domaćim i inostranim sudovima*, Monumanta Srebrenica, Book 4, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2015, p. 35-68.

9 See more in:

- Dž. Mahmutović, M. Mahmutović, *Prva presuda za genocid u Evropi poslije Drugog svjetskog rata*, Monumanta Srebrenica, Book 2, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2013, p. 129-157.

- V. Gurda, *Procesuiranje genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini pred međunarodnim, domaćim i inostranim sudovima*, Monumanta Srebrenica, Book 4, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2015,

is the genocidal suffering of the Bosniak family Zukić from the village of Karačići. On the example of mothers from the Zukić family from Karačići, whose 24 closest family members were killed in the crime of genocide (mother, husbands, sons, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, brothers, sisters, nephews), we know and prove that three generations of male members of families were killed in the genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica. In the case of mothers from the Zukić family, we prove that the genocidal murder of family members was committed on two and three generations of all female family members, such as mothers and daughters, but also mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. The mothers Fata and Zaha Zukić were the mothers-in-law of the other mothers of the Zukić family¹⁰, and to all of them the closest family members from one to four genealogical generations were killed. In the case of mother Hajra one generation, a son was killed. In the case of mother Fata Zukić, four generations were killed because her two great-grandchildren were also killed.

According to the number of killed family members of mothers from the Zukić family, the characteristic examples of mothers are Munira and Šida. A total of 12 family members of mother Munira was killed: mother Šaha, husband Husejn, sons: Hajrudin, Fikret, Izet and Zurijet, grandson Fahrudin, brothers Ismet and Šaban Izmirlić, and nephews (from brothers' side): Ekrem, Hazret and Hazim. So 3 generations of male descendants were killed. Since Munira is the daughter-in-law of mother Fata Zukić, that is, Fata is Munira's mother-in-law, with the same pain and wounds and the same family members, the difference is only one generation higher, nana Fata also lost them. Mother Šida, who is in the genealogical line with mother Zaha, had 6 family members killed: a husband Ramo, sons Jasmin and Senad, nephews (from her brothers' side) Ahmo and Kemal Mehić and a nephew (from her sister's side) Faris Jusufović. Two mothers, 18 members killed. Any comment on this fact is superfluous, except for the statement and proof that it is GENOCIDE.

p. 35-68.

¹⁰ See more in:

- Dž. Mahmutović, M. Mahmutović, *Prva presuda za genocid u Evropi poslije Drugog svjetskog rata*, Monumanta Srebrenica, Book 2, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2013, p. 129-157.

- V. Gurda, *Procesuiranje genocida u Bosni i Hercegovini pred međunarodnim, domaćim i inostranim sudovima*, Monumanta Srebrenica, Book 4, JU Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog naslijeđa Tuzlanskog kantona, Tuzla-Srebrenica, 2015, p. 35-68.